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1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Questions regarding conceptions of originality have always occupied 
great minds. From Plato to Baudrillard or Deleuze, philosophers have 
engaged in exploring the ontological sphere of originality in the first place 
and from there set out to investigate into related but traditionally 
antagonistic notions such as the copy, the fake or the simulacrum. 
The present analysis departs from various basic understandings of 
originality, which cannot necessarily be ascribed to specific philosophic 
traditions, but rather derive from the term’s etymological basis itself, i.e. 
the latin noun origo denoting origin, beginning or source. However, 
recurrent will be a triple focus in relation to specifically postmodern 
approaches to origins and originality. One approach will concentrate on 
epistemological questions, another will deal with sociocultural aspects 
while a third approach will aim at an aesthetic discussion of the central 
themes. 
On the social level more than on the artistic, the quest for origins can 
be labelled as an anthropological constant. Questions such as ‘where do 
we/I come from’, i.e. the pursuit of clearly definable roots, delineates an 
integral part of both collective as well as individual identity. Yet, the need 
for origins in art, in terms of creative originality, is a concept, which 
gained importance only relatively recently, in the Romantic period. Thus, 
with regard to the history of art, originality as an aesthetic prerequisite for 
artistic processes is not one of the concepts looking back on a long 
tradition. In fact, the contrary is the case: throughout centuries the 
Aristotelian teachings of imitation constituted the standard of artistic 
production.  
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The relative authority the concept of origin and artistic originality 
assumes today in a conventional humanistic interpretation derives from 
the idea of the beginning, of purity and of authenticity attributed to the 
original. The original comes first and everything else can only be 
secondary - within a temporal frame as well as in terms of value. The 
myth of the origin as a state of absolute truth and purity is one of the 
dominant orthodoxies of enlightened epistemology. Implicitly, the original 
conveys the message of being as close as it gets to reality. Thus, in 
humanity’s preoccupation with coherence, in its obsession with reality 
and in its hunt for ‘the real thing’, a privileged position is offered to the 
assumed original and its creator, as it is, for instance, the authority of the 
author in the literary field.  
Originality in the sense of creativity, the faculty of bringing into the 
world what has not existed before, is estimated highly in an information 
culture which increasingly sees itself confronted with the difficulty to 
distinguish between the supposedly true and false, original and fake or 
reality and simulation. Nevertheless, another interpretation, which has 
had to come a long way to deserve the attribute ‘common’ and probably 
the one to suit contemporary experience of reality best, is the conception 
of originality in terms of unusual approaches to things which already 
exist. Hence, it can be argued that an unorthodox choice of 
combinations, the exhibition of unexpected relations, but simultaneously 
also the deconstruction of supposed entities, represent the project of 
originality in the postmodern era. 
Postmodern approaches to originality rely on deconstructionist 
analyses of traditional dichotomies and logocentric ‘universals’ 
introduced by poststructuralism. The perception of the world as 
structured by the principle of binary oppositions such as good versus 
evil, reality versus fantasy, truth versus lie, relative versus absolute and 
also genuine versus fake cannot straightforwardly be rejected, as it offers 
a broad frame within which to organise meaning. However, the problem 
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arising from this understanding originates in the interpretation of 
dichotomies as “mutually exclusive: x and not-x” (Ruthven, 64). 
Contemporary theory cannot work with assumptions based on the 
principle of either-or (cf. Ruthven, 66) anymore. Instead, “[t]he analytic 
ideal of mutual exclusivity degenerates in practice into interdependency, 
and notoriously in the distinction between ‘self’ and ‘other’, where each is 
so implicated in the other as to be compromised by it” (Ruthven, 64). 
Jacques Derrida and later also Gilles Deleuze, both influential French 
philosophers, are only two of the names to be mentioned, when it comes 
to the deconstruction of given ‘essentials’.  
Deleuze’s specific relevance for this paper can be justified by his 
theory of differentiation (cf. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition), which 
does no longer rely on binary oppositions, i.e. ‘either-this-or-that’, 
irrefutably caught in a dialectics of negation. Rather, he concentrates on 
the potential of inclusion, i.e. ‘this-and-that’. Differentiation by means of 
inclusion has brought into play a new dimension of negotiating 
difference. Deleuze, arguing plurality and a positive interpretation of 
simulacrum, copy, and related concepts as emancipated from the 
original and thus entities in their own right, does not only in this respect 
collide with Jean Baudrillard’s more popular but also more criticised 
theory of the simulacrum. 
Hard to position – if at all, then on the margins of postmodernism –  
French sociologist and cultural critic Jean Baudrillard denies 
contemporary experience any access to originality in terms of real 
experience. His highly controversial theory about simulation and 
simulacra (cf. Baudrillard, Simulacra) claims that in our age of 
information and mass media the principle of reality has been eroded and 
that we are only able to perceive the world mediated through simulacra 
of the real.  
Following Baudrillard, which means in conflict with postmodern 
theory and Deleuze, however, a positive revaluation of the fake or 
simulacrum can hardly be possible, due to the fact that along his line of 
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argumentation the simulacrum does not imply a potential enrichment of 
culture but rather the danger of culture being absorbed by it, leaving 
nothing but the simulacrum itself. In this context it seems legitimate to 
appropriate Pearson’s words: while Deleuze has been named “the 
difference engineer” (Pearson, Deleuze and Philosophy), Baudrillard’s 
label could only be the indifference engineer.  
The simulacrum and its complex relationship to original, truth, reality 
and – not to forget – art proves to be a pivotal characteristic of 
postmodern experience. Thus, three postmodern novels, each of them 
written within the last three decades, have offered themselves for an 
analysis of both explicit and implicit thematisations of the simulacrum. On 
the 1998 Booker Prize shortlist, Julian Barnes’ novel England, England 
sets into the centre of its satirical narration the enterprise of creating an 
alternative and condensed version of England on the Isle of Wight. It is 
media mogul Sir Pitman’s successful venture to create the simulacrum of 
England, an unfaithful copy that is finally preferred to the original. Barnes 
especially plays with the exhibition of memory both private and public as 
mere constructs. The ironic deconstruction of history, the laying bare of 
threads that bring about the creation of national identity and the quest for 
a possible authentic personal identity within the all-devouring simulacrum 
of England, England are only some of the focal aspects of Barnes’ turn-
of-the-millennium text. 
Chatterton, written by Peter Ackroyd in 1987, was also shortlisted for 
the Booker Prize. In this historiographic metafictional novel Peter 
Ackroyd investigates into life and death of the historical Thomas 
Chatterton, the 18th century forger of the supposedly medieval Rowley 
Poems. Ackroyd intertwines three different narrative strands each to be 
located in a different era, 18th, 19th and 20th century, respectively. The 
deconstruction of a linear conception of historical development is only 
one of numerous characteristics shared between England, England and 
Chatterton. Chatterton, however, chooses a more technical approach to 
tackle the idea of simulacra or the construction of originality. By setting 
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the scene in the sphere of art, and more precisely in that of art 
production, Ackroyd directly approaches the big issue of the relation 
between art and reality and focuses on sensitive questions concerning 
the value of the original and the possibility of ever regaining something 
real. Chatterton offers a postmodern revaluation of stigmatised forms of 
artistic production such as forgery and plagiarism. 
The motif of literary forgery links Ackroyd’s Chatterton with the third 
text analysed, i.e. Peter Carey’s novel My Life as a Fake, published in 
2002. Also pertaining to the genre of historiographic metafiction, My Life 
as a Fake departs from a historical scandal, which perturbed the 
Australian literary system in the middle of the 20th century, known as the 
‘Ern Malley Hoax’. Carey shapes the fictional forger Chubb and his 
created-poet-come-to-life McCorkle and interweaves Chubb’s fate with 
the historic records. The simulacrum of McCorkle and his extraordinary 
poetry do not only state the question of how reality and art relate, but 
also – and more prominently – it centres on the dialectics of relative 
dependence and independence which governs the interaction between 
the supposed original Chubb and his simulacrum Mc Corkle. 
The conscious conception of the simulacrum as a means of 
experimenting with social and cultural phenomena provides the common 
ground for the analysis of the three novels. Their affinity to or ironisation 
of postmodern theory, their tackling of contemporary problems of 
representation and the always topical thematisation of the connection 
between art and reality form core aspects of this study. 
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2 
THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS ON 
POSTMODERN CONCEPTIONS OF ORIGINALITY 
 
 
2.1) DEFINING A POSTMODERN FRAME 
 
Quite casually, David Bate sums up: “What went out of the window 
with postmodernism was the idea of originality” (Bate). Of course, this 
catchy statement demands concretisation. In her important study The 
Poetics of Postmodernism Linda Hutcheon offers a wide frame for 
approaching postmodern thought. She argues that postmodernism is 
characterised best by its intrinsic qualities of paradox and contradiction. 
“[P]ostmodernism is a contradictory phenomenon, one that uses and 
abuses, installs and then subverts the very concepts it challenges” 
(Hutcheon, Poetics, 3). Thus, it cannot be substantiated that 
postmodernism completely rejects originality as such. Instead, it focuses 
on a redefinition of the concept to make it fit contemporary cultural 
experience.  
A redefinition of originality in a postmodern sense corresponds to a 
deconstruction of the logocentric universals enlightened epistemology is 
based on, that is truth, transparency and also origin. As Jacques Derrida 
and other representatives of poststructuralist theory suggest, Western 
rational thought intrinsically relies on hierarchic dichotomous structures 
that depart from the assumption of a metaphysical unity between the 
word, i.e. logos, and its stable and transcendental meaning. 
Deconstructionism, then, provides postmodern theory with the tools to 
enrich the all-embracing unity of humanistic knowledge with a potentially 
emancipatory concept of plural meaning.  
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The grand narratives of enlightenment thought, which rest on 
stability and coherence, have lost their value or, at least, their 
applicability. This crisis was first certified by Jean-François Lyotard, one 
of the eminent figures of postmodernism, in The Postmodern Condition 
(1979). Not as linear, causal, and objective does the world present itself 
but rather as provisional, fragmented and subjective (cf. Mayer, 543, 
Reese-Schäfer, 410-411). As a consequence, postmodern theory and 
art are challenged to develop new forms of representation in order to 
reflect this crisis. 
 Already a decade prior to Lyotard, the deconstruction of traditional 
conceptions of originality was thematised by Roland Barthes in his 
influential essay Death of the Author (1968). Barthes rejects the ideas of 
authority and originality conventionally attributed to the author as creator 
of a unique piece of art and, thus, argues for a shift of power from author 
to recipient. Authorship, in fact, is not a quality carrying the weight of 
originality, as author and text are only to be regarded as what Barthes 
called “echo chamber” (Barthes) of already existing texts. The 
importance of the author recedes analogously to the fading value of the 
original.  
 
We know now that a text consists not of a line of words, releasing a 
single ‘theological’ meaning (the ‘message’ of the Author-God), but 
of a multi-dimensional space in which are married and contested 
several writings, none of which is original: the text is a tissue of 
citations, resulting from the thousand sources of culture. (Barthes) 
 
Apart from Barthes, also Gerard Genette and Julia Kristeva have 
worked on theories dedicated to the inevitable interdependence of all 
texts, i.e. intertextuality, which has come to be one of the key concepts in 
postmodern thought. Kristeva’s understanding of intertextuality 
comprehends the text as a “mosaïque de citations” (Kristeva, 85). There 
is nothing new in the traditional sense. However, thanks to 
deconstruction, new dimensions for innovative combinations have proved 
themselves productive. In Literature of Exhaustion (1977) John Barth 
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claims that it has become impossible to create new, that is original 
literature as “literature has used up all its possibilities” (Stark, 9). 
Consequently, instead of resigning, artists should appropriate existing 
elements by recycling them in order to display the ludic function of 
postmodernist literature (cf. Barth, 70-83). The value traditionally ascribed 
to originality has shifted to different modes of expression or literary 
composition, which results in a strong focus on reference, pastiche, 
quotation, parody etc. “In essence then ‘postmodernism’ was the name 
given to these phenomena of ‘new’ representations coming into existence 
by more or less explicit reference to other representations, not to any first 
order or reality” (Bate).  
These new representations question “any totalizing or 
homogenizing system” (Hutcheon, Poetics, 11). Their power resides in 
“provisionality and heterogeneity [which] contaminate any neat attempts 
at unifying coherence (formal or thematic)” (Hutcheon, Poetics, 11). This 
provisionality also challenges conventional conceptions of history and 
historical facts and, hence, to a certain extent, they can be set in relation 
to postmodernism’s fascination with history. Postmodern accounts of 
history do not believe in unified, teleological representations, but rather, 
grasp history or the past as accessible through text only. In this sense, if 
history is perceived as a textual construct, it shares a common basis with 
fiction, that is, the narrative element. This connection and the 
consequent appropriation of historiographic metafiction as a means for 
representing postmodern experience is analysed lucidly by Hutcheon (cf. 
Hutcheon, Poetics). 
According to Hutcheon, postmodernism’s radical questioning of 
enlightened epistemology cannot be accounted for as a “new paradigm 
[…]. It has not replaced liberal humanism, even if it has seriously 
challenged it” (Hutcheon, Poetics, 4). As radical as subversive forms of 
the postmodern may be, liberal humanism cannot be discarded 
completely, because it involuntarily provides the premise, the platform 
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for postmodern ideas to develop, that is postmodern thought intrinsically 
depends on the very framework it seeks to subvert.  
If one takes into account that Western enlightened thought is based 
on dichotomies, i.e. on the strict delineation of concepts and their 
assumed opposites, it can be argued that one of these central 
dichotomies is formed by the supposedly antagonistic pair of origo and 
telos. Whereas the idea of the origin points backwards to a presumed 
prime moment of absolute purity, telos is directed towards the future and 
relies on the ideas of progress, purpose and final goal. Both these 
concepts are contested in postmodern ways of thinking. While the 
concept of origin is deconstructed as being inaccessible, the belief in a 
progressive development of, for instance, history, is equally questioned 
as one of enlightenment’s logocentric axioms.  
The above considerations all pertain to what Amy J. Elias delineates 
as epistemological postmodernism. In the introduction to her study 
Sublime Desire (2001) she draws attention to the fact that 
postmodernism resists almost any attempts at categorisation. Any 
undertaking in defining the postmodern has to remain rather abstract 
and open as, for instance, Hutcheon’s focus on paradox and 
contradiction displays. Nevertheless, by naming three different, yet 
interdependent and at times also contradictory spheres of 
postmodernism, Elias provides a workable frame for postmodern 
phenomena. The first and already mentioned is epistemological 
postmodernism essentially linked to Western history of ideas and 
philosophy. Elias calls this discussion “epistemological”, as “it deals 
mainly with questions about how late-twentieth century [Western] people 
[…] cognitively apprehend their societies and their relation to the past 
and how they define the possibilities of future knowledge” (Elias, Desire, 
xxi).  
The second sphere is labelled sociocultural postmodernism and 
refers to what Elias calls “an increased aesthetization of everyday life” 
(Elias, Desire, xxiii) based on the grounds that “postmodernism is a post-
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1945 social and economic phenomenon of capitalist First World nations” 
(Elias, Desire, xxiii). In this respect, Elias suggests, today’s media and 
information culture plays a crucial role. It becomes increasingly difficult 
to distinguish between reality and the medial staging of reality. How 
various cultural critics perceive this sociocultural sphere of 
postmodernism and in how far it is thematised in postmodern fiction is an 
essential aspect of this analysis.  
The third sphere Elias conceptualises is an aesthetic discussion of 
postmodernism in terms of a “new […] creative sensibility” which is 
“intimately tied to sociocultural postmodernism” (Elias, Desire, xxv). 
Simultaneously, it becomes relevant with regard to postmodern 
philosophy and, thus, can be regarded as a debate which arises at the 
intersection of epistemological and sociocultural postmodernism. This 
intersection has become especially relevant in relation to pop-culture. As 
regards the field of literary production, it is characterised by a strong 
tendency “toward self-reflexivity and irony” (Elias, Desire, xxvi), toward a 
critical reworking of history, toward experimenting with literary genres, 
etc. (cf. Elias, Desire, xxvi-xxvii). 
At times contradicting each other, at times supplementing each other 
and at other times examined independently from each other, the different 
spheres of postmodernist experience are a recurrent theme in the 
attempt to investigate into different postmodern conceptions of origins 
and originality. 
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2.2) POSTMODERN CONCEPTIONS OF HISTORY 
 
2.2.1) MEDIATED HISTORIES 
 
One of the basic assumptions with regard to postmodern 
understandings of history is the postulate that the past and historical 
representations are not as straightforwardly approachable as 
conventional historical criticism suggests. Thus, postmodern criticism 
asks: How do we gain access to the past? Why are historical facts 
embraced by an aura of unquestionable truth, or who is in charge of 
positioning and selecting events which are to become historical facts? 
Simultaneously, these questions are also applicable to origins and 
originality. How are these concepts mediated and why are they so 
powerful?  
One rather simplistic modus operandi in attempting to tackle these 
issues is to draw attention to the fatal equation of ‘fact’ with ‘truth’ and 
‘authenticity’ in our culture. This frequent equation overlooks that in 
etymological terms the noun ‘fact’ derives from the Latin verb ‘facere’ 
defined as ‘to make’, ‘to construct’. ‘Fact’, therefore, has little in common 
with ‘truth’ as a metaphysical entity. However, while contemporary 
Western culture – as postmodern as some of its aspects may be – is 
surrounded by facts, depends on facts and is committed to explain the 
world in terms of facts, postmodern theory has put a strong focus on the 
constructedness of the world. Nothing exists that is inherently true, 
original or eternal.  
In postmodern literary practice historiographic metafiction – the very 
term was coined by Linda Hutcheon – serves as a method to approach 
the past not in terms of irrefutable facts but as a past which is as textual 
as everything else. Therefore, this past communicated to us as history 
does not occupy a privileged position. Contrary to conventional 
perceptions, it is not an objective, untroubled or sovereign entity, but a 
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subjective, highly biased narrative construct. As poststructuralist 
theorists like Jacques Derrida or Michel Foucault stressed, our entire 
perceived reality is created within linguistic structures. Only through 
language, i.e. text and narrative, are we able to make sense of the world. 
 
In most of the critical work on postmodernism, it is narrative – be it in 
literature, history or theory – that has usually been the major focus 
of attention. Historiographic metafiction incorporates all three of 
these domains: that is, its theoretical self-awareness of history and 
fiction as human constructs is made the grounds for its rethinking 
and reworking of the forms and contents of the past. (Hutcheon, 
Poetics, 5) 
 
Following Hutcheon’s lucid argumentation, it is thanks to 
postmodern approaches to the past and to literary production, that “both 
history and fiction are [perceived as] discourses […] by which we make 
sense of the past" (Hutcheon, Poetics, 89). In relation to reworking 
traditional conceptions of history Hutcheon argues that historiographic 
metafiction helps to do away with evaluative attributes such as true and 
false as “there are only truths in the plural, and never one Truth, and 
there is rarely falseness per se, just others’ truths” (Hutcheon, Poetics, 
109).  
History is constructed and so is the concept of origin as well as the 
idea of originality. The origin is irretrievable, because it is constituted 
from text and each text – from a postmodern perspective – is a product 
of interrelations with other texts. There is no possibility of ever gaining 
access to a moment of uncontested primacy. Consequently, primacy is 
also one of the targets postmodern analysis seeks to deconstruct. With 
regard to origin and originality, this insight suggests that a linear 
approach aiming at tracing back step by step the hints, which would 
finally lead to the one single authoritative moment from which everything 
else results, is not productive but frustrating. Instead of searching the 
one prime moment or the one authoritative mind with regard to artistic 
originality, it is more rewarding to investigate into the plurality of 
meaning, the plurality and ambiguity of sources and their interaction.  
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The interaction of the historiographic and the metafictional 
foregrounds the rejection of the claims of both ‘authentic’ 
representation and ‘inauthentic’ copy alike, and the very meaning of 
historical referentiality. Postmodern fiction suggests that to re-write 
or to re-present the past in fiction and in history is, in both cases, to 
open it up to the present, to prevent it from being conclusive and 
teleological. (Hutcheon, Poetics, 110) 
 
Historiographic metafiction, then, plays with and subverts the 
conventional notion of art as mimesis, that is, the text as mirror and 
imitation of a possible reality, via implicit or explicit comments on its own 
constructed character. The metafictional aspect demands awareness 
from both writer and reader. While Robert Scholes points out that 
“[m]etafiction assimilates all the perspectives of criticism into the fictional 
process itself” (Scholes, 106), Patricia Waugh highlights that 
simultaneously metafictional practice disorientates the reader to a 
certain extent, “by frustrating his or her conventional expectations of 
meaning and closure” (Waugh, 22). This disorientation leads to a new 
consciousness with regard to the process of literary production on the 
part of the reader. Metafiction, hence, serves as a means to thematise 
“the ways in which narrative codes artificially construct apparently real 
and imaginary worlds in the terms of particular ideologies while 
presenting these as transparently natural and eternal” (Waugh, 22). 
Apart from the self-reflexive metafictional aspect prevalent in much 
of postmodern fiction, the historiographic aspect emphasises 
contemporary fascination with the past. Yet, as Umberto Eco mentioned, 
this orientation towards the past should not be characterised by 
innocence or naivety, instead, the past has to be reworked ironically. 
“[T]he past – since it may not be destroyed, for its destruction results in 
silence – must be revisited ironically” (Eco qtd. in Rosso, 2). The loss of 
innocence in relation to historical representation is a focal point of both 
postmodern theory and literary practice and calls attention to a  
[…] set of challenged cultural and social assumptions: our beliefs in 
origins and ends, unity, and totalization, logic and reason, 
consciousness and human nature, progress and fate, representation 
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and truth, not to mention the notions of causality and temporal 
homogeneity, linearity, and continuity. (Hutcheon, Poetics, 87) 
 
For Hutcheon as for Eco, the crucial point is that the past is revisited 
critically, not in terms of a nostalgic orientation backwards (cf. Hutcheon, 
Poetics, 4). While theorists like Eco or Hutcheon focus on the potential of 
postmodern irony in returning to the past, Frederic Jameson, for 
instance, adopts a far more pessimistic stance. He perceives the 
concepts of the past and history as generally threatened, if not “effaced 
altogether, leaving us with nothing but texts” (Jameson, 18). These texts, 
however, following Hutcheon’s line of argumentation, should not be 
chained with the attribute ‘nothing but’, as they are the only means for 
approaching the past. The past is not at all ‘effaced altogether’. Its 
existence is not doubted. However, the only way to experience it, to gain 
access to it, is via the text, which in turn is a construct. History results 
from a choice of past events over other past events and this choice 
demands human agency. “We cannot know the past except through its 
texts, its documents, its evidence, even its eye-witness accounts are 
texts” (Hutcheon, Poetics, 16). Thus, in a postmodern understanding, the 
textual element in both history and fiction provides the common ground 
for a critical reworking of the past.  
Historiographic metafiction as a postmodern means of literary 
expression provokes in two ways. On the one hand, it disposes of a 
teleological understanding of history as it presents “history as an ‘open 
work’”, while on the other hand, it “spatialize[s] history (Elias, Spatial 
History, 108). According to Elias, cultural development is no longer 
indebted to a metanarrative understanding of history. Furthermore, she 
states that postmodern fiction is not satisfied with substantiating the 
claims that history is textually constructed, but goes beyond that stage. It 
investigates into how this textualisation works. “By doing so, 
postmodernist historical novels explore the literary problem of how to 
represent time and space” (Elias, Spatial History, 109). 
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While Elias welcomes the ‘spatialization of history’ as an instrument 
to challenge the standard historical account, for Jameson, the loss of 
belief in a teleological development of history characteristic of the 
postmodern era turns out to be highly problematic. “Time, temporality 
and the syntagmatic [become awkward] in a culture dominated by space 
and spatial logic” (Jameson, 25). Thus, all that is left, for him, is “nothing 
but heaps of fragments” (Jameson, 25). Jameson does not perceive of 
postmodernism’s rejection of conventional conceptions of history as a 
conscious choice. Rather, he detects a gradual “loss of capacity […] to 
organize past and present into a coherent experience” (Jameson, 25). 
Alluding to Jean Baudrillard’s theory of simulation and simulacra, 
Jameson locates “a new spatial logic of the simulacrum”, whose 
dominance impedes any direct access to history, which, according to 
Jameson, was directly approachable before the advent of 
postmodernism.   
 
Cultural production is […] driven back inside a mental space which 
is no longer that of the old monadic subject but rather that of some 
degraded collective ‘objective’ spirit’: it can no longer gaze directly at 
some putative real world, at some reconstruction of a past history 
which was once itself a present, rather, as in Plato’s cave, it must 
trace our mental images of that past upon its confining walls. If there 
is any realism left there, it is a ‘realism’ that is meant to derive from 
the shock of grasping that confinement and of slowly becoming 
aware of a new and original historical situation in which we are 
condemned to seek history by way of our own pop images and 
simulacra of that history, which itself remains forever out of reach. 
(Jameson, 25) 
 
Experience is no longer possible in a progressive sense. Instead, 
contemporary culture is dominated by a medley of simultaneous scenes. 
Diachrony is replaced by a random and aleatory synchrony. While for 
Jameson the past is irretrievably lost, the present can only be 
experienced in the plural: ‘presents’. Anca Ignat underlines that 
Jameson, thus, diagnoses a general schizophrenia for contemporary 
culture. Living the simultaneity of different scenes at once has replaced 
our traditional perception of sequential history. Space has replaced time, 
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but this shift of focus leaves us struggling with the concurrence of 
manifold and fluctuating realities (cf. Ignat). According to Hutcheon, 
Jameson  
 
[…] appears to mistake a challenge to the ‘master’ status of 
narrative history for a denial of history itself. Despite its detractors, 
the postmodern is not ahistorical or dehistoricized, though it does 
question our (perhaps unacknowledged) assumptions about what 
constitutes historical knowledge. Neither is it nostalgic or antiquarian 
in its critical revisiting of history. (Hutcheon qtd. in Ignat) 
 
Postmodern writers have taken up the fascination with the past and 
explore how it can be revisited in a self-reflexive way on the aesthetic 
level and how far literary representation can digress from traditional 
concepts of mimesis. Corresponding to postmodern epistemology, they 
challenge linear narrative and a teleological perception of history in   
 
[…] an attempt to deconstruct and recompose the rigidly historical 
narrative, to break out from the temporal prisonhouse of language 
and the similarly carceral historicism of conventional critical theory to 
make room for the insights of an interpretative human geography, a 
spatial hermeneutic. (Soja, 1-2) 
 
Experimenting with a spatial understanding of lived reality, Peter 
Ackroyd interweaves three different historical settings in his 
historiographic metafictional novel Chatterton, and thereby suggests that 
perceived reality does not necessarily have to follow a temporal frame 
but can also be lived by shared experiences across centuries. As if to 
provide a theoretical premise for Ackroyd’s enterprise, Elias puts forward 
that postmodern fiction does not reject the temporal axe in general, but 
once more challenges conventional understandings of linear temporal 
progress. 
 
Postmodernist historical novelists recognize, of course, that events 
happen sequentially in time, at least in the dimensions of everyday 
human perception. However, […] postmodernists balk at accepting 
this linear quality of time as anything but the unfolding of the 
immediate present, undiluted and unstructured by any totalizing 
interpretation. They refuse to equate the sequential ‘linearity’ of 
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immediate experience with the teleological progressiveness of a 
totalizing historical view – an equation that has all too frequently 
been made by historians, writers, and politicians in the past. (Elias, 
Spatial History, 111-112) 
 
The role of the historian as fiction maker has been analysed by 
Hayden White, who argues that the practice of turning the past into 
history is in fact a “poetic process” (White qtd. in Lee, 34). As past 
events do not have a voice of their own, they need an agent to organise 
and select them into a “discursive whole” (Hutcheon, Politics, 58), be it in 
historical or fictional narrative. History does not lie naturally or 
transparently in front of us. Rather, it can be argued that history, 
basically, runs through the same processes as narrative composition 
examined by Wolfgang Iser in his theory of fiction.  
The composition of fiction, Iser explains, covers three different 
stages: Selektion, Kombination and Selbstanzeige (cf. Iser). A 
postmodern understanding of history, then, can link Hayden’s poetic 
quality of history with Iser’s theory and thereby apply Iser’s stages to 
past events. Out of the pool of past events, are selected only few, which 
then are combined into a coherent meaningful historical narrative. The 
third stage, however, turns out to be of a more complex nature. While 
Iser states that literary texts implicitly or explicitly thematise their own 
artificiality, i.e. their own state of being constructed, historical texts aim at 
exactly the opposite: they are presented as natural and true. Literary 
texts can draw attention to their artificiality by, for instance, para- or 
metatextual devices. They do not claim to present the world as it is. 
Even the most realist literary tradition is satisfied with the mere mirroring 
of a possible reality. Quite contrary, a traditional conception of history 
requests to be acknowledged as the one and only direct and objective 
access to the past. It aims at disguising the processes of selection and 
combination at work, and consequently also refrains from statements of 
Selbstanzeige. 
Postmodernism, however, dismantles this conception of history as a 
privileged discourse, by showing how strongly narrativisation is at work 
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in history-making. “The process of making stories out of chronicles, of 
constructing plots out of sequences” (Hutcheon, Politics, 66) is 
highlighted. It draws attention to the fact that selection and combination 
take place in history as well as in fiction. Furthermore, it breaks with the 
claim of being objective and universally applicable. History can no longer 
regard itself as a grand narrative, instead, in terms of a postmodern 
Selbstanzeige, it has to focus on its own subjectivity and peculiarity. 
“[H]istorians suppress, repeat, subordinate, highlight, and order […] facts 
[…]. To call this act a literary act is, for White, in no way to detract from 
its significance” (Hutcheon, Politics, 67-68). White justifies his focus on 
the historian as fiction-maker by suggesting that how past events are 
transmitted and how they find their way into history depends entirely “on 
the historian’s subtlety in matching a particular plot structure with the set 
of historical events that he wishes to endow with a meaning of a 
particular kind. This is essentially a literary, that is to say a fiction-making 
aspiration” (White, 49).  
Historiographic metafiction makes overt the limits of conventional 
historical representation and plays with a new potential released by the 
discharging of linear teleological development. It experiments with 
different approaches to history and displays how history is textually 
constructed. “[T]here is an intense self-consciousness in the act of 
narrating in the present the events of the past, about the conjunction of 
present action and the past absent object of that agency” (Hutcheon, 
Politics, 71). Corresponding to and interacting with postmodernism’s 
fascination with the past and history is another field of great concern, 
that is, how we can make sense of our lived reality, the present. Past 
and present, thus, in postmodern thought, are not separable entities but 
constantly interplay with each other in their different (con)textualisations. 
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2.2.2) BAUDRILLARD AND THE ‘END OF HISTORY’ 
 
The French social critic Jean Baudrillard criticises epistemological 
postmodernism for its lack of correspondence with contemporary 
sociocultural experience (cf. Baudrillard, Simulacra). According to him, 
postmodern culture neither expresses any emancipatory potential, nor is 
it capable of critically reworking the enlightened system of thought. The 
present is sometimes referred to as the time to realise utopian thought 
and if one takes into account Werner Welsch or Hutcheon’s (cf. Welsch, 
Moderne; Hutcheon, Poetics and Politics) claim of postmodernity as the 
advocate of plurality, one might agree with this conclusion. The 
postmodern rejection of the grand narratives offers the opportunity to 
realise small or marginal narratives. The era of increasing liberties and 
choices should lead to a diversification of experience and thought. The 
contrary is the case, Baudrillard argues. In his sociocultural analysis the 
liberating potential, instead of taking active steps towards the realisation 
of utopia/ae, has turned against itself, leading to final indifference and 
passivity in the era of universal simulacra. 
In this bleak prospect, for Baudrillard, reality is no longer accessible, 
because it has been substituted by signs of the real. We live in an utterly 
simulated reality, which cannot be actively combated. When there is no 
reality anymore, there no more can be illusion, says Baudrillard (cf. 
Baudrillard, Simulacra). Welsch mourns this loss of illusion, the loss of 
play(fulness) and Baudrillard’s apparent reluctance to propose counter-
strategies.  In the latter’s line of argumentation, a counter-rhetoric 
against the rampant growth of indifference would or could only further 
increase its growth. Inexorably, indifference will continue to conquer all 
fields of the social and cannot be altered or even stopped by opposition. 
On the contrary, Baudrillard fears, it might even push the process 
forward.  
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For Welsch, Baudrillard is to be associated with the posthistoire (cf. 
Welsch, Moderne, 149-154.) One of the major representatives of the 
aesthetics of the posthistoire, Arnold Gehlen, argued that there cannot 
be historical innovation anymore. There is no more forthcoming because 
history has reached its end. There cannot be anything new. The world is 
culturally crystallised (cf. Gehlen, 133-143). The posthistoire, the after-
history, can only reproduce in a static manner. Contrary to Lyotard, who 
– more than a decade later – sees in the disposal of the grand narratives 
a revaluation of the many small narrations, for Gehlen, the loss of belief 
in what Welsch labels “Globalideologien” (Welsch, Wege, 26) signifies 
the end of philosophy.  
 
[D]enn in einer prinzipienpluralistischen Gesellschaft und angesichts 
einer Fülle heterogener Wissensbestände gibt es keinen 
archimedischen Punkt mehr, von dem aus man alles überblicken 
und organisieren könnte. Ideen bewegen nichts mehr – gegen derlei 
anachronistische Erwartungen ist Zynismus zu richten. (Welsch, 
Wege, 26) 
 
Interestingly, Baudrillard, two decades later and coming from a 
different philosophic background, sympathises with Gehlen’s pessimistic 
theory, however, from a point of view that aims at analysing 
contemporary circumstances (cf. Welsch, Wege, 28). Despite or exactly 
because of this bleak outlook, Baudrillard’s theory has become 
extremely popular. Welsch locates the source of fascination and strength 
of the claims in the suggestion of  “Alles schon geschehen”  (Welsch, 
Moderne, 152). Yet, that “there is nothing new under the sun” 
(Ecclesiastes, 1.9, qtd. in Ruthven, 125) is apparently not an insight of 
the twentieth century. “[W]hatever can be said has been said already: 
tout est dit” (Ruthven, 125). And exactly this insight made the classical 
principle of imitatio (veterum) possible in the first place and, ironically, 
simultaneously provides the premise for postmodern artistic practices of 
parody, pastiche and citation.  
At this point, however, it is essential to proceed with care as social 
criticism and literary theory and practice may not be lumped together 
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uncritically. While the literary field – though as constructed in text as the 
field of cultural reality – is provided with experimental space for testing 
and finding different aesthetic accesses to a world in which tout est dit, in 
social theory it appears more difficult to accept the notion of tout est dit 
without falling prey to the cultural pessimism of Baudrillard. “When the 
real is no longer what it used to be, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. 
There is a proliferation of myths of origin and signs of reality, of second-
hand truths, objectivity and authenticity […]” (Baudrillard, Simulations, 3). 
But also in the literary field critical voices in relation to postmodernism’s 
reappropriation of the past have become loud. Fredric Jameson argues:  
[W]ith the collapse of the high-modernist ideology of style […] the 
producers of language have nowhere to turn but to the past: the 
imitation of dead styles, speech through the masks and voices 
stored up in the imaginary museum of a now global culture. 
(Jameson, 17-18) 
 
Interpreting Jameson, Robert Weimann explains that there is to be 
experienced something akin to a nostalgia for the present. The present 
can only turn to the past in order to experience itself, as, on its own, it is 
only a hollow object lacking any power (cf. Weimann, 79). “[History’s] 
reinjection has no value as conscious awareness but only as nostalgia 
for a lost referential” (Baurillard, Simulacra, 44). This understanding of 
the interrelation between past and present as uncreative and 
unproductive, is contested by postmodernism. Indeed, tout est dit, but 
this does not signify a necessary end to history or a necessarily nostalgic 
turn backwards of today’s culture. “[M]uch contemporary theory of 
history […] does not fall into either ‘presentism’ or nostalgia in its relation 
to the past it represents” (Hutcheon, Politics, 71). 
The paradox of the postmodern experience, however, also involves 
a very uncritical revisiting of history. Not always is it Hutcheon’s claimed 
irony that is at work when it comes to (re)appropriating the past in 
contemporary culture. “Memorial culture” (Huyssen qtd. in Ignat) is 
Andreas Huyssen’s term for this unreflected fascination with history. 
‘History light’ as a new fetish for consumer culture, has proven to be a 
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cash cow for the flourishing heritage industry, be it in form of historical 
theme parks, period dramas or retro-festivals. Thematised in Julian 
Barnes’ novel England, England, there is a nostalgic moment in 
contemporary culture, the longing for a putatively pure past, when 
authentic experience was still possible, and life closer to the ‘origin’. “Our 
entire linear and accumulative culture collapses if we cannot stockpile 
the past in plain view. […] We require a visible past, a visible continuum, 
a visible myth of origin, which reassures us about our end.” (Baudrillard, 
Simulacra, 10).  
Baudrillard’s compatriot Gilles Deleuze does not object to the 
apparent postmodern interest in the past, neither does he see the 
present as a hollow repetition or a nostalgic moment as does Baudrillard. 
In his line of argumentation the problem does not arise from 
reappropriating the past, that is from repetition itself, “da sie die 
Bedingung der Möglichkeit von Denken, Sprechen, Leben überhaupt ist” 
(Ott, 11). However, agreeing here, for instance, with Hutcheon’s 
understanding of postmodernism, Deleuze maintains that this repetition 
has to refrain from being a mechanical one, “die trotz des zeitlichen 
Abstandes ein Identisch-Werden anstrebt und nicht das Andere im 
Wiederkehrenden begrüßt” (Ott, 11). Difference and plurality, thus, result 
from repetition, repetition in terms of an appropriation of an already 
existing reality. Deleuze, essentially in line with postmodern 
argumentation, rejects the idea of a past oriented nostalgia and stresses 
the potential of a critical reworking. 
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2.3) POSTMODERN REPRESENTATION  
             – ORIGINS, REALITY AND SIMULACRA 
 
2.3.1) THE SILENT APOCALYPSE – A BAUDRILLARDIAN SCENARIO  
 
How do we make sense of the world? Is reality directly perceivable? 
Is it mediated through representations or images of that reality? Or has 
representation completely replaced reality? Questions such as these are 
pivotal to postmodern theory. In this respect various theories of the 
simulacrum have gained influence. The simulacrum denotes a copy of a 
supposed original, which is basically indistinguishable from its model, 
and thus becomes an independent form. It is a copy, which rejects the 
control of its original. 
The thematisation of representation is highly topical in postmodern 
theory, as it once more states a critical reworking of concepts which 
have gained the status of truth, transparency and logic without having 
ever been thoroughly questioned. Where some critics attest a severe 
crisis of representation with regard to the postmodern era, others simply 
perceive conventional representation as unsatisfactory and regard it as 
one of the concepts to challenge in order to threaten the dominance of 
humanistic master narratives. 
 
Postmodern representational practices […] deploy hybrid forms and 
seemingly mutually contradictory strategies frustrate critical attempts 
[…] to systematize them, to order them with an eye to control and 
mastery – that is, to totalize. (Hutcheon, Politics, 37) 
 
Hutcheon, as a literary theorist, stands in for a more moderate 
position in relation to a crisis of representation than for instance 
Baudrillard. While Hutcheon aims at contextualising her claims in the 
field of postmodern literary practice, Baudrillard remains on a far more 
abstract philosophical level in his criticism of contemporary culture. This 
high level of abstraction – in this respect Baudrillard as well as Deleuze 
Theoretical Considerations 
 25 
prolong a French intellectual tradition – has been both criticised and 
celebrated. Whereas some of the detractors of Baudrillard’s theories 
reject his apparent reluctance to analytically deduct his theories leaving 
nothing but a heap of unreadable texts, his followers celebrate exactly 
this quality of rhetoric play, which refrains from traditional approaches to 
philosophic questions. Baudrillard himself contends: “[I am] a very bad 
analyst” (Baudrillard, Live, 166). “[…] I am a terrorist and nihilist in theory 
as others are with their weapons. Theoretical violence, not truth, is the 
only resource left to us” (Baudrillard, Simulacra, 163).  
Paradoxically enough, Baudrillard – though a non-conventional 
thinker in his own right – cannot really be called a postmodern 
philosopher. If one takes totalisation as the one big common target of 
even the most distinct fields within postmodernist thought, then 
Baudrillard clearly has to remain outside this framework. Although he 
acknowledges plurality in our culture, he postulates that this plurality is 
only a superficial one, which, in fact, has engendered the totalising 
simulacrum of today’s reality.  
He presents himself rather pessimistically if not apocalyptically with 
regard to the alleged inherent quality of postmodernism, i.e. plurality. 
Postmodernism’s supposed plurality, for him, finally results or has 
already resulted in indifference. As suggested, unity or totality is a 
concept regarded as highly problematic in postmodern thought. Far from 
being euphoric about latent aspects of uniformity in contemporary 
(media-) culture, postmodern theorists regard it as highly dangerous in 
terms of its suppressive potential.  
Thus, plurality has to be central. The turn – which in contemporary 
culture has basically taken place in theory only – from a dichotomous 
world picture to one of interconnected plurality has opened the sphere 
“between those autonomous domains created by binary oppositions” 
(Ruthven, 65). Pluralisation, for Baudrillard, today only works towards 
general uniformity, which results in a final indifference he pessimistically 
diagnoses with our society. The enormous amount of information made 
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accessible by our age of mass media, does indeed carry the potential of 
empowering democratic and active experience. However, floods of 
information, as they come in our times, cannot be processed and 
consequently engender indifference, a passive mass of indifferent 
people. Baudrillard’s claim departs from the assumption that the more in 
number the options of choice, the less the value of each single option. 
And in the end, they have lost any meaning. To follow Baudrillard further 
means to acknowledge that “the mass media form has created a total, 
closed system [which] has led to a blurring of the relationship between 
cause and effect, between the subject and its object” (Epstein/Epstein, 
141).  
Not only do the simulated realities of today’s information culture blur 
the boundaries between cause and effect, he puts forward, but they 
subvert the principle of causality by suggesting that the appearance 
precedes reality, that the copy precedes the original. This is the basic 
assumption of the theory of simulation and simulacra (cf. Weibel, 28). 
The real has been replaced by independent copies of the real. In this line 
of argumentation representation is not in a state of crisis, rather, it is 
effaced altogether, because mere simulation has replaced 
representation. “[Simulation] is the radical negation of the sign as value, 
as meaning, as referential.  [In representation] a sign could refer to the 
depths of meaning, a sign could exchange for meaning” (Baudrillard, 
Simulations, 10). Today, however, we are moving into “the era of 
simulation [which] is inaugurated by a liquidation of all referentials” 
(Baudrillard, Simulacra, 2).  
In the era of simulation the real has lost its autonomy. If there is no 
real anymore, representation loses its ground and becomes impossible. 
“It is no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody. 
It is a question of substituting the signs of the real for the real” 
(Baudrillard, Simulacra, 2). According to Baudrillard, we no longer have 
the means to criticise this tendency in contemporary culture, as we, 
ourselves, are already absorbed by the simulacra of the real. We cannot 
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place criticism, as all the secondary instances such as theory, criticism 
or depiction have already become part of this reality, which in fact is 
nothing but an omnipresent simulation.  
Baudrillard’s theories touch upon one of postmodernism’s nagging 
issues: uniformity challenged by plurality and vice versa. How does 
contemporary culture approach the matter? What we are definitely 
dealing with is a kind of hybridisation of culture, the encounter of 
plurality/-ies in the widest sense. The question remaining is whether this 
plurality, as Baudrillard claims, is only an apparent one (cf. Welsch, 
Wege, 13-21). The open discrepancy between Baudrillard and 
postmodern thought derives from the fact that postmodern philosophy 
rejects any kind of totalitarianism. For Baudrillard, however, the age of 
information culture is dominated by the totalitarian rule of the simulacra. 
All meaning and difference implodes in the sphere of hyperreality, that is 
“the generation of a real without origin or reality” (Baudrillard, Simulacra, 
1). There is no way out. Difference engenders indifference and passivity. 
The silent apocalypse has taken place without anybody noticing it. In 
contemporary information-culture, reality is generated by the media, by 
information. As a consequence, it becomes increasingly harder – if not 
impossible – to distinguish between reality and simulacrum. When reality 
and simulation permeate each other, we find ourselves in a state of 
universal simulation and the Möbius-strip has become the emblem of our 
time (cf. Welsch, Moderne, 150). 
Nevertheless, simulation or the dominance of appearance does not 
mean that reality does not exist anymore in a material sense, instead, it 
indicates that the conventional understanding of how to make sense of 
the world, i.e. a world where everything can be ascribed an origin or a 
real referent, has lost its efficiency (cf. Jung, 381). Simulation theory 
suggests that there is no more a necessary referential tie,  
 
[n]o more mirror of being and appearances, of the real and its 
concept. No more imaginary coextensivity. The real is produced 
from miniaturized cells, matrices, and memory banks, models of 
control – and it can be reproduced an indefinite number of times 
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from these. It no longer needs to be rational, because it no longer 
measures itself against either an ideal or negative instance. It is no 
longer anything but operational. (Baudrillard, Simulacra, 2) 
 
Reality simply functions, fulfils its operational duties “ohne in ihnen 
einen Ausdruck des kollektiven Sinns, der Geschichte oder der Vernunft 
zu sehen” (Jung, 381-382), i.e. teleology has been disposed of. 
 
2.3.2) DELEUZE AND THE REVERSAL OF PLATONISM 
 
Teleology as a concept to dispose of is also the target of Gilles 
Deleuze, who – in contrast to Baudrillard – develops a different 
conception of the simulacrum more applicable to the ideas of 
‘mainstream’ postmodernism. Deleuzian philosophy is characterised by 
thought “ohne vorgefasste Begriffe und kategoriale Hierarchien […] 
Begriffe und Affekte [sind] untergründig verbunden, auf dass ein 
‘rhizomatisches’ Netz von Querverstrebungen und affektiven 
Wechselwirkungen entstehe” (Ott, 13). Deleuze thinks the simulacrum 
with regard to its emancipating, empowering potential and thus provides 
a valuable counter-narrative to Baudrillard’s apocalyptic pessimism. 
Whereas difference, for Baudrillard, only serves as a means to cause 
final indifference, Deleuze’s concept is based on the theorem that 
difference arises from other differences (cf. Welsch, Moderne, 141).  
In his attempt to approach philosophy in a subversive way, 
emancipated from the dogmatic power of Western philosophical 
tradition, Deleuze aims at rethinking ancient philosophy, more 
specifically Platonism. Thus, in relation to the simulacrum, he focuses on 
its platonic conception only to reverse it, i.e. to offer an alternative 
approach, which does not rely on a hierarchical structure of original, 
copy, and simulacrum. Instead, his theory of the simulacrum is based on 
an egalitarian structure, which he delineates as rhizomatic. 
Already ancient philosophy subjected the issue of originality, of 
clearly definable origins, to critical analysis. Plato’s theory of the 
simulacrum, exemplified in Sophist (cf. Plato, Sophist), became one of 
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the most influential ideas with regard to the relationship between original 
and copy in the history of philosophy. In its platonic conception the 
simulacrum is burdened with derogatory notions of the false or the 
unfaithful. In fact, it is perceived of in exclusively negative terms. Plato 
departs from the idea of an original, a pure and unflawed idea. A copy of 
this original can either be a faithful copy, also labelled icon, or an 
unfaithful copy, that is, a simulacrum. The triadic structure Plato ascribes 
to the dialectics of original and reproduction is a hierarchic one. The 
original (das Bild), as the prime moment, the source of everything else is 
valued the most. The faithful copy (das Abbild) internally resembles the 
original, whereas the simulacrum (das Trugbild) only externally 
resembles the original. Internally, though, it deviates from the original 
idea or corrupts it. The good copy is characterised by likeness to the 
ideal original, whereas the bad copy only pretends to be alike. In fact, it 
de-naturalises the original. The basic distinction Plato highlights, is, then, 
not the distinction between original and copy (good or bad), but the 
differentiation and hierarchisation of good and bad copy (cf. Deleuze, 
Ancient Philosphy, 291-303).  
The good copy as the full resemblance of the idea, that is, the 
original, is not criticised at all, whereas the bad copy, the simulacrum, is 
regarded as inferior, if not dangerous, because it refrains from 
reproducing all the inherent qualities of the idea. It becomes something 
else, a fake. Yet, on the surface it is indistinguishable from original and 
copy. In the platonic perception the idea of the origin(al) is a prime focus. 
The closeness to the original, for Plato, brings about a copy’s value. 
Thus, the good copy entirely derives from the idea, the original. The 
simulacrum only appears as to have the same origin. From there, to 
follow Plato, results its dangerous potential. It masks its origin. It 
simulates an origin which is not a faithful or true one.  
“The task modern philosophy has been defined: to overturn 
Platonism” (Deleuze, Difference, 71). In order to reverse the platonic 
simulacrum Deleuze approaches the issue from the opposite direction. 
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“Overturning Platonism, then, means denying the primacy of original 
over copy, of model over image; glorifying the reign of simulacra and 
reflections” (Deleuze, Difference, 80). For him, the essential criterion is 
not likeness but difference. From this premise he sets out to re-evaluate 
the simulacrum, not as something bad, unfaithful or fake, but as 
something different and independent in its own right. It is an 
emancipated copy. Neither does it rely on the original anymore nor does 
it appropriate a hierarchical systematisation of meaning.  
This conception becomes relevant in connection with postmodern 
ideas of origin, truth, deception, representation, etc., as the basic 
assumption underlying Deleuze’s thought is that of difference, 
“harbor[ing] a positive power which denies the original and the copy, the 
model and the reproduction” (Deleuze, Ancient Philosophy, 299). 
Conventional deductive rationality becomes obsolete. He rethinks 
difference not in terms of conventional categories such as identity, 
similarity, analogy or opposition but liberates his concept from the idea of 
the identical (cf. Welsch, Moderne, 141).  
Only what deviates is designated to exist. Deleuze’s work is 
characterised by analyses of deviation and difference. In his conception 
of difference as delineated in his seminal text Difference and Repetition, 
however, there is no model in the first place from which difference can 
result, but difference itself is understood as preceding the model. 
Alexander Farshim, thus, attests Deleuze an extreme anticonservatism 
(cf. Farshim, 123). Deleuze reverts the causal and transcendental 
principle of philosophy dominant since the ancients. He rejects the idea 
of representation in terms of the identical, which is based on the 
underlying concepts of origin, identity and similarity (cf. Farshim, 123). 
Instead, his philosophy of difference is an act of becoming, and a very 
postmodern approach to originality, as it undermines the possibility of an 
origin in the first place. “Angefangen wird mittendrin […]” (Ott, 10-11). 
In an attempt to relate contemporary conceptions of the simulacrum 
as different as those of Deleuze and Baudrillard it proves fertile to go 
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back to Scott Durham’s analysis, who highlights the contradictory nature 
of the two theories:  
 
on the one hand, the claim to have released the virtual potential of a 
new humanity to freely reinvent itself without any reference to any 
founding essence or transcendental law; on the other hand, our 
experience of that virtuality as the emanation of a spectacular world 
from which we are separated. (Durham, 5) 
 
For Baudrillard, the simulacrum signals that meaning can no longer 
be attained, as the real is no longer accessible. Deleuze, instead, argues 
that the simulacrum creates meaning as it emerges from difference and 
hence contributes to the plurality of contemporary experience. Where 
Baudrillard still embarks from the assumption of an underlying original, 
though entirely withdrawn from the simulacrum through the processes of 
simulation, Deleuze completely contests the idea of a relation between 
original and simulacrum. There are no processes of removal at work, but 
a simple underlying assumption of internal difference. Brian Massumi, 
who cannot follow Baudrillard’s theses, welcomes Deleuze’s theory as a 
sensible premise from which to set out to analyse “our cultural condition 
under late capitalism without landing us back with the dinosaurs or 
launching us into hypercynicism” (Massumi). Massumi also draws 
attention to the lamentable fact that Deleuze does not really elaborate on 
his theory of simulacra in specific. 
Both Baudrillard and Deleuze depart from the notion that humanistic 
principles such as a teleological understanding of history or causality do 
not serve contemporary purposes. However, while the breakdown of 
these principles for Baudrillard renders experience impossible outside a 
universal state of hyperreality, for Deleuze it signifies a chance for 
difference and plurality.  
Despite the fact that both philosophers present their theories in 
highly abstract terms, the controversy arising from the different 
viewpoints presented has become essential for both the posing of 
epistemological questions on the one hand and a sociocultural analysis 
of the present on the other hand. With regard to contemporary literary 
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practice it, thus, turns out to be of extraordinary interest to examine the 
aesthetic strategies postmodern texts employ in order to self-consciously 
reflect on sociocultural and epistemological concerns raised by 
contemporary theorists such as Baudrillard or Deleuze.  
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2.4) THE FAKE, THE GENUINE AND THE LITERARY SYSTEM 
 
Both Peter Ackroyd’s Chatterton and Peter Carey’s My Life as a 
Fake express a straightforward postmodern distrust in origins and artistic 
originality by thematising literary forgery. The novels thereby exhibit the 
“power of literary forgeries to disturb the societies in which they are 
produced” (Ruthven, 2).  
Fake and forgery, delineated by Julian Barnes as “guerrilla attacks 
on the authority of the cognoscenti” (Barnes, Fake! 24) are burdened 
with almost exclusively negative associations. Branded as inauthentic, 
secondary, false and sinister, they represent society’s hypocritical 
attitude towards literariness. As K. K. Ruthven points out, original and 
fake or forgery are presented as dichotomous. “[L]iterature is valorised 
as the authentic Self and literary forgery [is] disparaged as its bogus 
Other” (Ruthven, 3). Thus, the conventional conception of literary art is 
that of a unique original piece of invention clearly set aside from its 
supposed counterpart, i.e., the dishonest and spurious fake or forgery. 
According to Ruthven, however, “literary forgery is not so much the 
disreputable Other of ‘genuine’ literature as its demystified and 
disreputable Self” (Ruthven, 3). 
Julian Barnes’ novel England, England focuses on the sociocultural 
field of interaction between originals and fakes. The construction of a 
fake England, which ironically treats contemporary culture’s fascination 
with theme parks and heritage industry, implicitly thematises today’s 
paradox of hunting for the real thing while thereby being absorbed by 
reproductions of reality.  
 
The heritage and tourism industries are frequently criticised for 
inferiorising the real by habituating us to simulacra, thus heightening 
our sense of disappointment with some shabby actuality first drawn 
to our attention by a glossy reproduction of it: a ubiquitous 
inauthenticity, we are told, has now superseded the unproblematic 
authentic. (Ruthven, 169) 
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Social simulacra, or what Daniel Boorstin calls “pseudo-events” tend 
to supersede reality as they are designed to be more intense, more 
concise than reality itself. They are “easier to disseminate and to make 
vivid” (Boorstin, 36) because that is what they are aimed at being: “more 
intelligible and hence more reassuring […], more persuasive than reality 
itself “(Boorstin, 36). In his argumentation Boorstin even goes as far as 
asserting that “whenever […] a pseudo-event competes for attention with 
a spontaneous event in the same field, the pseudo-event will tend to 
dominate” (Boorstin, 39). Fake reality “tend[s] to drive spontaneous 
happenings out of circulation” (Boorstin, 40), says Boorstin and thereby 
demonstrates an almost Baudrillardian pessimism.  
While the fake on the sociocultural level appears to go hand in hand 
with the rise of the media and the age of information and, thus, stands in 
for a specifically contemporary experience, literary fakes can look back 
on a longer tradition. But also the concept of literary originality is a quite 
recent one if one looks back on the history of literature. Nevertheless, 
since its rise in the Romantic period it has gained enormous importance 
in terms of judging the literary value of a text. The perception of the 
author as an original genius has been predominant until roughly the 
middle of the twentieth century.  
With the advent of postmodernism, however, the aesthetics of the 
genius has been disposed of as ineffective. Literary originality is a myth 
as, according to Roland Barthes, “writing is the destruction of every 
voice, every origin” (Barthes, 49). Barthes therewith highlights the 
intersection between epistemological and aesthetic postmodernism. 
While on the epistemological level, thanks to poststructuralism, the 
irretrievability of origins has been analysed, aesthetic postmodernism 
has repudiated the primacy of origins by employing new textual 
strategies. Literary originality no longer is at the centre of artistic 
attempts, rather, there is to be noticed a strong tendency towards a 
reappropriation of already existing texts through techniques such as 
parody, pastiche, citation, etc. 
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These intertextual, and mostly self-reflexive texts, draw attention to 
the inaccessibility of literary originality and thereby play with literary 
conventions. Chatterton, for instance, focuses on the topic of literary 
forgery both on the level of content as well as on the structural level as 
intertextual references are being made without quoting the supposedly 
original source.  
For Ruthven, literary forgeries are especially interesting and 
moreover important as the premise for a critical analysis of the 
conventions of the literary system.  
 
[Literary forgeries] exhibit a carnivalesque irreverence towards the 
sanctity of various conventions designed to limit what is permissible 
in literary production. Whenever they succeed they destabilize the 
fragile economy of literary accreditation by drawing attention both to 
its conceptual shoddiness and the expediencies that characterise its 
operations. […] Seeing that these supposedly ‘irregular’ and 
‘abnormal’ literary phenomena occur more frequently than is 
generally acknowledged, the burgeoning archive of literary forgeries 
remains an unresolved problem for cultural analysts. (Ruthven, 4) 
 
The literary system is conventionally perceived as being based on a 
dichotomy, that is, the binary opposition between original and fake text. 
“[A] fake literary text is merely supplementary to those genuine ones, 
which make up the corpus of literature. Sometimes amusing, sometimes 
outrageous, but always deemed to be ‘outside’ literature” (Ruthven, 70). 
Postmodern literary practice aims at emancipation from – to appropriate 
Raymond Federman’s terminology – “the lie of originality” (Federman, 
57). “[L]iterature merely plagiarizes itself” (Federman, 58) and texts 
basically consist of quotations of other texts. There is no original voice 
as each voice is the result of uncountable previous voices, suggests 
Barthes, referring to the text as an echo chamber. Implicitly or explicitly, 
each textual construct is intrinsically intertextual. In terms of an 
epistemological approach, “texts” as John Frow suggests, “are therefore 
not structures of presence, but traces and tracings of otherness” (Frow, 
45). The postmodern thematisation of intertextuality, forgery and 
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plagiarism highlights: “[l]iterary forgery is criticism by other means” 
(Ruthven, 171). 
To quote, then, in a postmodern understanding is not something 
uncreative or secondary. Instead it alludes to the human capacity of 
becoming aware of and establishing connections, that is cross-thinking. 
Horst Peter Neumann points out that even a text entirely consisting of 
quotations can be labelled as creative because “[er könnte] die fremden 
Texte in Gespräche verwickeln, deren Dynamik die Teile übergreift und 
auf neue Weise zum Sprechen bringt” (Neumann, 296). Reference to 
other texts do not represent an exotic practice but can be identified as 
the norm in the process of literary composition (cf. Ackermann, 11). 
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3 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
I had read in books that art is not easy 
But no one warned that the mind repeats 
In its ignorance the vision of others 
Ern Malley ‘Durer: Innsbruck 1496’ 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1) JULIAN BARNES’ ENGLAND, ENGLAND 
 
Historical consciousness, one of the recurrent concerns of the 1946 
born English novelist Julian Barnes, is at the core of his 1998 satirical 
novel England, England, which was short-listed for the same year’s 
Booker Prize. Barnes, whose oeuvre comprises both traditional and 
experimental texts, is especially known for his hybrid style of writing. 
“[A]dvocating multiplicity and decompartmentalisation”, Vanessa 
Guignery maintains, “his books blur and challenge the borders that 
separate existing genres, texts, arts and languages” (Guignery, History, 
60). Apart from the implicitly metafictional novel England, England, his 
preoccupation with historical knowledge and its consequent 
problematisation become especially obvious in his historiographic 
metafictionial works like the acclaimed Flaubert’s Parrot (1984) or A 
History of the World in 10 ! Chapters (1989).  
The strength of England, England, it can be argued, becomes 
palpable in Barnes’ attempt to follow a double strategy. On the one hand, 
he - typically postmodern in his attitude - raises epistemological 
questions regarding conceptions of history, truth, authenticity, origins, 
reality and simulacra. On the other hand, possible answers to these 
questions are straightforwardly tested against the background of a 
cultural scenario which might appear extreme, yet not completely 
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unthinkable in relation to contemporary sociocultural experience. Thus, 
from a theoretical stance, England, England develops its potential at the 
intersection of epistemological and sociocultural postmodernism. 
The scenario mentioned above is media tycoon Pitman’s enterprise 
of establishing a theme park on the Isle of Wight, which should comprise 
all the essential qualities of England on one single spot. The tiny island is 
meant to fulfil the purpose of presenting a condensed and richer form of 
the mother country. Already the ironic redoubling in its name England, 
England alludes to the implicit promise of being able to offer twice as 
much as England in an almost ridiculously small area. The project 
flourishes. England, England is a great success, withdrawing all the 
attention from the mother country, it exposes the latter to retrograde and 
decay. Completely isolated, England, renamed Anglia, devoid of all its 
former glory based on national myths and history, falls back into a more 
or less pre-industrial state.   
In England, England Barnes embarks on an investigation into the 
construction of identity. By intertwining the individual quest for identity of 
his female protagonist Martha Cochrane with the highly artificial identity 
of a newly created version of England, i.e. England, England, the novelist 
establishes a tight connection between two major factors in the process 
of identity construction: personal memory on the part of the individual 
and collective memory based on ‘history’ on the part of the nation.  
The novel’s three parts chronologically align with three different 
stages in the life of protagonist Martha Cochrane. Part one, labelled 
England, relates to Martha’s childhood experiences in the late 20th 
century. Part two, England, England, recounts a defining stage in 
Martha’s professional life as a successful member of the theme park’s 
management in the early 21st century. Part three, called Albion, yet 
constantly referred to as Anglia, finally describes Martha as an old lady 
and her retired life in the old country. 
Martha serves as a classic example of highlighting Barnes’ general 
choice of characters. Instead of living history, Gregory J. Rubinson 
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contends, Barnes’ characters “research history” (Rubinson, 77). As much 
as many other protagonists Barnes gives life to, Martha fails in her 
attempt to “uncover any definite answer to [her] quest for historical 
knowledge” (Rubinson, 77) and, thus, her failure proves to be 
representative of Barnes’ own attitude towards historical certainty as “a 
flawed concept” (Rubinson, 77). Corresponding to Hutcheon or White’s 
view of history as underlying fictional processes, Barnes’ interpretation of 
history as a “soothing fabulation” (Barnes, History, 242) is already 
articulated in A History of the World in 10! Chapters. There is no way of 
ever fully seizing it: “The history of the world? Just voices echoing in the 
dark” (Barnes, History, 242). And also Geoffrey Braithwaite, protagonist 
of Flaubert’s Parrot, philosophises: “history is merely just another literary 
genre: the past is autobiographical action pretending to be parliamentary 
report” (Barnes, Parrot, 90). Obviously, as Rubinson suggests, Barnes 
interweaves theoretical reflections with lived experience. Taking Martha 
Cochrane as an example, this lived experience is severely 
overshadowed by her own theoretical self-reflections, which finally 
prevent her from becoming part of or identifying with her surroundings. 
Martha does not only research history, rather, she researches her own 
epistemological frame and reaches the conclusion that authentic 
happiness is unattainable as it depends on being true to one’s heart and 
one’s nature (cf. EE1, 226). To know one’s heart and one’s nature, 
however, is as impossible as to gain historical knowledge, because  
 
the past was never just the past, it was what made the present able 
to live with itself. The same went with individuals […] when the brain 
told you now what it claimed had happened then [it] would be 
coloured by what had happened in between. (EE, 6) 
 
Truth, authenticity and origins are out of reach, memory is elusive and 
“knowledge gleaned from academic modes of enquiry is inevitably 
limited” (Rubinson, 77). 
                                                
1
 References regarding England, England will be abbreviated as EE in the following 
chapters. 
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3.1.1) (DE)CONSTRUCTING ORIGINS  - THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF AUTHENTICITY 
3.1.1.1) England - Distrusting Individual Memory 
 
Grounded in a double quest for identity the dialectics of private and 
public experience in England, England is exemplified by a strong longing 
for retrievable origins on both levels. On the private level it is the memory 
of individual persons that becomes crucial in the process of identity 
construction, whereas on the public level collective memory represented 
as official history plays the essential part.  
Right on introducing the girl Martha, Barnes thematises the problem 
of retrieving origins or of regaining at least a primary conscious moment. 
“’What’s your first memory?’ someone would ask. And she would reply, ‘I 
don’t remember’” (EE, 3). Although still being a child, Martha distrusts 
the concepts of origins and even memory itself. “A memory was by 
definition not a thing, it was … a memory. A memory now of a memory a 
bit earlier of a memory before that of a memory way back when” (EE, 3). 
Already Freud dedicated parts of his studies on neurosis to the hunt for 
an Urszene, a prime moment from which the respective problem could 
be derived. His findings showed that a single origin could not be traced 
but a “multiplicity of origins” (Carroll qtd. in Ruthven, 132). “Since what 
the ‘origin’ marks is not the beginning of something but the horizon 
beyond which our understanding of its genesis can go no further, 
hermeneutically it is always irretrievable” (Ruthven, 132).  
However inaccessible an origin may be, traditionally, it is perceived 
as one – if not the – basic element as regards identity-formation. In 
Baudrillardian terms: “[w]e require a visible past, […] a visible myth of 
origin, which reassures us about our end” (Baudrillard, Simulacra, 6-7). 
Martha, not being able to recover a first memory, decides to conform to 
social conventions and simply invents her first conscious moment. “Yes, 
that was it, her first memory, her first artfully, innocently arranged lie” 
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(EE, 4). By depicting Martha’s first memory as utterly constructed, the 
novel already introduces its sometimes implicitly, sometimes explicitly 
presented focus, that is, the postmodern fascination with an apparently 
authentic present which entirely depends on the constructedness of the 
past.  
As a satire England, England exaggerates the postmodern fetish of 
constructedness. It ironises numerous aspects of contemporary reality, 
yet simultaneously it does not dismiss postmodern perspectives as 
essentially unproductive. In a nutshell, it can be argued that the novel 
demonstrates an extreme amount of implicit self-consciousness by 
ridiculing the peaks of postmodern thought, while at the same time 
showing its potential to account for contemporary experience. In this 
sense, the construction of a simulacrum of England surely is one of the 
novel’s successful endeavours to ironically highlight some of the 
excesses of contemporary culture. Nevertheless, the text does not 
expose today’s entire reality to ridicule. On the contrary, by confronting 
the collective with the individual Barnes seems to suggest that each of 
the distinct conceptions of authenticity presented turns out to be 
problematic. “[T]he self is a site of contesting fictions of identity” (Eva 
Müller-Zettelmann, 71), Eva Müller-Zettelmann says, and so is the 
nation, Barnes might add. 
Martha’s traits of independence, detachment and cynicism and her 
mistrust in given facts render her a classic postmodern character. She is 
highly conscious of the sometimes even contradictory processes of 
construction taking place within herself as well as in her surroundings. 
Her problematization of memory does not reside in a straightforward 
rejection of the value of memory as such, but rather consists of constant 
reflections on how it can become so powerful in the first place. One 
element she ascribes to the power of memory is “a continuing self-
deception […]. Because even if you recognized […], grasped the impurity 
and corruption of the memory system, you still, part of you, believed in 
that innocent authentic thing – yes, thing – you called a memory” (EE, 6-
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7). The temptation for Martha resides in the objectification of memory 
rendering it as something seizable, touchable, concrete and real. 
Martha’s “Counties of England jigsaw puzzle” (EE, 4) is the first 
metaphorical link Barnes establishes between her personal identity and 
the identity of England. England’s counties depicted as differently 
coloured pieces are waiting to be put together correctly in order to have 
the puzzle solved. The nation’s potential instability is exposed by 
Martha’s problem of finding the jigsaw’s last piece, “whereupon a sense 
of desolation, failure, and disappointment at the imperfection of the world 
would come upon her” (EE, 5). Ironically, her father “who always seemed 
to be hanging around at this moment, would find the piece in the 
unlikeliest place” (EE, 5-6). It is a mighty father figure that finally 
manages to establish the unity of the puzzle. The metaphor of a piece 
found by him “in the unlikeliest place” (EE, 6) relates to power structures 
at work in processes of identity construction on a collective level. 
Memory always goes hand in hand with power. What to remember and 
what to forget, or where to take the missing jigsaw piece from still widely 
depends on patriarchal power. Not surprisingly, the allegedly 
homosexual historian Dr. Max point outs: “History, to put it bluntly, is a 
hunk” (EE, 148). “His line”, Barnes contends, “which is not particularly 
original, is that there is still a sort of masculine bias for history […] you 
forget – I am not saying anything unusual – you forget the silent fifty per 
cent” (Barnes qtd. in Guignery, History, 65). 
Seeing her father restore the coherence of England, Martha feels 
delighted, as “her jigsaw, her England, and her heart had been made 
whole again” (EE, 6). Yet, when her father leaves the family for another 
woman, he unknowingly takes with him a piece of Martha’s puzzle (cf. 
EE, 14-15). For Martha, then, England and her heart were never to be 
whole again. Bruno Zerweck perceives this double loss of identity as 
constitutional for Martha’s most dominant character traits, which are 
cynicism and independence, and takes them furthermore to be the 
source of her future “Bindungsängste” (Zerweck, 255).  
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After an initial period of desolation, Martha, in response to her 
mother’s recovery after having been left, “made a decision” (EE, 17). 
Piece by piece she would deconstruct the England-jigsaw and 
unconsciously also her longing for completeness by disposing them 
between the seats of the school bus. Emancipated both from her father 
as well as from the desire of coherence, Martha grows up a headstrong 
and independent woman.  
Her general distrust in memory results from her perception that it 
was neither reliable nor authentic, but rather its sentimental potential was 
made to serve the most diverse purposes following the rules of the 
market. In analogy to her personal memory Martha is also suspicious of 
collective memory. In both spheres Martha detects “[a]n element of 
propaganda, of sales and marketing […] A continuing self-deception as 
well” (EE, 6). When Sir Jack interviews Martha for the job of a special 
consultant, he detects a number of calculatedly untrue details in her 
personal file. On being asked whether the rest was “as approximate to 
the truth as that” (EE, 45), Martha nonchalantly answers: “It’s as true as 
you want it to be. If it suits, it’s true. If not, I’ll change it” (EE, 45). Martha 
herewith suggests that truth is always relative and adaptable to specific 
circumstances.  
The implication of Martha’s curriculum vitae being as constructed as 
her first memory once more underlines her unconventional way of 
thinking with regard to authenticity and truth. Whereas for most people a 
curriculum vitae, comprising the most relevant data of one’s life, is meant 
to represent a truthful account of a personal history, for Martha, it simply 
signifies a means of reaching her goals and she does not refrain from 
changing details that do not fit her marketability. Yet, it is not an 
underhanded act on Martha’s part, because for her the so-called facts 
about her life do not count in an absolute way.  
In history lessons at school Martha experiences “the chants of 
history” (EE, 11) as an almost religious experience. Her teacher Miss 
Mason “would lead them in worship like a charismatic priestess, keeping 
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time, guiding the gospellers” (EE, 11). The importance of history for 
Martha exceeds by far the importance of religion. “Martha was a clever 
girl, and therefore not a believer” (EE, 12). Martha’s rejection of religion 
can be seen as the postmodern replacement of religious belief in favour 
of a deep fascination with history. Furthermore, history in Miss Mason’s 
class does not rely on a linear development.  
 
There would be actions which called for dates; variations, 
improvisations and tricks; the words would duck and dive while they 
all clung to a scrap of rhythm. Elizabeth and Victoria (clap clap clap 
clap), and they would reply 1558 and 1837 (clap, clap, clap, clap). 
[…] She led them in and out of two millennia, making history not a 
dogged process but a series of vivid and competing moments. (EE, 
12)  
 
Thus, already as a girl Martha experiences a spatialisation of history 
and moreover also a selection of historical events corresponding to 
contemporary tastes which will later come to dominate her professional 
life in the theme park England, England. “Cross-epoch extravaganza” 
(EE, 228) it is called, when the current King “shake[s] hands with his own 
great-however-many-times-granny” (EE, 164) and does not manage to 
get a smile from Queen Victora. Due to his sexual harassment of Nell 
Gwynn, he is threatened with Oliver Cromwell to take over official 
representation (cf. EE, 189).  
Apart from several allusions to a wider focus, i.e. the sphere of 
collective identity construction, in its first part the novel accentuates the 
personal level of building one’s character (cf. EE, 15). Although Martha’s 
personal development does not cease to be a centre of attention in the 
novel’s second and third parts, the text’s scope noticeably widens as the 
issues of collective memory and consequently also collective identity 
gain importance.  
The analogy between individual and collective identity is furthermore 
underlined by postmodern theories of memory, which stress that the 
dialectics between past and memory are not linear in terms of a seizable 
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past being the basis for memory. The contrary is the case: “Erinnern 
konstruiert Vergangenheit” (Schmidt, 217). 
 
Gedächtnis und Erinnerung spielen eine entscheidende Rolle beim 
Aufbau und dem Erhalt individueller wie gesellschaftlicher Identität. 
Ohne individuelle und soziale Selbstkonzepte und 
Geschichtsentwürfe können die ablaufenden Prozesse der 
Selbstvergewisserung keine Stabilität bekommen. […] Kultur, 
Gedächtnis und Erinnerung sind daher autokonstitutiv und in diesem 
Sinne abgekoppelt von der sog. Objektivität der geschichtlichen 
Ereignisse. (Schmidt, 217) 
 
Martha’s disbelief in her own memory thus represents a problem with 
regard to the constitution of what is commonly perceived as a stable 
identity. Her awareness of all the ongoing processes of self-deception in 
relation to giving meaning to her life prevents her from getting involved 
with the world. Barnes depicts her as a highly reflective character and, 
hence, she remains detached form her own personality, detached from 
the Pitmanian project and finally also detached from her surroundings in 
Anglia. It can be argued that, paradoxically, Martha’s insights into her 
own personality and the world around her designate her to remain an 
outsider forever.  
 
3.1.1.2) England, England and Anglia - Trusting Collective Memory  
 
The specific difference between the individual Martha and the 
collective memory of England is the latter’s lack of scepticism. While 
Martha displays a tendency to cynically question anything that comes her 
way, society is characterised by a passive receptiveness. While the 
novel’s plot evolves around Martha, Sir Jack Pitman and the project 
management, the target of their enterprise, i.e., the future customers, 
whose collective memory the theme park is based on, is not even 
ascribed a minor active role. Different voices within the collective get lost 
in the data of statistics and later on dissolve in the anonymity of tourist 
masses. 
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In order to excavate the essence of what people, that is the potential 
customers of “Quality Leisure” (EE, 47), associate with England, the 
project’s management commissions a survey of the “[t]op fifty 
characteristics associated with the word England” in order to find out 
“how much people know” (EE, 58). The results are meant to provide the 
basis for the future theme park. The outcomes, however, are not too 
encouraging: the top characteristics associated with Englishness cannot 
be directly taken over by the project as planned, because they do not 
only include the most marketable images of Englishness. While the top 
three attributes, the Royal Family, Big Ben/Houses of Parliament and 
Manchester United, will not present any major problem regarding their 
reconstruction on the Isle of Wight, other traits like hypocrisy, which 
ranks right after double-decker buses, or a stiff upper lip, frigidity or bad 
smell (cf. EE, 83-84) will have to be adapted or even abandoned 
altogether in order to ensure economic success.  
An analysis of the 50 English quintessences displays a definite 
orientation towards the past, as the top ranking Royal Family, Big Ben or 
Robin Hood prove. Cynically, those quintessences, which do not bear 
any explicit reference to the past, but rather describe what might be the 
general timeless picture of a collective English identity, are for the most 
part negatively connotated such as snobbery, hypocrisy or perfidy. 
Martha sarcastically points out the problem of marketability of these 
connotations: “[H]ow do we advertise the English? Come and meet 
representatives widely perceived […] as cold snobbish, emotionally 
retarded and xenophobic. As well as perfidious and hypocritical, of 
course” (EE, 108). Zerweck claims that the reinterpretation of these 
negative connotations into a “radikal bereinigte[…] Version von 
Englishness” (Zerweck, 260) is the main characteristic of Pitman’s 
undertaking. 
English people are not very charming and the days of English glory 
are to be located in the past. These are the prerequisites for Pitman’s 
economic but also – as he highlights - patriotic project. “I am a patriot 
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too, you forget” (EE, 37). His consultant Jerry Batson phrases the 
problem of the English present the following way: “So, England comes to 
me, and what do I say her? I say, ‘Listen, baby, face facts. We’re in the 
third millennium and your tits have dropped. The solution is not a push-
up bra.” (EE, 37). Yet, England’s advantage is that it is  
 
a nation of great age, great history, great accumulated wisdom. […] 
We are what others may hope to become. This isn’t self-pity, this is 
the strength of our position, our glory, our product placement. […] 
We must sell our past to other nations as their future. (EE, 39) 
 
England, England is an economic undertaking, which, however, from 
Pitman’s perspective has also patriotic undertones. Apart from the 
economic success he expects, he also perceives himself as the saviour 
of the grandeur of the English national past and takes this as a 
justification of an extreme restructuring and amalgamation of English 
history. Seeing that some of the survey’s outcomes would have to be 
dismissed as unusable and taking into account the general unfamiliarity 
with England’s official past on the part of the future target group, Sir Jack 
suggests that, since there is no knowledge to refer to, this knowledge 
has to be constructed. He advises Dr. Max, the project’s “Official 
Historian” (EE, 58): 
 
You are our Official Historian. You are responsible for our, how can I 
put it, for our history […] Well, the point of our history – and I stress 
the our – will be to make our guests, those bying what is for the 
moment referred to as Quality Leisure, feel better. […] Feel. We 
want them to feel less ignorant. Whether they are or not is quite 
another matter, even outside our jurisdiction  […] So we don’t 
threaten people. We don’t insult their ignorance. We deal in what 
they already understand  […] They’ll come to us to enjoy what they 
already know. (EE, 70-71) 
 
The lack of historical knowledge Dr. Max is confronted with in his 
survey might suggest that the collective memory presented does not 
exist on firm grounds. In this respect Vera Nünning mentions “that the 
national ‘echo-chamber’ supposedly ringing with voices and traces of the 
past is curiously hollow, consisting at best of names, dates or 
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meaningless catch-phrases” (Nünning, 66). Yet, Barnes appears to 
highlight the contrary. The less people know about the possible origins of 
their national past, the more stable is their collective identity. Dr. Max 
observes “that patriotism’s most eager bedfellow was ignorance, not 
knowledge” (EE, 82). In this sense, the novel implicitly hints at Martha’s 
individual identity, which underlies the same structures as collective 
identity but is shown as the counter-experience. The more she knows 
about and reflects on her own history, the more she doubts it.  
In order to succeed in its enterprise the project has to reduce, 
simplify and caricature English history to a minimum of presupposed 
knowledge, a process which Martha calls a “repositioning of myths for 
modern times” (EE, 148). This process involves the disposal of 
‘unnecessary’ historical burdens. Sir Jack employs the well-worn 
metaphor of history as a heavy backpack:  
 
Why [were] people […] burdened by yesterday, and the day before, 
and the day before that? By history? Here, on the Island, they had 
learnt how to deal with history, how to sling it carelessly on your 
back and stride out across the downland with the breeze in your 
face. Travel light: it was true for nations as well as for hikers. (EE, 
203)  
 
The extent to which Sir Jack forces the lightness of his customer’s 
travels can be exemplified by the restructuring of “a primal English myth” 
(EE, 146): Robin Hood, “no. 7 on [the] list of The Fifty Quintessences of 
Englishness” (EE, 146). The myth is reshaped and adapted to fit 
contemporary circumstances. The changes concern all possible 
interpretations of adequate political correctness and only start with 
rethinking gender roles departing from the possible consequences of the 
assumption that Robin, in fact, is a sexually ambiguous name (cf. EE, 
146-152). 
As a counter narrative to all the ongoing processes of construction, 
be it the actual building of the theme-park itself or the related building of 
new traditions based on fragments of historical evidence, Barnes lets 
Martha be tempted by experiences of the real and authentic in the love-
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relationship with her colleague Paul. “[T]h novel,” James Miracky argues, 
“satirically explores the inauthenticity of ‘theme parking’ but also sets out 
in pursuit of the authentic or that which can be considered ‘real’, which 
Barnes seems to locate in human experience” (Miracky, 168). While in 
both their professional lives an aura of artificiality embraces all actions, in 
their scarce private time, they both attempt to be just and true to each 
other. “She was careful, she was honest; so was he” (EE, 89). Their 
relationship is based on high esteem and respect for each other and their 
apparently genuine affection for each other provides the counter balance 
to their artificial surroundings. Miracky sees the importance of the 
relationship reflected in the use of “the language of the real” (Miracky, 
168). Searching for an adequate description for his feelings for Martha 
Paul mentions: “That was the word: falling in love with Martha made 
things real” (EE, 103). Nevertheless, Martha, silently talking to herself, 
recognises that authenticity and happiness are not necessarily linked (cf. 
Pateman, 80) and the old cynicism awakes. 
 
-No, it feels like this: no games, no deceptions, no pretence, no 
betrayal.  
-Four negatives make a positive? 
-Shut up, shut up. Yes, by the way, they might. So shut up. 
-Don’t say a word, Martha. Sleep well. Just out of interest, why do 
you think you woke up? (EE, 97) 
 
As soon as her old cynical self reappears, the relationship is bound 
to fail and Martha withdraws from Paul. By testing the possibility of an 
authentic relationship Barnes seems to question the poststructuralist 
assumption “that the human subject has been disposed as an interesting 
ontological category” (Fjellman qtd. in Miracky, 168).  
The failure of a relationship based on terms of the true seems to go 
hand in hand with the flourishing of the project, which is deeply grounded 
in the discourse of the fake. “The Island” (EE, 179) is being fully 
accepted and ‘history light’ serves as a tourist magnet. Dr. Max explains 
how reality and history are adapted in order to make them fit for people’s 
taste.  
Julian Barnes’ England, England 
 50 
 
R-eality is r-ather like a r-abbit, […]. The great public – our distant, 
happily distant paymasters – want reality to be a pet bunny. […] If 
you gave them the real thing, something wild that bit, and if you’ll 
pardon me, shat, they wouldn’t know what to do with it. Except 
strangle it and cook it. (EE, 133) 
 
The real thing, the Official Historian points out, cannot be handled, 
thus, it has to be shaped and formed into something nice and neat, i.e. 
into something people feel happy to live with. By selecting just the 
positive attributes of English history and identity, by reshuffling them and 
by reducing them to a straightforward basis, Barnes suggests, a new 
English identity is being forged. This collective identity does not self-
reflectively question its own characteristics but passively accepts them. 
Martha as an individual struggles with coherence, trust and 
authenticity and represents the postmodern idea of a fragmented 
subject, presenting not a single coherent identity but competing 
experiences, which do not allow for a linear progessive development of 
Martha’s character. The masses, on the contrary, composed of an 
indefinite number of individuals, are happy with a preconstructed identity 
to take on. While a single personality stands for the multiplicity of 
possibilities, the multitude of characters only find refuge in a single, 
almost totalitarian collective identity preshaped by the project. 
Martha’s most intense experience on The Island is a meeting with 
the actor employed to play ‘Dr. Samuel Johnson’. However, he does not 
perceive himself as an actor anymore but as the real Dr. Johnson and, 
thus, develops the same personal characteristics as the historic model, 
for instance, he suffers from a heavy spleen, which apparently annoys 
customers. Vera Nünning observes: “The ‘English malady’ of melancholy 
may be English, but it was not accepted as such by visitors, who prefer 
and demand an idealized version of Englishness that is adjusted to the 
tastes of the present” (Nünning, 2001, 65). Martha realises that “[t]he 
Island was itself responsible for turning ‘Dr. Johnson’ into Dr. Johnson, 
for peeling off the protective quotation marks and leaving him vulnerable“ 
(EE, 217).  
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Yet when she talks to him, that is the fake Dr. Johnson, she gets the 
impression of experiencing truth and authenticity for the first time. “She 
was alone with another human creature” (EE, 211). All role-playing 
suddenly disappears. Neither is she the tough “business women, [n]or 
even a person of her time” (EE, 211). She simply is. And so is the 
superficially fake Dr. Johnson, who is far from enacting his role. When he 
leaves, Martha feels irritated: “he had behaved as if she were less real 
than he was. At the same time, she felt light-headed and flirtatiously 
calm, as if, after long search, she had found a kindred spirit” (EE, 212). 
To a certain extent he is more real than she is, because he takes on the 
historic Dr. Johnson in all his complexity, not just the ‘pet bunny’ as Dr. 
Max would call it, but the real ‘rabbit’. He is the same complex being as 
the historic Dr. Johnson, not just a simplified caricature of him as 
intended by the project. “The sudden truth she had felt when he leaned 
over her, wheezing and muttering, was that his pain was authentic […] 
because it came from authentic contact with the world” (EE, 218). The 
fake Dr. Johnson has turned into a Baudrillardian simulacrum, and has 
become indistinguishable from the real Dr. Johnson. Paradoxically, 
Martha feels the truth and authenticity of the simulacrum more than she 
has ever felt herself real, original. 
Martha, who does not believe in the project, is finally dismissed by 
the management and has to leave The Island. She finds refuge in old 
England, renamed Anglia. As all the national and international attention 
has been withdrawn from the country, Old England finds itself in a 
basically pre-industrial state. “[O]nly those with an active love of 
discomfort or necrophilic taste for the antique need venture there” (EE, 
185). Far from presenting a supposedly more authentic possibility of 
collective memory or national identity or even a utopian place, Barnes 
states that  
 
the third part is meant to be the slow movement of the book and it’s 
meant to be rather opaque and rather ambiguous. […] What I try to 
do is ask the question: say everything collapses somewhere, and 
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then you start again, what does that starting again consist of for a 
country? (Barnes qtd. in Guignery, History, 71-72) 
 
The Anglian village Martha is prepared to spend her old age in, is 
willing to start anew, and being completely robbed by its collective 
identity and its history it is confronted with the problem of reinventing a 
national tradition. “Old England had lost its history, and therefore – since 
memory is identity – had lost all sense of itself” (EE, 251). Barnes uses 
Anglia’s enterprise as a metaphor for all (re)constructions of history: 
 
In many ways, it’s a completely fake village. It’s a bogus village 
reinventing itself. We create something from fragments and bits of 
memory, national memory and we stick it together with a very rough 
glue, and then once it’s been there for a certain time, like a year, we 
think it’s real, this is authentic, and then we celebrate it – it’s 
fabulation all over again – convincing ourselves of a coherence 
between things that are largely true and things that are wholly 
imagined. (Barnes in Guignery, 2000, 72) 
 
Anglia is a curious amalgam of archaic and newly invented 
structures, claiming to be entirely authentic. For instance, there is Jez 
Harris, the former American legal expert Jack Oshinsky, who decided to 
“backdate both his name and his technology” (EE, 243) and to stay 
behind when his firm left the country. He takes enormous pleasure in 
inventing folk tales and “play[ing] the yokel whenever some 
anthropologist, travel writer or linguist theoretician would turn up 
inadequately disguised as a tourist” (EE, 243). Martha is only mildly 
amused at all the undertakings to establish a new sense of village 
identity, one of which is the “reviv[al] – or perhaps, since record were 
inexact, [the] institut[ion] of a village Fête” (EE, 245). Yet, she is willing to 
contribute some of her childhood memories, as she “unlike most of the 
village’s current occupants, had actually grown up in the countryside” 
(EE, 245). Despite the fact that Martha is able to contribute one of the 
scarce possibly authentic memories, the villagers vote in favour of newly 
invented traditions for their constitutional celebration. Martha, socially on 
the margin of Anglia, reflects: 
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She was not sure if she had done right, if Anglia had done right, if a 
nation could reverse its course and habits. Was it mere willed 
antiquarianism […] – or had that trait been part of its nature, its 
history anyway? Was it a brave new venture, one of spiritual 
renewal and moral self-sufficiency, as political leaders maintained? 
Or was it simple inevitable, a forced response to economic collapse, 
depopulation and European revenge? (EE, 257) 
 
The villagers do not care, they are happy with their newly invented 
tradition, defined as “hybrid amusement” (Miracky, 169) by Miracky. “The 
Fête was established; already it seemed to have its history” (EE, 266). At 
night, when Martha feels bored by the Fête she leaves and watches the 
new national dance “[t]he conga, national dance of Cuba and Anglia” 
(EE, 265) from the nearby hill. Ironically, it is a rabbit that captures her 
attention. Rustling nearby it was “fearless and quietly confident of its 
territory” (EE, 266). The inhabitants of Anglia have finally managed to 
create their own version of ‘history light’, i.e. their own ‘pet bunny’. 
History, Barnes seems to suggest, is not inexistent, yet it is as 
inaccessible as a wild rabbit.  
Both England, England and Anglia base their possible collective 
identity on the artificial constructions of fake traditions. Despite the fact 
that on The Island the commercialisation of tradition works on a much 
larger scale, the same processes are at work in Anglia, where a colourful 
past is invented in order to satisfy scarce visitors who are interested in 
Anglia for scientific reasons only. Yet, in Anglia there is also the 
tendency to invent traditions not only for tourists but for the villagers’ own 
sake. They need a tradition in order to be grounded, rooted. The fact that 
these roots are constructs does not prevent them from feeling authentic. 
The Anglian endeavour proves to be as ridiculous as the large-scale 
economic enterprise, nevertheless it feels definitely more pathetic as the 
community itself aims at establishing a collective identity. 
In England, England it is the project’s management that decides 
which myths to reproduce or how to adapt them. The people, i.e. the 
tourists, are merely the target. They are passive consumers. Umberto 
Eco, in his analysis of Disneyland argues in the same line: “An allegory 
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of the consumer society, a place of absolute iconism, Disneyland is also 
a place of total passivity. Its visitors agree to behave like […] robots” 
(Eco). In Anglia, on the contrary, the inhabitants of the village themselves 
are the creators of the myths and traditions. They actively construct, and 
decide what to take and what to leave. Yet, in the end they also have 
their “pet bunny”. The rabbit, real history, is hopping on alone at night, 
unseizable as Geoffrey Braithwaite’s piglet in Flaubert’s Parrot. 
Anglia’s inhabitants consciously reject the only connection they have 
to the past, that is records in books and Martha’s own memories of her 
childhood. In fact, however, this does not make any difference as these 
records or Martha’s memory are as constructed as the new inventions. 
Dr. Max was right when he stated: “[T]here is no authentic moment of 
beginning, of purity, however hard their devotees pretend. […] What we 
are looking at is almost always the replica […] of something earlier” (EE, 
132). In his essay “Fake!” published in Letters from London (1995) 
Barnes himself argues against the possibility of ever recovering authentic 
origins, both as an individual and as a nation: 
 
The British are good at tradition; they’re also good at the invention of 
tradition […]. And like any other nation, they aren’t too keen on 
having those invented traditions exposed as bogus. […] And since 
any individual identity depends in part upon national identity, what 
happens, when those symbolic props to national identity turn out to 
be no more authentic or probable than a fur-bearing trout?” (Barnes, 
Fake!, 27-28) 
 
By deconstructing authenticity, Barnes thereby also implicitly 
undermines the concept of mimetic literary representation. The constant 
questioning of the real and the original on various levels hints at an 
additional level not explicitly mentioned, that is the level of narrative 
construction. The narration pinpoints the constructedness of individual 
identity and the constructedness of collective identity and thereby 
successfully highlights its own constructedness, its status as fictum (cf. 
Zerweck, 262). By establishing an analogy between real and fictional 
processes, Barnes accentuates the blurring of the boundaries between 
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fact and fiction und thus alludes to the fictionality of reality (cf. Domsch, 
27), which according to Sebastian Domsch has been Baudrillard’s main 
contribution to contemporary theory. With reference to Baudrillard, 
Sebastian Domsch affirms that the simulacrum signifies an ontological 
uncertainty, which results from the difficulty of distinguishing reality and 
non-reality.  
 
3.1.2) (DE)CONSTRUCTING ORIGINALITY – THE REPLICA’S RULE 
 
The quest for or the deconstruction of the authentic in England, 
England does not only indulge in the analogy between personal and 
collective identity-construction. Again posing epistemological questions 
alongside sociocultural realities, Barnes furthermore sets the question of 
possible relations between original and replica, i.e. simulacrum. The 
theme-park version of England and its counterpart, the apparently 
original mother country, are the basis for deliberations on identity and 
difference. The condensed replication of England, which supersedes the 
original functions as a parody of the Baudrillardian conception of the 
simulacrum. 
Baudrillard’s theory is not only instrumentalised as an abstract 
allusion to the postmodern problem of representation, but by introducing 
a “French Intellectual” (EE, 52), whose function is the scholarly 
justification of the project, Barnes, though not explicitly referring to him, 
presents an ironic subversion of Baudrillard’s ideas. It can be argued that 
Barnes offers a reversal of late twentieth-century Baudrillardian thought 
as a widely shared philosophical point of view in the early 21st century. 
“[I]n our intertextual world […] reference, however ironic, is of course 
implicit and inevitable” (EE, 53), the French Intellectual puts forward, and 
thereby self-reflectively alludes to his own state of being a parody of 
Baudrillard. 
While Baudrillard, in his pessimistic cultural theory of our simulacral 
age of mass-media, – it is not by chance that Sir Jack Pitman is a media 
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tycoon resembling ‘originals’ such as the late Robert Maxwell or Rupert 
Murdoch – laments the loss of direct access to reality, Barnes’ 
intellectual celebrates this step as an advance. The original is a concept 
of the past, he seems to suggest, and should, thus, be discharged in 
favour of the replica. There is no longer the need for the original as a 
point of reference as technology is able to (re)produce the original and, 
accordingly, it is capable of constructing an alternative reality, both more 
complex and more convenient than conventional reality. 
 
It is well established […] that nowadays we prefer the replica to the 
original. We prefer the reproduction of the work of art to the work of 
art itself, the perfect sound and solitude of the compact disc to the 
symphony concert in the company of thousand victims of throat 
complaints, the book on tape to the book on the lap. (EE, 53) 
 
 Yet, the French Intellectual concedes, this euphoric perspective on 
contemporary culture was not commonly shared right away. “When such 
discoveries were first made, there were certain old-fashioned people who 
expressed disappointment, even shame” (EE, 53-54). The reference to 
old-fashioned people might very well be set in relation to the work of 
Walter Benjamin, Guy Debord or Baudrillard himself.  
Benjamin, in his important essay “Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner 
technischen Reproduzierbarkeit,” testified a loss of aura to the original 
piece of art in the age of technical reproduction. This aura, defined by a 
“Hier und Jetzt” (Benjamin, 12), guarantees the work of art’s authenticity. 
Authenticity, however, Benjamin underlines, cannot be technically 
reproduced. Yet, ironically pinpointing the antiquarianism of such a 
perspective, the success of England, England shows that the uniqueness 
or a Hier und Jetzt of premier sites does not play a major role in touristic 
tastes. A factor by far more crucial and characteristic for contemporary 
consumer society is convenience. “[I]f given the option between an 
inconvenient ‘original’ or a convenient replica, a high proportion of 
tourists would opt for the latter” (EE, 181).  
Julian Barnes’ England, England 
 57 
The Situationist Guy Debord is directly cited by Pitman’s own ironic 
“Haus-Baudrillard” (Häntzschel qtd. in Zerweck, 263), yet remains 
unnamed. 
 
Permit me to cite one of my fellow-countryman […] ‘All that was 
once directly lived’, he wrote, ‘has become mere representation’. A 
profound truth, even if conceived in profound error. For he intended 
it, astonishingly, as criticism not praise. To cite him further: ‘[…] 
there remains nothing, in our culture or in nature, which has not 
been transformed, and polluted according to the means and 
interests of modern industry.’ (EE, 45-55) 
 
Debord’s seminal text, The Society of the Spectacle (1967), serves 
to highlight yet another ‘old-fashioned’ strand of twentieth-century 
pessimistic analysis of consumer society. The French Intellectual 
contends: “He understood, this old thinker, that we live in the world of the 
spectacle” (EE, 5). However, a nostalgic longing for the real thing would 
not correspond to 21st century attitudes. In contrast, representation ”is 
not a substitute for that plain and primitive world, but an enhancement 
and enrichment, an ironisation and summation of that world. […] Is it our 
loss? No, it is our conquest, our victory” (EE, 55).  
Barnes has the ‘original’ 20th-century-Baudrillard undergo a process 
of what Martha calls a “repositioning of myths for modern times” (EE, 
148). His philosophy is reshaped and fitted nicely into the author’s 
narrative purposes. In Simulacra and Simulation (1985) Baudrillard 
develops a theory of representation which argues that reality has been 
irretrievably lost. The only way of perceiving the world is channelled by 
universal simulacra. Yet, according to Baudrillard, this was not always 
the case. Baudrillard’s theory of simulacra is marked by three different 
stages of the image in the cultural development from the renaissance to 
the industrial revolution and our present stage of hyperreality. It can be 
argued that Baudrillard extends the Platonic triadic structure regarding 
the relationship between original and copy, i.e., original, faithful copy and 
simulacrum, to a fourth stage. Baudrillard, mainly interested in the 
different functions of the image, takes the original, i.e. in his terms reality, 
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for granted and starts with the “image as the reflection of a profound 
reality” (Baudrillard, Simulacra, 6). This first Baudrillardian stage 
corresponds to the second Platonic state, that is, the stage of the good 
copy. The second Baudrillardian stage of the simulacrum “masks and 
denatures a profound reality” (Baudrillard, Simulacra, 6) and thus can be 
equated with the final Platonic stage, i.e. the unfaithful copy or the 
simulacrum. For Baudrillard, however, the simulacrum reaches yet 
another stage which “marks the absence of a profound reality [and 
consequently] has no relation to any reality whatsoever: it is its own pure 
simulacrum” (Baudrillard, Simulacra, 6). In Deleuzian terms, it would be 
defined as entirely different and no more enslaved by attributes of 
similarity. Yet, Baudrillard does not choose a terminology of difference 
but one of priority. In its last stage, the simulacrum is prior to the original, 
signifying a reality created by the simulacrum. Shortly put, Baudrillard’s 
first and second stages of the simulacrum demand a pre-existing 
original, while at the third stage, which is also defined as hyperreality, the 
pre-existing simulacrum shapes reality. In hyperreality society “hat sich 
hier von jedem Bezug zu einem im Realen begründeten Ursprung gelöst” 
(Domsch, 29). 
Barnes both parodies and makes graspable this rather abstract 
theory. The theme park England, England, it can be observed, is 
designed to commence on the second order of the simulacrum. It is not a 
direct copy or a faithful image of the mother country, but an “original 
reproduction (oxymoron intended)” (Nünning, 61) as it aims at a 
condensation, i.e. at retrieving the essence of what used to be England 
by means of selection and adaptation. “Ignorant critics”, the French 
Intellectual warns the project’s management, “will no doubt assert that 
you are merely attempting to recreate Olde England […]” (EE, 55). 
However, Pitman’s goal reaches far beyond a mere replication, rather, 
he wants to achieve to “substitute the real for the signs of the real” 
(Baudrillard, Simulacra, 2).  
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Following the principles of ‘history light’ and ‘correct product 
placement’, England, England, on the second order of the simulacrum 
does not mimetically reflect the reality of old England but denatures it. 
Consequently the boundaries between the fake and the original begin to 
blur. Actors, employed to represent the historical characters, for 
instance, undergo a process of identification with their models. The gang 
of Robin Hood and his Merrie Men refuse to stay within the strictly 
defined bonds of their role-playing and begin to act like real outlaws. 
They turn into the historical characters. And so does the actor of the 
historic Dr. Johnson. By taking on all of the latter’s character traits, Dr. 
Johnson becomes his own simulacrum. In this sense, a certain 
development manifests itself, which lets the project hover on the edge 
between the simulacral stages two and three.  
However, taking into account the proceedings in old England, that is 
Anglia, it can be argued that Barnes suggests that the original country 
England, England referred to when it started as a project, no longer 
exists and thus England, England lacks any reference to a pre-existent 
reality. It has turned into a third order simulacrum, which precedes the 
original.  
Barnes’ application of Baudrillard’s theory of the simulacrum has 
been both celebrated and disapproved of by critics. Miracky, for instance, 
appreciates the author’s attempt at making a complex and sometimes 
even opaque theory ironically palpable. According to Miracky “Barnes 
satirizes both the world of hyperreality and that of critical theory, in effect 
creating a parody of a parody, or a novel that continually turns in on 
itself” (Miracky, 165). Pateman, however, does not contribute to the 
panegyric and argues that Barnes falls prey to oversimplifying 
postmodern theory.  The dialectics between the simulacra and the real  
 
ha[s] been the mainstay of much of contemporary theory and 
philosophizing. Translating some of these often obscure and difficult 
arguments into novelistic form here has the effect of sometimes 
banalizing the arguments, and sometimes obscuring the novel. […] 
While [the French Intellectual’s] exposition is certainly a reasonable 
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pastiche of a sort of postmodern theory, it sits uneasily here. 
[M]ainly because it reads like a lesson that Barnes himself is proud 
to have learned so well, but rather embarrassed to have included. 
(Pateman, 79) 
 
Moreover, Pateman repeatedly points out the novel’s lack of artistic 
originality and draws attention to its resemblance to Barnes’ earlier 
novels Metroland (1980) and Talking It Over (1991). As a kind of self-
referential pastiche, England, England could be labelled, Pateman 
argues. Yet, he views the technique Barnes apparently employs, i.e. “the 
strategies of simulacra, inauthenticity, and fake in order to tell a story of 
simulacra, inauthenticity, and fake” (Pateman, 75) as not very 
sophisticated in its far too blatant ways of calling attention to itself.  
The lack of control we can exert on reality makes us fear it, the 
French Intellectual says. Accordingly, it is only a logical consequence 
that controllable simulacra of that reality assure us in our yearning for 
power and dominance. 
 
[W]e must understand and confront our insecurity, our existential 
indecision, the profound atavistic fear we experience when we are 
face to face with the original. We have nowhere to hide when we are 
presented with an alternative reality to our own, a reality which 
appears more powerful and therefore threatens us. […] We must 
demand the replica since the reality, the truth, the authenticity of the 
replica is the one we can possess, colonise, reorder, […]. (EE, 54-
55) 
 
Sir Jack does not see himself capable of averting the loss of 
importance and seriousness of England, “dubiously termed ‘the original’ 
(EE, 54). Yet, the reproduction, the simulacra, provides him with 
unlimited power. It can be argued that the mighty father figure in the 
novel’s first part with its ability of re-establishing metaphorical coherence 
by means of the jigsaw-puzzle serves as the anticipation of Sir Jack’s 
patriarchal power. The analogy between the jigsaw as a symbolic 
replication of England and the theme park-replica draws attention to the 
fact that in both cases the father-figure, i.e. the epitome of human 
supremacy, is not apt to master reality itself.  Only the reality of the 
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replica is governable. ‘Original’ reality, which of course is also implicitly 
questioned as a fictional(ised) construct, withdraws from his sphere of 
influence.  
Pitman is growing old and hence the idea of one last great strike, 
one last assertion of power, increasingly manifests itself: the 
megalomaniac project of replicating the glory of England. “We are not 
talking theme-park. […] We are not talking heritage centre. We are not 
talking Disneyland. […] We shall offer far more […] We are offering the 
thing itself“ (EE, 59). Yet, the Disneyesque atmosphere of England, 
England cannot be fully discarded. In a Baudrillardian conception 
Disneyland is not concerned with a deceivingly authentic reproduction of 
a supposed reality but with exceeding the limits of reality. In his analysis 
of America Baudrillard even argues that Disneyland is staged as overtly 
imaginative in order to cover the fact that the rest of American reality has 
already ceased to be real itself.  
All of [America’s] values are exalted by the miniature […]. Embalmed 
and pacified. [Disneyland is:] digest of the American way of life, […] 
idealized transposition of a contradictory reality. Certainly. But this 
masks something else and this ‘ideological’ blanket functions as a 
cover for a simulation of the third order: Disneyland exists in order to 
hide that it is the ‘real’ country, all of ‘real’ America that is Disneyland 
(a bit like prisoners are there to hide that it is the social in its entirety, 
in its banal omnipresence, that is carceral). (Baudrillard, Simulacra, 
12) 
 
A straightforward application of this idea to England, England proves 
to be futile as the theme park does not function as a – however fake - 
self-confirmation of a ‘real’ England, but is meant to entirely replace it. 
’Original’ England has ceased to exist and thus cannot be compared to 
England, England. Thus, Pateman’s accusation of the novel’s 
oversimplification of complex theories becomes palpable. 
Simultaneously, however, it can be argued that Barnes takes the idea of 
‘repositioning myths for moderns times’ so far as to pick out only 
fragments of Baudrillard’s theory in order to instrumentalize them for his 
own textual purposes. In doing so, he once more underlines the 
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processes of construction on the level of content as well on the structural 
level. 
Baudrillard is not the only one to analyse American reality from a 
euro-centric perspective. Eco’s Travels in Hyperreality (1991), for 
instance, has also become widely known. For Eco, Disneyland embodies 
what he defines as “the Absolute Fake” (Eco, Travels). And he agrees 
with Baudrillard that the participation in the spectacle functions as a 
means to assure oneself of one’s own reality. “[T]he customer finds 
himself participating in the fantasy because of his own authenticity as a 
consumer” (Eco, Travels). Moreover, Eco argues that “Disneyland tells 
us that technology can give us more reality than nature can […] and 
afterwards reality will always be inferior to it” (Eco, Travels). He thereby 
agrees with Baudrillard and also Boorstin’s analysis of pseudo-events, 
which claims that fake reality tends to supersede reality because the 
former can be controlled, intensified and presented as unambiguous (cf. 
Boorstin, 36-40). 
While some of Barnes’ attempts to ironically appropriate specific 
Baudrillardian elements appear to be rather forced and while, according 
to Pateman, others even completely fail (cf. Pateman, 72-81), the 
hilarious parody of a general Baudrillardian perspective exhibits Barnes’ 
virtuosity as a postmodern novelist. Baudrillard laments: “[i]t’s as if art, 
like history, was recycling its own garbage and looking for redemption in 
its own detritus” (Baudrillard, Objects, 8). Pitman’s entire project is a 
celebrated recycling of historical garbage and thus an ironic subversion 
of Baudrillard’s complaints.  
“Employing quotation, simulation, reappropriation, it seems that 
contemporary art is about to reappropriate all forms and works of the 
past, near or far […] in a more or less ludic or kitsch fashion” 
(Baudrillard, Objects, 7). While Baudrillard perceives the ludic aspect of 
postmodern art as hollow and uncreative, Barnes seems to act in line 
with mainstream postmodern theory as represented for instance by Linda 
Hutchean, and revels in the ludic potential of contemporary art. The two 
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perspectives will hardly be reconciled as Baudrillard argues: “Of course, 
all of this remaking and recycling claim to be ironic; but this form of irony 
is like a threadbare piece of cloth – a by-product of disillusion – a 
fossilized irony” (Baudrillard, Objects, 7). Barnes’ novel, however, does 
not appear to be fossilized. On the contrary, the self-reflective irony 
employed indeed reveals the threads of a piece of cloth, but only to 
make visible how its different layers are interwoven to form an apparent 
unity in the first place.  
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3.2) PETER ACKROYD’S CHATTERTON 
 
Born three years after Julian Barnes, i.e. in 1949, Ackroyd and the 
former belong to a generation of British writers who explicitly and 
implicitly process postmodern concerns in their literary works. Ackroyd’s 
ideas on contemporary theory were first expressed when he was 
studying at Yale in the early 1970s. His Notes for a new Culture (1976), 
which he later called “a polemic” rather than an essay, is deeply 
grounded in French and American poststructural theory, its main 
theoretical influences being Derrida and Lacan. Even though Ackroyd 
has later relativised some of his more radical ideas articulated in the 70s, 
he nevertheless foregrounds that the basic tone of this essay would still 
correspond to his theoretical convictions today (cf. Finney, Chatterton). 
His fascination with postmodern concerns such as the revaluation of 
historical knowledge, one of the underlying ideas in Chatterton, are 
prevalent in most of Ackroyd’s literary works mediated via fictional (auto) 
biographies such as e.g. The Last Testament of Oscar Wilde (1983) or 
via self-conscious reworkings of historical events such as for instance in 
his well-known text Hawksmoor (1985). Historiographic metafiction is 
one of the preferred genres the author is known to adopt as a means of 
artistic expression. 
Like Julian Barnes and many other writers of the postmodern era, 
Peter Ackroyd is highly conscious of and reflexive on postmodern 
epistemological and aesthetic positions based on contemporary theory. 
Both novelists exhibit a deep awareness of the dialectics between 
postmodernism and orthodox views on history, reality, truth and 
originality. 
However, while Barnes in his satirical novel England, England tends 
to focus on the sociocultural aspect of contemporary experience, 
Ackroyd opts for explicitly addressing the sphere of art itself. He thereby 
accentuates the extent to which art both forms and is formed by so-
called reality. Whereas Barnes stresses artificiality in relation to the (re-) 
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creation of a nation’s history on the shaky basis of collective memory 
correlating with contemporary consumer society, Ackroyd emphasises 
this constructedness of history by interlinking it with artistic practices. 
Thus, his main argument is that history and fiction share the same 
ontological characteristics, i.e. both are highly subjective and ‘created’. 
Much like England, England, Chatterton shatters the enlightened 
assumption of history as “pure fact, independent of individual perception, 
ideology, or the process of selection necessitated simply by creating a 
written narrative” (Lee, 29). 
The idea of writing history as a rather passive undertaking, which is 
moreover generally regarded as a direct and mimetic depiction of reality 
is contrasted with artistic production, generally perceived as active, 
creative and imaginative. Ackroyd reveals that this traditional distinction 
cannot be maintained, as both spheres – if at all one can distinguish one 
from the other – share more characteristics than there are to separate 
them. 
Ackroyd explores this basic postmodern frame challenging so-called 
‘truths’ in order to raise a number of other related questions. Chatterton 
is set in the artistic world of poets and painters and in this respect 
Ackroyd draws attention to one of the most pressing issues concerning 
art, i.e. the distinction between original and fake or copy.  
Ackroyd here establishes the same line of argumentation as in his 
history versus fiction or art discourse. Conventional enlightened theory is 
based on the following dichotomy: history is real/true and thus contrary 
to art, which is invented. Within the sphere of art itself there is to be 
detected a similar structure. An original piece of art by a clearly 
identifiable artist is claimed to be truthful, authentic and valuable, 
whereas the copied, faked or forged piece of art only simulates 
originality, which means that it is judged to be of a secondary and 
indirect nature. 
Like history the originality of a work of art is regarded as organic, 
while fiction or a faked work of art is constructed. In this respect Edward 
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Young comments: “[a]n original may be said to be of a vegetable nature; 
it rises spontaneously from the vital root of genius; it grows, it is not 
made” (Young qtd. in Höfele, Originalität, 77). Andreas Höfele 
furthermore contrasts the perceived authority of the original in relation to 
the fake/forgery and thus explains: 
 
Fälschungen ‚wachsen’ nicht, sie werden gemacht. Origin, origo, 
Ursprung – diese Wörter bestimmen die Genese des Kunstwerks als 
natürlichen Prozeß, der in der organischen, der gewachsenen 
Einheit, des fertigen Textes resultiert. Im Gegensatz dazu 
bezeichnen die englischen Wörter forgery und fabrication 
menschliche Tätigkeiten. (Höfele, Originalität, 77) 
 
Thus, in Chatterton, the ontological uncertainty regarding the nature 
of art and consequently also the nature of reality, provides the basic 
battleground on which to negotiate competing assumptions prevalent in 
20th century cultural and literary theory.  
Short-listed for the 1987 Booker Prize, Peter Ackroyd’s celebrated 
fourth novel Chatterton is placed in the world of art, more precisely the 
world of poets and painters. Ackroyd employs three different yet 
interrelated storylines set in different historical periods, all of which are 
revolving around the historical figure of Thomas Chatterton. Chatterton, 
a young 18th century poet, became (in-)famous for his forging of 
medieval poems ascribed to a medieval monk named Thomas Rowley, 
whose entire existence was invented by Chatterton himself. 
Ackroyd locates his first narrative strand in the late 18th century, i.e. 
Chatterton’s own lifetime and depicts both his short life and death. 
Official historical records claim the young poet to have committed suicide 
at the age of only 17 due to his lack of success on the literary market 
with works published under his own name.  
The second narrative sets its focus on the Victorian period. The 
painter Henry Wallis is fascinated with the idea of portraying the young 
Chatterton on his deathbed. In order to establish the greatest realism 
possible he asks the poet George Meredith, another historical figure, to 
model the dying Chatterton. Wallis’ portrait The Death of Thomas 
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Chatterton (1856) is said to be the only one of the late poet and turns out 
to be one of the sources of the ongoing fascination with the figure of 
Chatterton. 
The third storyline is set in the late 20th century and concentrates on 
yet another but entirely fictional writer, the unsuccessful poet Charles 
Wychwood, who, inspired by a different portrait of Chatterton showing 
him as a middle-aged man and therefore contradicting official records, 
which highlight Chatterton’s early death, sets out to find out the truth 
about the mysterious forger Thomas Chatterton. 
The central link holding the three scenic approaches together is 
provided by the figure of Chatterton, who can be taken as symbolic of 
literary and artistic concerns in general. By choosing this controversial 
historical person as the centre of his historiographic metafictional novel, 
Ackroyd sets the scene for a highly self-reflexive enquiry into the 
interrelated spheres of art, reality, originality and history.  
 
3.2.1) NARRATING (TRANS)HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE   
 
Introduced by a number of paratextual passages Peter Ackroyd’s 
text first of all is preceded by an official historical record of Chatterton’s 
life. Like an encyclopaedic entry these first lines seem to comprise the 
most important details about his short life and his artistic work, part of 
which made him (in)famous as the great forger of the medieval Rowley 
poems (cf. Ch2, 1). 
Presented as a linear and coherent version of history this 
introductory entry is followed and contrasted by four different fragments 
from the three different storylines set in the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. 
While the first three fragments are in chronological order and correspond 
to the respective historical setting, by the end of the fourth fragment the 
novel’s challenging of traditional logics of space and time becomes 
                                                
2 References regarding Chatterton will be abbreviated as Ch in the following chapters. 
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obvious, as here the 18th century poet Chatterton interacts with 20th 
century Charles Wychwood. 
The paratextual strategy employed in the beginning highlights the 
author’s double aim, as it stresses Ackroyd’s consciousness of balancing 
structural against content elements. On the one hand, he offers a 
concise anticipation of the novel’s content in terms of thematising its 
most pressing concerns, i.e. art, authorship, history, authenticity and the 
questioning of a linear conception of historical development (cf. Ch, 2-3). 
On the other hand, Ackroyd simultaneously forecloses his narrative 
technique, which heavily relies on repetition, variation and pastiche. It 
can be argued that these first paratextual fragments form a mise en 
abyme of the text proper with all its variations on both content and 
structural level. In short, Ackroyd fastidiously executes what he allows to 
be Chatterton’s view of originality but at the same time he also offers a 
postmodern contribution to the highly polemic issue of artistic originality: 
“Chatterton knew that original genius consists in forming new and happy 
combinations, rather than in searching after thoughts and ideas which 
had never occurred before” (Ch, 58). 
Chatterton inspires the painter Wallis as well as the poets Meredith 
and Wychwood in their work, much like a predecessor inspires the 
generations to follow. This conventional approach, based on a linear and 
causal understanding of time is expanded and simultaneously subverted 
by Ackroyd, as he allows his novel to undermine conventional 
conceptions of historical experience by transgressing temporal 
constraints. In this respect Susana Onega speaks of  
 
a cyclical space-time continuum that constantly feeds on itself and 
simultaneously moves both forward and backward, so that the 
protagonists of each story, the visionary poets Thomas Chatterton, 
George Meredith, and Charles Wychwood, can easily cross their 
respective historical boundaries and interact with each other. 
(Onega, Metafiction, 60) 
 
While Susana Onega comprehends time in Chatterton as cyclical, 
Brian Finney underlines Ackroyd’s understanding of time as “essentially 
Peter Ackroyd’s Chatterton 
 70 
atemporal”, as “past and present interact in the moment” (Finney, 
Chatterton). However, a more accurate way of describing Ackroyd’s use 
of temporal development throughout the novel would be a transhistorical 
conception of time in terms of a symbiosis of Onega and Finney, which 
allows for both, a meandering between different times without rejecting 
historical experience as such and a temporal experience not limited to a 
circular matrix.  
It has to be noticed, however, that the 18th century’s Chatterton is 
more likely to transcend his historical period in order to interact with his 
literary companions in later periods than Wychwood or Meredith are able 
to retrocede in history. Chatterton supports his fellow poets in moments 
of crisis, such as during Charles’ malady foreshadowing his actual death 
(cf. Ch, 47, 78, 152) or when Meredith considers suicide after having 
acknowledged the failure of his marriage (cf. Ch, 70). It appears that the 
timeless essence of art impersonated by Chatterton is most seizable in 
contemplation of death.  The motif of death, and more precisely the motif 
of the death of the artist is a recurrent one in Chatterton. It is not by 
chance that Ackroyd here echoes Roland Barthes’ The Death of the 
Author. Similar to Barthes Ackroyd seems to argue that the artist and 
especially the author is not immortalised by his works, but by the traces 
his works leave in the works of other artists, i.e. his influence is of a 
purely intertextual nature. 
Death, art and the immortalisation of the artist become topical as 
Chatterton lives on through his fame of being a great forger as well as 
through being represented by Meredith in Wallis’ portrait.  Ackroyd 
makes a point of the traces left by Chatterton when he describes Wallis 
at work: ”On the following morning he began. […] But as he watched that 
absolute white drying slowly on the canvas he could already see 
‘Chatterton’ as a final union of light and shadow” (Ch, 164). 
Traces of Meredith live on in the portrait and traces of Charles can 
be found in Philip’s discovery of his own artistic creativity. The author 
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lives on, though not directly in his texts but indirectly as part of an 
intertextual system. 
Meredith and Charles access Chatterton’s world first of all by so-
called historical knowledge, in the case of the former provided by Wallis’ 
project and in the case of the latter provided by the documents which 
Charles takes to be originally composed by Chatterton. Apart from this 
access, which is linked to the sphere of reason, logic and temporal 
causality, both poets furthermore get into contact with Chatterton in the 
irrational world of dreams or daydreams. Meredith mentions:  
 
’Did I tell you, Henry, that I dreamed of Chatterton the other night? I 
was passing him on some old stairs. What does that signify?’ ‘I 
believe stairs are an emblem. Was that your word? Stairs are an 
emblem of time’. (Ch, 139) 
 
Charles is able to transcend time and to enter the world of 
Chatterton when his son Edward and he are taking in Wallis’ picture of 
Chatterton in the Tate Gallery for the first time. In a daydream-like 
manner Charles here anticipates his own death and perceives himself as 
the corpse in Chatterton’s attic room (cf. Ch, 132). 
 If Meredith, Wallis and Charles believe to gain access to the past 
via so-called historical knowledge, this allegedly objective sphere of 
historical knowledge is reduced to absurdity. Wallis, aiming at the 
greatest realism possible, constructs a pseudo-realist setting for his 
portrait with Meredith acting as the representation of the dead 
Chatterton. Furthermore, Charles, on investigating into the death of 
Chatterton, falls prey to faked historical documents on his part.  
Ackroyd’s criticism of enlightened culture follows the argument that 
conventional historical theory grants historical research unchallenged 
authority as regards the representation of the past. Ackroyd hence 
deconstructs this dogma by presenting alternative but equally valid and 
most importantly fragmented versions of the historical events in 
question. According to official records Chatterton committed suicide due 
to his lack of literary success. Ackroyd, however, offers two further 
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alternatives. One possible version describes Chatterton as a person who 
did not only fake poetry, but furthermore even faked his own death in 
order to be able to continue his practices without being restrained by the 
hypocritical corset of society (cf. Ch, 81-92). The other alternative 
Ackroyd offers is Chatterton’s accidental death caused by an overdose 
of arsenic meant to cure a venereal disease (cf. Ch, 191-234). All three 
versions appear equally credible, yet they contradict each other. Ackroyd 
hereby once more draws attention to the fact that the return to past 
events, which seem more or less easily retrievable, is constructed and 
its truth claim highly questionable, while the move forward in history, as 
Chatterton is able to do in a sphere transcending rationality, is presented 
as a possibility of interaction between past and present worth 
considering.  
 
The past as referent has been effaced, time has been textualized, 
leaving only representation, texts, pseudo-events, images without 
originals: a spatial rather than a temporal order of simulacra. 
(Bennett qtd. in Janik, 160) 
 
That time can be imagined in a spatial conception rather than a 
temporal is a polemical concern of 20th century theory. While ‘end of 
history’ theorists like Baudrillard or Jameson have mourned this move 
away from a linear temporal development, defenders of postmodernism 
like Hutcheon underline its emancipatory potential as regards its 
capacity for self-reflexive ironic and parodic analysis. It is not the 
rejection of history or the empty celebration of a vacuum as Jameson 
claims, but the subversion and calling into question as Hutcheon argues 
(cf. Hutcheon, Politics).  
Apart from the physical aspect of transhistorical experience Ackroyd 
repeatedly employs repetition and déjà-vu as structural devices for 
blurring the boundaries between different historical periods. Charles sits 
at a fountain (cf. Ch, 46) just as Meredith is described to sit next to a 
fountain in historical record found by the librarian Philip (cf. Ch, 60). 
Meredith is thinking of suicide (cf. Ch, 60) just as Chatterton is claimed 
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to have committed suicide (cf. Ch, 196). Chatterton meets a boy living in 
ruins, who later on will be known as Tom (cf. Ch, 208-210). It appears to 
be the same boy painted in a portrait by the late Seymour (cf. Ch, 35) 
etc. Many events in the lives of the artists seem to echo events from 
different historical periods and thus Ackroyd creates a tight link as 
regards transhistorical experience. These moments of shared 
experience seem to diminish the dominance of historical records and 
historical coherence. It is Ackroyd’s employment of repetition and déjà-
vu that deconstructs a teleological understanding of history and a linear 
development of time. 
Hence, it is not by chance that the three writers take on the same 
physical position when it comes to death and the representation of 
death. Even when Charles plays a corpse, he unconsciously adopts the 
position Wallis has chosen for his portrait of Chatterton. “[Vivien] 
managed to smile as Charles feigned death and fell across the sofa, with 
one arm trailing on the carpet” (Ch, 15). It is the same position he will 
assume on his actual deathbed in hospital. “His right arm fell away and 
his hand trailed upon the ground” (Ch, 169).  
Ironically, the position Charles assumes most probably is not 
Chatterton’s own position when dying but it is influenced by Wallis’ highly 
romanticised version in the portrait. “[Meredith] stepped back quickly 
when he saw Wallis’ body lying on a bed, one arm trailing down upon the 
floor. But the body spoke: ‘Don’t be alarmed, George. I’m rehearsing 
your part’” (Ch, 136). On painting the portrait of Chatterton’s death some 
decades after the poet’s real death, the Victorian painter aims at a direct 
mimetic representation of the historical event based on official records. 
Ackroyd here stresses the paradox of mimesis. “’So the greatest realism 
is also the greatest fakery?’” (Ch, 139). Wallis seeks to establish a 
setting which corresponds to Chatterton’s own circumstances as closely 
as possible. He has Chatterton modelled by another poet and has his 
model Meredith wear 18th century clothes. He arranges all the props as 
they – in his own imagination inspired by official historical records – 
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 might have looked like in Chatterton’s attic. Wallis even has Meredith 
and his wife Mary visit Chatterton’s attic room in order to familiarise 
themselves with the originality of the setting.  
 
‘You cannot beat the reality, Mrs. Meredith. This is Chatterton’s 
room, precisely as it was…’ ‘Is everything the same?’ Mary surveyed 
it, steadily taking in her husband as she looked around as if he, too 
were part of the old furniture. ‘Yes, it is! And, you see, if I can depict 
the room now I will have fixed it forever. Even the poor plant, of all 
things the frailest, that too will survive.’ (Ch, 142) 
 
Ackroyd lets Wallis comment on the originality of the plant on 
purpose, as the latter thereby explicitly contradicts himself because the 
“small plant” (Ch, 137) can be identified as one of the current resident’s 
few belongings in the attic room. History is not directly mirrored but 
adapted and appropriated according to Wallis’ needs. Wallis, as he has 
no direct access to Chatterton other than via Catcott’s historical records, 
is well aware of the fact that he is rearranging things but he neglects the 
effects of these rearrangements, while Meredith is highly conscious of 
his inability to mirror the world as it is, as he, as a poet, perceives 
himself to be caught in the framework of language. Wallis insists: “’After 
all, I can only paint what I see’. […]” (Ch, 133). But Meredith counters:  
“‘And what do you see? The real? The ideal? How do you know the 
difference’” (Ch, 133)? In the following dialogue between Wallis and 
Meredith Ackroyd thus explicitly comments on the artist’s role as creator, 
not just recreator of the world.  
 
’It is just that everything I do becomes an experiment – I really don’t 
understand why and, please God, I never shall – and until it is 
completed I never know whether it will be worth a farthing.’ 
‘But how can you experiment with what is real? Surely you only have 
to depict it.’ 
‘As you do? But what about your phial of poison, which miraculously 
changed its position?’ 
‘But the phial was a real object. That did not change.’ […] 
‘I am in the same boat. […] I said that the words were real, Henry, I 
did not say that what they depicted was real. Our dear dead poet 
created the Monk Rowley out of thin air, and yet he has more life in 
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him than any medieval priest who actually existed. The invention is 
always more real’. (Ch, 157) 
 
It can be argued that Ackroyd makes the figure of the Victorian 
painter Wallis an implicit personification of the role of the enlightened 
historian, which increasingly is confronted with postmodern criticism. 
Superficially, Wallis only recreates what he believes to be the truthful 
past. Thereby, however, he is far more engaged in creative activities 
than he is willing to admit or even conscious of. Ackroyd here again 
seems to comment on the impossibility of a mimetic access to reality, 
whether through art or through history. Historical research usually claims 
to gain direct and objective access to past events. Its only basis, 
however, are textual traces of history, which are being amalgamated – in 
a creative process – into a single, coherent and meaningful narrative. 
The depiction of a past reality is impossible as much as the depiction of 
a present reality is impossible. “’The poet does not merely recreate or 
describe the world. He actually creates it. And this is why he is feared’” 
(Ch, 157). Neither does the historian merely describe or depict the world.  
Ackroyd makes visible how the creation or adaptation of a past 
reality is transformed into reality itself. Thus, in Ackroyd’s line of 
argumentation, which rejects the orthodoxies of a causal and transparent 
historical development, it is only a logical consequence that Chatterton’s 
own death position resembles the one created by Wallis approximately 
70 years later. “He stretched out upon the bed, lying with his arm across 
his forehead” (Ch, 224).  
Though in this version of the poet’s death, which is presented by 
Ackroyd as competing with other equally credible or dismissible 
possibilities, Chatterton does not commit suicide. Rather, his death is 
caused by an accidentally overdosed medicine against a venereal 
disease. The picturesque death position imagined by Wallis, the author 
suggests, might as well have been preceded by a death in agony.  
It is one of the novel’s main virtues that it effortlessly transcends the 
boundaries of historical time in order to make artistic and historical 
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experience palpable. Like mirrors set in parallel the text displays its ludic 
elements by reproducing concerns related to art in the various periods 
thereby spinning a tight net of inter- and intratexutal references. Hence it 
does not come as a surprise that the 20th century storyline interlinks with 
the 18th and 19th centuries as Harriet Scrope’s friend Sarah Tilt is 
working on a project on the representation of death in English painting 
and thus has analysed Wallis’ painting The Death of Chatterton. “’And so 
the dead can be exalted by others feigning death?’ ‘The whole point of 
death is that it can be made beautiful. And the real thing is never pretty. 
Think of Chatterton – ‘” (Ch, 34). 
Ackroyd offers competing versions of Chatterton’s possible life and 
death, neither of which can be sustained as ultimate truth. He thus 
explicitly interweaves postmodern theoretical positions into his novel 
without being shy of parodying his own theoretical ideas, which he 
argued in Notes for a New Culture: 
 
’Can we imagine reality?’ [Charles] settled back again on the sofa, 
quite at ease with the sort of theoretical discussion he had once had 
at university; in fact, his understanding of such matters had not 
significantly advanced since that time. ‘Oh yes’, he said, ‘it’s a 
question of language. Realism is just as artificial as surrealism, after 
all’. He remembered these phrases perfectly. The real world is just a 
succession of interpretations. Everything which is written down 
immediately becomes a kind of fiction. (Ch, 41) 
 
The textuality of reality is one of the concerns of postmodern theory. 
The inaccessibility of reality through language is characterised by a 
paradox. Neither can we put our experience of reality in words, nor can 
we experience reality without the frame of language. “‘It can only be 
experienced. It cannot be spoken of’. […] ‘And yet the words for it still 
haunt us, pluck at us, fret us’”(Ch, 162).  
Artistic experience is contrasted with historical knowledge and 
Ackroyd’s focus on transhistorical experience suggests his siding with 
experience as the medium for transmitting authenticity. Artistic 
experience can be communicated and lived across centuries, whereas 
historical knowledge claiming its own coherence, objectiveness and 
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traceability, can only remain fragmented, subjected and polyphone. It 
cannot offer direct access to reality.  
Just as contemporaries of Chatterton found his supposedly medieval 
poems more historically authentic than some actual medieval verse, 
so Mary Meredith finds her husband less real than either Wallis’s 
representation of him on paper or his own poetic writing. The past 
can best be recaptured by the imaginative act of the artist, not the 
painstaking researches of the historical scholar. (Finney, Chatterton) 
 
 Interestingly, the conventionally sharp distinction between the fields 
of art and history is undermined by Ackroyd’s focus on the relativity of 
originality. It is a fake portrait of Chatterton’s supposedly real death, 
which becomes so convincing that it gains apparent authenticity. 
Analogously, supposedly objective historical knowledge becomes so 
fragmented that it can no longer be put together to a single coherent 
narrative as Charles notices that various biographies – a literary genre 
closely connected to history’s universal truth claim – on Chatterton offer 
quite different information. “In any case he noticed that each biography 
described quite a different poet: even the simplest observation by one 
was contradicted by the other, so that nothing seemed certain”(Ch, 127). 
It is Charles’ ability to deal with these fragments that render him a 
truly postmodern character. “At first Charles had been annoyed by these 
discrepancies but then he was exhilarated by them: for it meant that 
anything became possible. If there were no truths, everything was true” 
(Ch, 127). 
Not only does Ackroyd cast doubt on the possibility of retrieving a 
unified and valid version of history in a wider sense, but also on the 
possibility of retrieving one’s own history. Harriet Scrope ponders on 
fragments of what are supposed to become her memoirs. Apart from the 
fact that she does not even intend to write them herself – instead she 
asks her secretary “to put them together” (Ch, 27) – Harriet is well aware 
of the fact that the notes from her own past do not correspond to factual 
truth. “’Why don’t you just link dear Tom with those bits about Fitzrovia? 
[…] There must be a connection, you know. I can’t think of everything’” 
(Ch, 27). When Mary out of moral reservations refuses to do as 
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demanded, Harriet reacts laconically. “’I can’t write it for you. I can’t 
make it up’. ‘But didn’t you know? Everything is made up’” (Ch, 28). 
Displayed against each other Ackroyd’s narrative strands convey the 
general impression of narrative coherence. This coherence, however, 
can only bear up against a superficial analysis. It is mediated via a very 
subtle postmodern use of authorial voice and narrative structure. 
Ackroyd therewith foregrounds the fictional processes at work both in 
historical documentation as well as in artistic production. “[T]he real 
world is just a succession of interpretations. Everything which is written 
down immediately becomes a kind of fiction” (Ch, 40). 
Violeta Delgado stresses the ambivalence of Ackroyd’s use of the 
narrative voice. On the one hand, the author opts for a traditional 
heterodiegetic, omniscient and ubiquitous 3rd person narrator indebted to 
realist tradition, whose authority, on the other hand, is undercut by the 
use of multiple competing storylines. The effect created by the narrative 
mode of realism “is that of immediacy and unmediated direct access to a 
world that exists as an objective entity and that furthermore exists 
independently from its representation” (Delgado, 350). However, by 
contradicting itself, it sets itself apart from the traditionally objective and 
intersubjective perspective conveying a coherent meaning based on the 
principle of causality (cf. Delgado, 350). Rather, Ackroyd presents his 
narrative voice as unconscious of its own contradictory strategy. It 
appears to be a narrative voice that is tricked and furthermore also 
trapped down by its own content. For Delgado Ackroyd here reveals a  
 
Barthean conception of the modern author as ‘scriptor’, who refuses 
to impose a single unified meaning on the text – and thus, sacrifices 
himself -, in favour of the text itself, and of the preceding texts it 
includes, without sacrificing storytelling. (Delgado, 348) 
 
Similarly Onega stresses that Ackroyd’s works like those of other 
historiographic metafictionists seems to be inhabited by what Hutcheon 
termed “a longing for the traditional relish in storytelling while 
simultaneously underlining the fact that this return is problematic” 
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(Hutcheon, Poetics, 124-125).  While conventional realist fiction relies on 
the implied willingness of the reader to fully accept the narrative 
construction without challenging its validity in terms of its ability to mirror 
reality as precisely as possible, metafictional art draws attention to its 
own status of being constructed (cf. Onega, Metafiction, 1-2). “Art that 
conceals art, fiction that covers its own fictionality, is the basic aesthetic 
principle of mimetic realism” (Delgado, 349). 
Mimetic realism as the basis for both art and history is a mode of 
narration Ackroyd implicitly presents as highly controversial as “direct or 
phenomenal reference to the world means [paradoxically] the production 
of a fiction” (Caruth qtd. in Clingham, 35). By undermining the authority 
of his own narrative voice in terms of introducing multiple storylines, 
Ackroyd simultaneously undermines the generally unchallenged role of 
the historian as the mediator of past events. Ackroyd, like other 
“novelists of history understand[s] and capitalize[s] on the fact that all 
historical accounts employ the same narrative strategies as novels […]” 
(Finney, English fiction, 25). He subverts the principle of mimesis which, 
among other criteria, relies on the principle of detailed world description 
by letting it turn against itself. Meticulously Ackroyd manages to describe 
the respective worlds of the 18th, 19th and 20th centuries. Only by offering 
contradictory, unexplained or irrational fragmentary elements, does he 
cast doubt on the validity of mimetic narratives. Greg Clingham 
comments, “Ackroyd’s novel conceptualizes the difference between then 
and now – repeats and defers the closure of history as a metaphysical 
system – by holding up a mirror to that trace and allowing us to see it 
more fully in operation” (Clingham, 40). It is not so much the rejection of 
traditional strategies of storytelling that Ackroyd highlights, but rather 
their subversion, the making use of strategies and thereby foregrounding 
their problematic aspects. 
Already on the structural level does Ackroyd thereby introduce the 
idea of the fake. The fake becomes apparent in terms of a faked history 
narrated by an only apparently authentic and objective narrative voice. 
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The rejection or at least the calling in question of principles like originality 
and fake is exemplified on the structural as well as on the content level, 
as Ackroyd does not highlight a single dominant and valid history but a 
number of equally possible and highly subjective histories.  
 
Ackroyd is evidently concerned to show from the start of his book 
that we all appropriate the past for our own purposes and in our own 
ways. There is no such thing as an objective past, let alone a 
recoverable figure of Chatterton. (Finney, Chatterton) 
 
In his subtle use of language Ackroyd focuses on the assumption 
that our access to reality is shaped by our use of language. As Zwierlein 
summarises, there is no access to reality but through language. And 
language transforms our experience of reality. “[J]ede außersprachliche 
Wirklichkeit entzieht sich dem menschlichen Zugriff“ (Zwierlein, 251). On 
the structural level of Chatterton the postmodern conception of the fake 
is furthermore strengthened by a pastiche use of language. It is this 
narrative strategy that shapes our perception of the different historical 
periods presented in the novel in the first place.  
 
 
 
3.2.2) FAKES, FORGERIES AND PALIMPSESTS – ON ARTISTIC AUTHENTICITY  
 
In Chatterton each narrative stratum is composed in a pastiche style 
reflecting the use of language of the respective period. Pastiche, 
however, is not only a structural device Ackroyd makes use of but also a 
relevant concern on the content level as Ackroyd not only grants his 
protagonist, the forger-poet Chatterton, a late 18th century style but also 
lets him explain how it is possible to make pastiche work, i.e. to speak in 
a language of a different period and/or person. The successful use of 
pastiche is Chatterton’s source of fame. 
 
Here were such phrases as ‘sendes owte his greetings’, ‘ye have 
gyvyn me a grete charge’ […] and it seemed even then that the 
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Dead were speaking to me, face to face; and when I wrote out their 
words, copying the very spelling of the Originals, it was as if I had 
become one of those Dead and could speak with them also. […] I 
found that I could continue in my own right; there was a pritty little 
Sentence, viz ’And so they toke him by every parte of the body’, to 
which I then added, ‘and bare hym into a chambir and leyde him a 
rych bedde’. The very words had been called forth from me, with as 
much Ease as if I were writing in the Language of my own age. (Ch, 
85) 
 
Chatterton describes how he invented Thomas Rowley and how the 
late medieval speech patterns came naturally to him. Thereby Chatterton 
implicitly and explicitly lays bare Ackroyd’s own procedures when 
composing a novel. In a similar way as Chatterton creates Rowley, 
Ackroyd creates Chatterton thereby mimicking 18th century speech 
patterns, which he regards as a natural process:  
 
[T]he speech we use today contains or conceals previous levels of 
speech, from the most recent to the most ancient. They are as it 
were implicit in modern speech, modern writing, and it only takes a 
little effort to peel back the layers. (Ackroyd qtd. in McGrath, 46) 
 
Form and content of the novel are interwoven in terms of presenting 
a protagonist who explicitly comments on structural devices Ackroyd 
employs himself. Having the protagonist Chatterton explain the use of 
pastiche can be identified as forming part of the level of content, while 
detecting the same element of pastiche as a means of Ackroyd’s own 
artistic expression points towards the novel’s structural level. Ackroyd 
hereby seems to argue for the transhistoricality of literary experience. 
His 18th century poet employs the same literary techniques as the 
postmodern author himself and thereby once more underlines Ackroyd’s 
understanding of literary originality as “forming new and happy 
combinations” (Ch, 58). 
Through his perfection in creating a pastiche of medieval language 
Chatterton is able to bring into existence an entire poet. 
“[C]ontemporaries of Chatterton found his supposedly medieval poems 
more historically authentic than some actual medieval verse” (Finney, 
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Chatterton). From the 18th century onwards, however, the literary system 
clearly differentiates between good original art and bad faked art. The 
value of a text is judged by its supposed authenticity. Oscar Wilde once 
mentioned, thereby underlining Ackroyd’s view on the hypocritical cult of 
the original in the artistic world, that “to censure an artist for a forgery, 
was to confuse an ethical with an aesthetic problem” (Wilde, 1150).  
A forgery is hardly ever subject to aesthetic criticism for its own sake 
as is the supposed original. First of all it is perceived as an artistic failure 
on account of an underlying moral judgement. In a second step, an 
aesthetic dimension only becomes relevant in terms of its resemblance 
to its original. Is it a good imitation or a bad one? Is its supposed 
inauthenticity easy or difficult to make out (cf. Höfele, Originalität, 75-
76)? Höfele lists two common basic criteria when it comes to discerning 
the originality of a work of art. The first criterion relates to the 
independence or self-containment of the original, as it should directly 
reflect the author’s individuality. The second criterion highlighted refers 
to the priority of the original. “[D]as Original ist immer ein Erstes, ein 
noch nie Dagewesenes” (Höfele, Originalität, 77). The conventional but 
for a postmodern understanding rather artificial separation between the 
original and the fake is reduced to absurdity with the acknowledgement 
of intertextual indebtedness applicable to each work of art.  
Harriet Scrope assures herself about her tendency to plagiarise a 
long forgotten Victorian author: “In any case novelists do not work in a 
vacuum. We use many stories. But it’s not where they come from, it’s 
what we do with them” (Ch, 104). The artist does not exist in an empty 
space but is influenced and inspired by numerous other artists, their 
artistic products and practices.  
Dass ein Text Fälschung und Original gleichzeitig sein kann, verliert 
den Anschein des Widersinnigen, wenn man bedenkt, dass selbst 
die auffälligsten ‘originalen’ Werke stets durch ein Netz von 
Abhängigkeiten an bereits existierende Modelle und Normen 
gebunden sind. (Höfele, Originalität, 78) 
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Clingham emphasises that the historical figure of Thomas 
Chatterton used to be of rather marginal literary interest. His relevance 
for contemporary literary criticism and its fascination with historiography 
results from his work being of a forged nature. Furthermore, Clingham 
underlines the relativity of artistic originality by pointing out that up to the 
18th century the reception of literary creativity worked along different 
lines compared to conventional contemporary criticism. Only with The 
Copyright Act of 1709 and its introduction of the idea of intellectual 
property the modern conception of the author as the creator and 
proprietor of ideas and compositions which had not ever existed before 
slowly evolved (cf. Clingham, 38). 
 
While Ben Jonson could compliment Shakespeare unequivocally for 
his capacity to forge, meaning his poetic creativity, by the 1760s 
forgery of the kind practised by Horace Walpole in The Castle of 
Otranto, James Macpherson in The Works of Ossian, and Thomas 
Chatterton in the Rowley poems and various other texts, was seen 
as conspiracy to undermine the centres of institutional authority. 
(Clingham, 36) 
 
 Postmodern criticism in this sense shares a number of features with 
the pre-18th century understanding of literary originality and with great 
subtlety Ackroyd foregrounds the hypocrisy practiced in the system of 
art. His three different narrative strands echo the same literary concerns. 
Though clearly separable and distinctive from each other on the surface, 
they negotiate or meditate on what appears to be a transcendental 
canon of artistic concerns. 
 
 
 
3.2.2.1) Intertextuality – Adaptation and Appropriation 
 
If “every text is the absorption and transformation of other texts” 
(Kristeva, 146), then Ackroyd’s Chatterton is a true intertextualist, as he 
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“knew that original genius consists in forming new and happy 
combinations” (Ch, 58). Harriet “believed that plots themselves were of 
little consequence”, and she does not hesitate to “take this one and use 
it as a plain, admittedly inferior, vessel for her own style” (Ch, 102). 
Similarly Philip excuses Harriet’s borrowings, as he “believed that there 
was only a limited number of plots in the world (reality was finite, after 
all) and no doubt it was inevitable that they would be reproduced in a 
variety of contexts” (Ch, 70). Yet these perceptions are stigmatised in 
the public sphere of the literary system both in the 18th century and in the 
20th century. Harriet is convinced that “if she revealed what even to 
herself she called her ‘secret’, there would be an outcry against her, a 
cleansing and a purification which, she was sure, would lead to her 
death…” (Ch, 29). Ackroyd’s 18th century poet is presented as a proto-
postmodernist. While he ‘knows’ of the interdependence of different 
texts, Harriet and Philip ‘believe’ that intertextuality was inevitable. 
The balance between structure and content becomes once more 
apparent when looking at Ackroyd’s method of employing historical 
figures and borrowing existing plots and also quotes, which he 
interweaves into new creations. In discussing Eliot’s The Waste Land In 
Notes for a New Culture he anticipates this technique and also 
conviction: 
 
[I]n their combination these words cease to be a collection of 
sources…they have become a new thing. It is not that they possess 
a meaning which is the sum of their separate parts, not that they 
embody the poet’s own voice within a tradition of voices. The words 
have acquired their own density and their forces come from the 
differences of diction which, although staying in evidence, are 
mediated by the life of the whole. The source of this life is language 
itself. (Ackroyd, Notes, 52)  
 
Repeatedly Ackroyd’s close examination of Eliot’s work becomes 
palpable in Chatterton. Other implicitly present authors Ackroyd has 
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worked on are Wilde and Dickens3. Not only does Ackryod refer to Eliot 
in his theoretical essay, but Eliot, also confronted with doubts about the 
originality of some of his literary work, is also repeatedly alluded to in 
Chatterton. When Chatterton explains his technique of simulating 
medieval language he points out:  
 
“[…] I decided to shore up these ancient fragments with my own 
Genius; thus the Living and the Dead were to be reunited. […] I 
reproduc’d the Past and filled it with so much detail that it was as if I 
were observing it in front of me: so the Language of the ancient 
Dayes awoke the Reality itself, tho’ I knew that it was I who 
composed these Histories, I knew also that they were true ones. 
(Ch, 85) 
 
At first sight Chatterton’s lines seem to echo Eliot’s The Waste Land: 
“These fragments I have shored against my ruins” (Eliot, 75, line 430), in 
a second step, though, they bring to mind that Eliot himself might not be 
the original genius behind this sentence. By interlinking Chatterton and 
Eliot, Ackroyd subverts the conventional conception of literary originality 
as he consciously casts doubt on the origin of the phrase. He thereby 
stresses the assumption that it is basically of no importance at all, who 
created it. The important aspect is, that it is used to form part of 
something new but equally valid. According to Finney Ackroyd here 
interlinks the Romantic conception of the artistic genius with the 
modernist understanding of the “self in ruins” (cf, Finney, Chatterton). He 
thereby merges different historical understandings of the literary subject 
and literary experience into a transhistorical allembracing experience. 
On a different level, however, this passage turns out to be even 
more relevant as it comments on the technique of pastiche Ackroyd 
makes use of. Like mirrors set in parallel it becomes obvious that 
Ackroyd reflects his structural techniques on the content level. 
Structurally speaking it is Ackroyd who makes use of the style and 
                                                
3 Ackroyd has published a biography on T.S.Eliot T.S. Eliot – A Life in 1984, two books on 
Charles Dickens Dickens’ London – An imaginative Vision in 1987 and Dickens in 1990 
and the fictional autobiography of Oscar Wilde The Last Testament of Oscar Wilde in 
1983. 
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speech patterns of 18th century literary language in order to create a 
credible narrative figure of Chatterton. Chatterton on his part made use 
of pastiche in order to create the language of the past. Consequently, 
content and structure are interlinked, if not blurred, but nevertheless well 
balanced.  
Intertextual references in Chatterton are uncountable. Ackroyd 
himself gives further insight into his fascination with phrases already 
uproduced by other writers: 
 
I realize now in retrospect that I tended to take lines of various 
writers and string them together. I wrote a play at Yale, which now I 
can’t find, in which I go about 60 different playwrights. I used a 
different line of each poet and structured a play out of that. So I 
presume my interest in lifting or adopting various styles, various 
traces, various languages, is part of my imaginary trend, and I 
suppose the use of historical fact as well as other people’s writings 
is just an aspect of this magpie-like quality. (Ackroyd qtd. in Onega, 
Interview, 213) 
 
The ludic aspect of appropriating different quotations becomes 
especially palpable when Ackroyd employs parodic strategies to make 
visible the intertextual net all texts rely on. Harriet Scrope’s continuous 
but nevertheless unconscious misquotings from “cutting boughs” where 
Marlowe spoke of branches (cf. Ch, 3) up to “[l]et them eat cake” are as 
hilarious as Andrew Flint’s almost neurotic habit of expressing himself 
via classical authors. The apex of parodic playfulness is reached when 
both interact for instance at Charles’ funeral: 
 
‘Sunt lacrimae rerum, don’t you think? Mentem mortalia tangunt?’ 
‘Does that mean, they are dropping like flies?’ She adopted a 
solemn voice for this phrase. ‘Well, they are.’ 
‘Exeunt omnes – ‘ he began to say. 
‘In vino veritas.’ (Ch, 177) 
 
But also Chatterton’s adaptation of Shakespeare does not lack a 
hint of irony: “I was a willing Student but, at first, there was more 
madness than method in my labours” (Ch, 86). 
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[I]ntertextuality replaces the challenged author-text relationship with 
one between reader and text, one that situates the locus of textual 
meaning within the history of discourse itself. A literary work can 
actually no longer be considered original […] It is only part of prior 
discourses that any text derives meaning and significance. 
(Hutcheon, Politics, 126) 
 
Chatterton presents the idea of artistic dialogue between centuries, 
between different texts but also between different authors. Here 
Ackroyd’s way of dealing with intertextuality can be interpreted as slightly 
different from Kristeva’s more radical rejection of the author. 
Nevertheless, the notion of “textual productivity” (Hutcheon, Politics, 
126) superseding the notion of ‘authorial productivity’ also becomes 
prevalent in Ackroyd’s novel. The author, in this case Chatterton, is not 
immortalised directly through his works but through traces of his texts in 
other texts. In this sense it can be argued that in Ackroyd’s text the figure 
of the transcendental author becomes symbolic of the literary trace in 
general. The author is not rejected in Chatterton but transformed from an 
original creator into a collagist of already existing texts. 
 
Irony makes these intertextual references into something more than 
simply academic play and some infinite regress into textuality: what 
is called to our attention is the entire representational process – in a 
wide range of forms and modes of production – and the impossibility 
of finding any totalizing model to resolve the resulting postmodern 
contradictions. (Hutcheon, Politics, 95) 
 
The portrait of a middle aged Chatterton Charles discovers at Leno 
Antiques is a metaphor for the net of intertextual references in the novel. 
Like in a palimpsest past and present are interlinked, if not merged. 
Hence, the Chatterton portrayed on the painting is not a single face but 
made up of numerous others. Just as Chatterton was influenced by other 
writers, he will influence both Meredith and Charles. When Meredith 
looks at the picture it resembles himself, when Edward looks at the 
painting it seems to mirror his father Charles. But still there are 
Chatterton’s features shimmering through. The becoming similar of the 
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three poets from the different periods is used as a metaphor for the 
transcendence of their shared literary experience. 
 
‘This face is familiar, Mrs Meredith’, he said. ‘Is it a poet, I wonder?’ 
With trembling hands he held it up against the light, which streamed 
in from the doorway, and for a moment Mary saw Meredith’s own 
face depicted there – lined and furrowed in a desolate middle age. 
(Ch, 174) 
 
The portrait’s mysterious aura results from its structural complexity: 
“It’s the paint. There are so many different layers” (Ch, 205). It is not just 
one face but many and can therefore be labelled as “transhistorical 
palimpsest” (Onega, Metafiction, 72). Ironically, it is the forger Stewart 
Merk who is charged with the task of judging the portrait’s originality. On 
trying to peel back the layers in order to get through to the original 
painting, he fails as the layers have merged into each other. Any attempt 
to separate them in order to retrieve the portrait’s original layer is bound 
to fail.  
 
The face itself seemed to have acquired the characteristics of three 
or four different images […] He had already realised that it would be 
necessary to strip the paint altogether and, using the outline on the 
canvas, begin all over again. But he was still trying to determine 
which painter of the period he would use as his model: as Seymour 
had known, Stewart Merk was a fine and subtle painter but one who 
was preoccupied with technique. For him the pleasure of painting 
rested in the formal execution and not in imaginative exploration, in 
mimesis rather than invention. And now he was saying to 
Cumberland, ‘I can restore the finished outlines, but I can’t revive 
the lost colours. I’ll have to use fresh pigments. […] Don’t worry. I 
can darken the paint with coffee and dirt. And then pop the canvas 
into the oven. 
‘The oven?’ 
‘Just for the cracks, yes? And then I finish them off with a needle. It 
will be the best fake you ever saw. Better than this one, anyway.’ 
(Ch, 205) 
 
As Merk is not able to retrieve the separate layers, he contemplates 
faking the original layer. It is impossible and not even desirable to peel 
back the layers of intertextuality from different texts. There will be 
nothing left, Ackroyd suggests. The multitude of different influences from 
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different periods cannot be separated anymore, as it has become a new 
entity. In varying, repeating and rearranging fragments from the past, a 
new text comes into existence. As Merk suggests, the layers are not 
separable from each other, they would come off together and leave 
emptiness. It is also criticism of historical research that is alluded to in 
the textual passage above. Historiography tries to gain insight into to the 
past by attempting to access one historical stratum after the other. As 
past periods are intertextual products exactly like literary texts, this 
undertaking turns out to be impossible. Here, Ackroyd’s points out the 
basic dilemma of historical research: like the forger Stewart Merk, the 
historian comes to the point where he/she has to either admit his/her 
failure in retrieving origins or, as Merk does, opts for the artificial creation 
of a new historical narrative, which will be taken as the original. “If you 
trace anything backwards, trying to figure out cause and effect, or 
motive, or means, there is no real origin [emphasis in the original] for 
anything” (Ch, 232). Ackroyd foregrounds his conviction of the 
intertextual nature of any text by introducing the portrait, which fulfils an 
intermedial function linking visual art with literature by revealing its 
textuality.  
 
3.2.2.2) Accepting Influence, Discarding Anxieties 
 
While Chatterton, a proto-postmodernist in his own right, self-
consciously reflects on the idea of artistic originality and its relative 
impossibility in terms of creating something entirely new, the 20th century 
writers are much more concerned and burdened by the idea of 
depending on influences from other writers. The antagonistic couple 
Ackroyd introduces in order to express the most crucial issue of artistic 
influence and how writers come to terms with it are the plagiarist Harriet 
Scrope and the blocked wannabe-writer Philip Slack. It is Harold Bloom’s 
theory of the “anxiety of influence” (cf. Bloom) which Ackroyd 
deconstructs in favour of his own understanding of aesthetic influence. 
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Finney points out that “Bloom sees the strong poet in precisely the terms 
that Ackroyd condemned in Notes” (Finney, Chatterton). According to 
Bloom influence is only acceptable in terms of “[i]mages and ideas 
[which] belong to discursiveness and to history, and are scarcely unique 
to poetry” (Bloom, 71). Bloom continues that “[y]et a poet’s stance, his 
Word, his imaginative identity, his whole being must [emphasis in the 
original] be unique to him, and remain unique, or he will perish, as a poet 
[…]” (Bloom, 71). Chatterton clearly rejects this conception as literary 
influence is welcomed as enrichment and necessity, not as an oedipal 
struggle against one’s writing predecessors. It is not a poet’s ‘stance’ 
that renders him/her original but his/her style, i.e. his/her way of 
adapting, combining and rearranging existing plots and structures. 
These theoretical assumptions form the basis for negotiating Harriet 
Scrope’s and Philip Slack’s approaches to aesthetic influence. 
Harriet Scrope owes all her literary success as novelist to the plots 
she has stolen from a forgotten 19th century author.  
 
Harriet Scrope had written a novel in which a writer’s secretary is 
responsible for many of her employer’s ‘posthumous’ publications; 
she knew his style so well that she was able effortlessly to 
counterfeit it, and only the assiduous researches of a biographer 
had uncovered the fakery. This was very close to the nineteenth-
century novel which Philip now held in his hand. He dropped it, and 
its fall echoed around the basement in the library. (Ch, 69) 
 
Passages like these make visible the novel’s extraordinarily dense 
structure and Ackroyd’s subversive strategy. Not only does it suggest 
Harriet’s incapacity of inventing new plots for her own novels, but 
furthermore it highlights the limitedness of all plots whether in literature 
or in reality. Repetition turns into a decisive structural element both in 
literature and in real life. Ironically, Bentley’s literary plot from the 19th 
century is reproduced in the 20th century not only by Harriet, who 
plagiarises the plot for literary purposes, but also in real life by Stewart 
Merk and his faked Seymours. Merk, Seymour’s last assistant and 
familiar with his style, had forged Seymour’s latest paintings. The 
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reproduction of a fictional plot in reality is a further hint at the 
interconnectedness of art and reality and the intertextuality of both, i.e. 
art can be an intertext for reality and vice versa. 
The book echoing in the library on being dropped is a nice metaphor 
of its intertextual resonance in a world of books and plots. One of these 
echoes, Bentley’s title The Last Testament can be identified as an 
allusion to Ackroyd’s own novel on Wilde, The Last Testament of Oscar 
Wilde. Although Harriet Scrope is well aware of her incapacity to create 
something artistically original, she is neither willing nor able to admit her 
borrowings publicly as she fears sanctions from the literary system. In 
contrast to Harriet Philip is incapable of producing any text due to his 
feeling burdened by too many literary voices. While Harriet simply claims 
them to be her own, the librarian Philip feels blocked and refrains from 
becoming creative at all. 
Bloom’s Freudian interpretation of the artist who has to battle the 
fathers in order to free himself from their burden is contradicted in 
Chatterton.  Literary heritage, Ackroyd suggests, is fertile as it offers 
uncountable possibilities. To murder the father, to assume an oedipal 
approach to art, would mean to ignore the indebtedness to artistic 
predecessors and/or be burdened by it. If an artist rules out all 
influences, the outcome will be someone like Fritz Dangerfield.  
 
Sarah took up a catalogue […] and read out the summary: ‘Fritz 
Dangerfield’s composition, The Opium Dream. He painted the same 
picture over and over again but he would not be parted from the 
canvases, which he kept in his bedroom until his death. He did not 
speak, and he did not write except in an alphabet of his own 
invention.’ She closed the catalogue. ‘Now that really is madness.’ 
‘I see what he meant, though,’ Harriet had becomes serious. ’He 
wanted to be separate from everything. He had his own alphabet 
because words made him feel unclean. He wanted to start all over 
again.’ 
‘But that’s just the point. As a result he was unintelligible. No one 
can start again.’ 
‘So there’s no choice. You have to carry it all around with you.’ 
(Ch, 116) 
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Ackroyd employs this exaggerated example for parodying possible 
consequences of Bloom’s theory for artists. Dangerfield has liberated 
himself from any dependence on other authors. The outcome, however, 
also implies that thus he has become unintelligible to others. The lack of 
artistic interaction results in a lack of inspiration and a lack of artistic 
development rendering the poet an auto-plagiariser bound to reproduce 
his own pictures again and again without ever changing them. 
Furthermore, the invention of an own alphabet expresses the desire to 
establish an existence without the dominance of conventional language. 
However, outside the textual system communication becomes 
impossible. 
Only by accepting influence and its appropriation the artist can go 
through a process of artistic empowerment. The reappropriation of the 
past for present needs does not result in the complete dissolution of the 
author in intertextual play but involves his/her conscious choices.  
 
3.2.2.3) Simulating Originality 
 
Baudrillard differentiates between simulation and dissimulation. “To 
dissimulate is to pretend not to have what one has. To simulate is to 
feign what one doesn’t have. One implies a presence, the other an 
absence” (Baudrillard, Simulacra, 3). Applied to the debate on literary 
originality, dissimulation can be attributed to forgery whereas simulation 
can be associated with faking. Chatterton, for instance, was 
dissimulating when he created Rowley as he was hiding his own 
authorial presence and so was Merk being responsible for some of 
Seymour’s paintings. In contrast, Harriet Scrope is hiding the absence of 
her own ideas behind Bentley’s plots. However, the postmodernist 
Ackroyd here does not go in line with Baudrillard as he refrains from 
judging either of the two ways of dealing with influence. Instead, he 
ludically reveals their potential in calling into question the conception of 
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artistic originality and historical truth. While Baudrillard laments “that 
truth, reference, objective cause have ceased to exist” (Baudrillard, 
Simulacra, 3), Ackroyd self-consciously displays the possibilities and 
limitations of art which thematises its own status of constructedness as 
well as the artificiality of the so-called objective reality. “When the real is 
no longer what it was, nostalgia assumes its full meaning. There is a 
plethora of myths of origin and of signs of reality – a plethora of truth, of 
secondary objectivity, and authenticity” (Baudrillard, Simulacra, 6-7). 
Postmodern irony is the method Ackroyd adopts to counteract 
Baudrillard’s pessimism. Baudrillard departs from the assumption that 
the real is an entity we have lost access to through the increasing 
omnipresence of simulacra of the real. Ackroyd seems to suggest that 
the real was never accessible in the first place as it is created in 
textuality.  
Whereas Baudrillard diagnoses an abundance of secondary truths 
and authenticity, Ackroyd’s Chatterton investigates into these secondary 
truths by making visible their underlying structure. “Anything became 
possible. If there were no truths, everything was true” (Ch, 127). In 
Finney’s words: Ackroyd “cultivates a postmodern delight in parody and 
linguistic self-consciousness” (Finney, Chatterton). Especially the 
intersections of the spheres of art and reality are of great importance to 
Ackroyd. Does art imitate life or life art? “When Molière created Tartuffe, 
the French nation suddenly found him beside every domestic hearth. 
When Shakespeare invented Romeo and Juliet, the whole world 
discovered how to love. Where is the reality there?” (Ch, 133). 
The novel’s constant ironic thematisation of apparent realism and 
fakery and their subversion becomes especially palpable when Harriet’s 
cat hilariously devours a stuffed bird.  
 
Fortunately she was still wearing her fur hat but, although she was 
not injured, the canvas knocked off the little stuffed bird which had 
been fastened to it. Mr Gaskell immediately pounced on it. ‘It’s not 
real,’ she shouted. ‘It’s only an imitation!’ But it was too late: the 
bird’s stuffing was now strewn across the carpet. She readjusted her 
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hat and, with a sigh, got down from the chair. ‘Oh well, darling,’ she 
murmured, ‘you wouldn’t know the difference anyway, would you? 
You’re not really human, after all.’ (Ch, 188) 
 
Any attempt to identify the genuine or the original has to fail.  It is 
“an imitation in a world of imitations” (Ch, 91). Formulated by Hutcheon 
in a theoretical way, and put into practice by Ackroyd’s Chatterton, the 
Baudrillardian culture of simulacra fails to characterise contemporary 
experience. “Past events are given meaning, not existence by their 
representation in history. This is quite the opposite of Baudrillard’s claim 
that they are reduced to simulacra: instead, they are made to signify” 
(Hutcheon, 1989, 82). Representation has not effaced the referent 
altogether, as Baudrillard argues, but – according to Hutcheon – 
questions and challenges its own role as the alleged straightforward and 
transparent connection between signified and signifier, i.e. the sign and 
its referent. Postmodern representation reflects on and plays with its own 
state of representation, “that is, as interpreting (indeed as creating) its 
referent, not as offering direct and immediate access to it” (Hutcheon, 
1989, 34). 
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3.3) PETER CAREY’S MY LIFE AS A FAKE 
 
Published in 2003, My Life as a Fake is Peter Carey’s eighth novel. 
Apart from South Africa’s J.M.Coetzee, the Australian author now living 
in New York City is the only novelist to have received the Booker Prize 
twice, the first time for his celebrated novel Oscar & Lucinda in 1988 and 
the second time for The True History of the Kelly Gang in 2001 (cf. The 
Booker Prize Foundation). Like Barnes and Ackroyd, who belong to the 
same literary generation as the 1943 born Australian, Carey’s approach 
to literature is heavily influenced by his fascination with history and 
numerous of his novels enquire into its epistemological status.  
Unlike the British authors Barnes and Ackroyd, however, whose 
oeuvre can be roughly summarised as circling around the nature of 
British cultural identity and in the case of Ackroyd especially around 
London identity, Peter Carey centres on specifically Australian concerns 
and the rewriting of Australian colonial history. Despite the fact that all 
three authors can be subsumed under the label of postmodern authors 
who employ historiographic metafiction as a means for storytelling, it is 
Peter Carey’s particular approach from the fringes of British literary 
tradition, which renders the author a highly conscious and critical 
observer of cultural identity. The deconstruction of the normative 
distinction between processes of making and processes of faking are the 
core of all three novels discussed. While Barnes and Ackroyd, however, 
seem to celebrate the ludic function of postmodern literature, the former 
most typically in ridiculing contemporary consumer and ‘heritage’ culture 
in England, England, the latter more specifically and in a technically 
more elaborate way in accentuating and thus parodying the different 
processes underlying the literary system in Chatterton, Carey, it can be 
argued, discharges the ludic function in favour of excessive storytelling 
and an extraordinary focus on an elaborate development of narrative 
voice.  
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It is not so much satire or parody that is foregrounded in Carey’s 
novel, than an ambivalence towards concepts such as truth and lie, 
which, as Macfarlane suggests having My Life as a Fake at the back of 
his mind, “veers between the comedic […] and the sub-gothically 
chilling” (Macfarlane, 2005, 337). Nevertheless, like many other self-
conscious postmodern novels Carey’s text has been criticised for the 
enormous weight of “a theoretical concern, which [according to 
Macfarlane] occasionally overwhelms the narrative thrust of the novel” 
(Rubik, 235). 
With My Life as a Fake Carey attempts a rewriting of a literary 
scandal which preoccupied the Australian public in the 1940s and has 
since become known as the Ern Malley Hoax4. “[T]he novel 
demonstrates what the hoax itself revealed, if only we could see it: that 
real life can be created by the text” (Ashcroft, 29). James McAuley and 
Harold Steward, two young “anti-modernist” (MLF5, 273) poets, created 
poetry by a supposedly lower middle-class poet named Ern Malley, 
whose existence they entirely invented. Not only did McAuley and 
Stewart create Ern Malley but also his sister Ethel, who, after Ern’s 
supposedly early death, felt obliged to send her brother’s poems to Max 
Harris, then the young editor of a fashionable literary magazine.  
Harris fell prey to the hoax and dedicated an entire edition to the 
young deceased poet. On revealing the fake McAuley and Stewart, 
having exposed Harris to public ridicule, argued that the celebrated 
poems were the product of a Saturday afternoon, when they randomly 
picked passages from the most diverse sources and simply pasted them 
together.  
Cynically, the verse of the phantom poet Ern Malley did not only ruin 
Harris’ reputation as an editor, but furthermore brought him to trial for 
editing indecent poetry (cf. Macfarlane, 335-336). In the long run, 
                                                
4 For a detailed study on the Ern Malley Hoax see: Heyward, Michael: The Ern Malley 
Affair. London: Faber&Faber. 1993. 
5 References regarding My Life as a Fake will be abbreviated as MLF in the following 
chapters. 
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however, the most ironic aspect of the entire hoax turned out to be that 
neither McAuley’s nor Stewart’s own poetry had much resonance in 
Australian literary history, whereas Ern Malley’s verses today are 
included in numerous anthologies of Australian poetry. Peter Carey 
explains:  
 
If you’re a literary Australian of a certain age, then Ern Malley’s 
voice – not just the voice of the poetry but the personality as 
represented by the sister’s fake letters – is real for us. [N]obody 
reads the hoaxer’s poetry, but Ern Malley is remembered and 
continues to live on. If you look at any contemporary book of 
Australian poetry, you’ll find Ern Malley’s poetry in there. (Carey qtd. 
in Murphy) 
 
This is the historical situation which Carey takes as a starting point 
for his reworking of the literary scandal. Carey takes interest in the 
phantom poet and in the consequent textualisation of life and he 
embarks from the following questions: “What would it be like to […] have 
been conceived as a joke? … To be known as a fake?” (Carey qtd. in 
Murphy). The issue of origins and originality in My Life as a Fake is thus 
tackled from yet a different perspective. The novel asks questions about 
the relationship between author and text, i.e. about a possible 
independence of a text from its creator, thus adding a further dimension 
to the discussion on the death of the author.  
Carey’s historiographic metafictional novel is marked by the 
interplay of two different narrative strands. While the hoax plot is based 
on historical accounts, the text’s framing storyline, which is equally set in 
the literary world, is entirely fictional. Significantly, it is the fictional strand 
mediated by the first person narrator Sarah Wode-Douglas, editor of a 
British literary magazine, which serves as point of reference in the 
incredible entanglements of the novel’s history-based plot. The 
breakdown of this point of reference as regards truth and reliability 
functions as a reinforcement of the hoaxer storyline. By displaying 
against each other fact and fiction, truth and lie and their consequent 
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collapse, Carey manages to accentuate his claim of the textuality of 
reality. 
The exoticism of Malaysia provides the scenic background for My 
Life as a Fake. Carey’s female protagonist and narrator Sarah is 
persuaded by John Slater, a British poet and former friend of her upper-
class parents, to accompany him to Malaysia. Hoping to clarify the 
ambivalent role Slater played in her mother’s suicide when Sarah was a 
child, she agrees to join him only to be severely disappointed when 
being left alone once in Kuala Lumpur. On one of her reluctant walks 
through the city her attention is drawn to a middle-aged European man 
reading Rilke in a ramshackle bicycle shop, whose consequent 
acquaintance will make her enter “a maze from which, thirteen years 
later, [she] yet [has] to escape” (MLF, 7). It is Carey’s hoaxer 
Christopher Chubb and he relates the most unbelievable story about a 
phantom poet, leaving Sarah, at a point of crisis in her life herself, - and 
the reader - uncertain of where to discern between truth and lie, fact and 
fiction and original and fake; “[…] struggling in a web of mystery that I 
doubt I ever shall untangle” (MLF, 13). Stimulated by some lines of 
exceptional poetry, Sarah agrees to listen to Chubb’s story. “Rereading 
the fragment, I felt that excitement in my blood which is the only thing an 
editor should ever trust” (MLF, 27). 
Carey has the two historical hoaxers represented by a single figure, 
the conservative poet Christopher Chubb. ”In Australia they think I am 
the great conservative. Listen, I had spent more time reading Eliot and 
Pound than Weiss ever did, and later I would prove it” (MLF, 32). It is 
this knowledge of modernist techniques that Chubb makes use of in his 
attempt to trick the avant-garde editor David Weiss into publishing the 
poetry of Chubb’s hoax, the artistic bicycle mechanic Bob McCorkle. “No 
problem to trick a lazy reader with the mannerisms” (MLF, 32). In his 
snobbish attitude – “What a notion, that the ignorant can make great art” 
(MLF, 39) – Chubb relies on Weiss’ editorial urge to discover exceptional 
poetry. “He would so want pearls in the shit of swine, so want the genius 
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to be a mechanic that he would never stop to question the evidence” 
(MLF, 33). 
Chubb, highly disgusted that “people had become so hooked on the 
latest fashion” (MLF, 40) i.e. modernism, feels compelled to “prove the 
truth [because] [t]he truth was dead and rotting” (MLF, 40). Modernism, 
for him signified “a complete decay of meaning and craftsmanship in 
poetry” (MLF, 40) and thus he sets out to prove his point, just like the 
historical hoaxers, by patching together stolen verse with non-fiction 
fragments. By doing so he creates the poetical oeuvre of Bob McCorkle, 
whom he has die at the age of 24. Only through the letters of McCorkle’s 
– equally invented – sister does Chubb approach Weiss. And Chubb is 
highly conscious of the influence these letters will have on Weiss. “The 
writing in the letter, Chubb said, is even better than the poems. You can 
smell the suburbs in it. […] Reeking odours of the petite bourgeoisie” 
(MLF, 42). Thus, Chubb creates a double fake. He creates a fake poetic 
voice as well as a fake non-fiction voice as regards the letters. Only 
through the convincing textuality of McCorkle’s supposedly real sister is 
Chubb able to launch his hoax. Commenting on the historical hoax, Bill 
Ashcroft rightly observes that  
 
[the poetry’s] textuality is a continuation of a textual construction that 
begins, not with McAuley’s and Steward’s afternoon lark, but with 
Ethel Malley’s letter. […] Whatever the quality of the poems, there is 
no doubt that Ethel’s letter produces the simulacrum of a real 
person. Who could not avoid the hope that the bicycle mechanic 
might have produced something of real merit? (Ashcroft, 32) 
 
It can be argued that Carey, from this point in the novel onwards, 
experiments with the possibilities of textuality. Chubb’s imagination gives 
birth (cf. MLF, 32, 41) to a textual creation. 
 
The photography […] I made myself, patched together from three 
different men. My creature. Over six feet tall. Fantastic head, huge 
powerful nose and cheekbones, great forehead like the bust of 
Shakespeare. I had put him together […]. Chopped him up and 
glued him. (MLF, 52) 
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This textual creation, however, as Chubb wants Sarah to believe, 
comes to life. “I had brought him forth. […] I imagined someone and he 
came into being” (MLF, 100). The fake becomes original. The lie 
becomes true, a simulacrum of the real. From the moment his creation 
assumes physical presence, Chubb’s life is forever haunted by 
McCorkle. At David Weiss’ funeral – he is claimed to have committed 
suicide over being publicly disgraced – Chubb is physically confronted 
with his brainchild for the first time. When McCorkle begins to recite the 
verses Chubb had composed for him, Chubb is taken aback: 
 
[A] strange and passionate recitation. […] Chubb knew the poem, of 
course, but nothing had prepared him for this performance of it, the 
strange and passionate waving of his free arm, the twisting of the 
head, the eyes rolled back like a blind man playing jazz piano. And 
the voice, which its original author had always imagined to be some 
variation of standard BBC English, was here so fierce and nasal, 
hoarse, ravaged by failure and regret. […] this man was like a 
tethered beast, a wild man inside a cage. […] This was and was not 
the poem Chubb had written. It had been conceived as a parody and 
the first key to the puzzle of the hoax, but this lunatic had somehow 
recast it without altering a word. What had been clever had now 
become true, the song of the autodidact, the colonial, the damaged 
beast of the antipodes. (MLF, 83-84) 
 
The text has come to life, it has emancipated itself from the author 
and it aims at taking revenge for its conception as a fake. McCorkle’s 
revenge consists in kidnapping Chubb’s baby daughter.  
Wherever I am, I have put myself outside your power. I have made 
myself a whole man, almost – except, when I hold this child, I feel 
the weight of everything you stole from me […]. I know exactly what I 
want from you. […] This is a childhood. (MLF, 156) 
 
Chubb pursues the kidnapper into the exotic rainforests of Malaysia 
and its capital Kuala Lumpur. Always keeping track with his creation but 
never being able to get hold of his daughter, who regards McCorkle as 
her true father and rejects Chubb. Any attempt at killing McCorkle fails 
until Chubb is finally able to poison the phantom poet causing his slow 
death. Yet his death does neither liberate Chubb nor gain him back the 
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love of his daughter Tina, instead he lives on enslaved by McCorkle’s 
legacy. 
 
3.3.1) THE DIALECTICS OF (INTER)TEXTUALITY 
 
3.3.1.1) Fact and Fiction as Intertexts 
 
By having Chubb – involuntarily though – creating a human being, 
Carey consciously enters an intertextual dialogue with Mary Shelley’s 
Frankenstein, a connection already implied in the epigraph preceding the 
novel proper chosen from Frankenstein. It is Chubb’s hybris, his 
“fastidiously high standards” (Carey qtd. in Murphy), his perceived 
superiority that predefine his fall. Chubb’s hybris, “[…] the blasphemous 
possibility that he had, with his own pen, created blood and bone and a 
beating heart” (MLF, 155) echoes Frankenstein’s hybris, his “human 
endeavour to mock the stupendous mechanism of the Creator of the 
world” (Shelley, 9). Similarly, Frankenstein’s nemesis parallels Chubb’s. 
“His success would terrify the artist; he would rush away from his odious 
handiwork, horror-stricken” (Shelley, 9). Carey’s other main intertextual 
reference is the historical Ern Malley Hoax from the 1940s.  
Official history and fiction as common intertextual grounds for a 
novel already anticipate the blurriness of the boundaries between truth 
and lie, history and imagination. This double strategy is further replicated 
on a different level. Carey amends his account of the hoax with the 
official trial documents of the Ern Malley affair on the one hand, and on 
the other hand he employs Ern Malley’s poetry as McCorkle’s, a scheme 
he is careful to point out in the author’s note of My Life as a Fake (cf. 
MLF, 273-274). It can be observed, thus, that the merging of fact and 
fiction is at the core of Carey’s undertaking. Simultaneously, he thereby 
stresses the subversion of commonplace truths. The mimetic dogma as 
regards literary representation, i.e. the norm that fiction mirrors reality, is 
reversed by Carey’s reading of the Ern Malley scandal. Reality, that is 
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the court trial, is engendered by fiction, that is the poetry of a fictional 
artist. Thus, in this case it is art that produces reality and not vice versa. 
The reversal of the mimetic principle leads to a collapse of the 
boundaries between fact and fiction rendering them both as nothing but 
textual products. As a result, the only certainty left is the textuality of all 
being, or as Macfarlane labels it, “the textuality of knowledge” 
(Macfarlane, 339). 
My Life as a Fake gains its narrative strength from being composed 
of numerous different discourses on truth, history, fact, lie, memory, 
imagination and fiction. Like Frankenstein’s monster, which is made up 
of different body parts, or McCorkle/Ern Malley moulded from different 
textual sources, Carey’s novel itself is the product of multiple sources, 
which – combined as they are – leave the impression of the complex, the 
intense, as their combination is more than just “the sum of their separate 
parts” (Finney, Chatterton). It has become a new textual entity, only 
echoing its components.  
There has to be noticed an uncanny element in My Life as a Fake, 
which is engendered by the disintegration of boundaries between fact 
and fiction or truth and lie. The reader is not provided with an omniscient 
or normative voice, but is drawn into the various stories only to doubt 
them afterwards again. Carey, as Barnes and Ackroyd, seems to say: 
truth is not accessible, the only access we have to experience the world 
is language, i.e. textuality. 
 
3.3.1.2) Textualising a Life  
 
The fictional poet McCorkle is born from an amalgamation of 
multiple sources both factual and fictional, i.e. of encyclopaedic entries 
and regarding his poetry of lines echoing for instance Pound (cf. 
Murphy). Even more importantly, he is indirectly created by the 
supposedly real letters of his fake sister Beatrice McCorkle (cf. MLF, 41-
42). Again, Carey draws attention to the labyrinth of fact and fiction one 
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cannot withdraw from. In Ashcroft’s words: “both truth and lie, history 
and hoax, are a function of narrative. Both gain life by stories told about 
them. The stories that survive as truth are the stories that best convince 
their audience” (Ashcroft, 28). Furthermore, Ashcroft stresses that how 
“we come to know about a life” (Ashcroft, 32) is based on history or 
memory. Taking into account the textuality of both forms just mentioned, 
James McAuley or any other person that really lived can be regarded as 
textual as Ern Malley (cf. Ashcroft, 32). Most significantly the textuality of 
the simulacrum Ern Malley cannot only be reduced to his poetic 
textuality itself, as it also has a social dimension mediated via Ethel’s 
convincing letters.  
In order to stress the quality of the real in the simulacrum Ern 
Malley, model for Carey’s simulacrum Bob McCorkle, Carey quotes the 
hoaxed editor Max Harris’ convictions in his author’s note to My Life as a 
Fake: 
 
In all simplicity and faith I believed such a person existed, and I 
believed it for many months before the newspapers threw their 
banner headline at me. For me Ern Malley embodies the true sorrow 
and pathos of our time. […] a living person, alone, outside literary 
cliques, outside print, dying outside humanity but of it… (MLF, 274) 
 
The impossibility to distinguish between hoax and reality 
paradoxically provides the basis for Chubb’s creation in the first place 
and in a second step also the ground for his nemesis. Chubb’s nemesis 
turns out to be especially tragic as he “set[s] out to prove the truth” (MLF, 
40) and does not only fail in doing so but, moreover, he contributes to an 
even more blurred version of reality. Instead of making his point by 
means of his own poetry, his failure is furthermore made obvious by his 
creation of a simulacrum which is to supersede his own artistic capacity. 
When the editor Sarah is shown poems written by Chubb himself, she is 
rather disappointed: “If this was his ‘real’ poetry, then I preferred the 
fake. […] Frankly, these dry yellow pages were priggish, self serving, 
snobbish” (MLF, 88). Chubb’s own poetry is not at all convincing. Thus, it 
Peter Carey’s My Life as a Fake 
 104 
is even more tragic that the only thing he would be remembered for are 
fake poems he did not intend to be taken seriously (cf. MLF, 30).  
In an interview with Jessica Murphy, Carey mentioned that he 
started off his novel detesting the hoaxers as they – as he put it in My 
Life as a Fake –  “had preyed on the best, most vulnerable quality an 
editor has to offer. […] that hopeful, optimistic part which has you 
reading garbage for half your life just so you might find, one day before 
you die, a great unknown talent” (MLF, 21). In the course of the novel, 
however, it is the wretched Chubb the reader is most likely to 
sympathise with (cf. Carey qtd. in Murphy). His hoax, conceived with bad 
intentions played back on him, leaving him a haunted, desperate and 
lonely person, unable to use his own creativity for anything else but to 
pursue his simulacral creation. 
“My Life as a Fake also dramatizes and psychologizes the 
competing claims to and anxieties of ownership about a textual creation 
– Chubb’s (the claim of the author), Sarah’s (the claim of the reader) and 
McCorkle’s own (the claim of the text)” (Macfarlane, 343). Who owns the 
text, then? Is it its creator, Chubb? Is it the reader, i.e. Sarah, who 
attributes meaning and thus lets it grow authentic? Or is it McCorkle, 
who has emancipated himself from Chubb? In a postmodern reading it is 
the reader, who gains valorisation as regards the authority over the text. 
Thus, it lies with Sarah to believe or to discard Chubb’s story. Yet, both 
author and text make it almost impossible for her to decide what to 
believe. Is the author Chubb in control of his text and only tricking her 
into his hoax? Has his text, McCorkle, become indeed independent? 
Sarah is torn between trusting Chubb’s narration and trusting her own 
rationality, which turns out to be unreliable itself (cf. MLF, 125-140). 
Sarah “had no understanding yet of what she was flirting with […], [of 
her] vain attempt to establish the true nature of this gigantic man who 
had emerged, so [she] assumed, from the darkest recesses of Chubb’s 
disturbed imagination” (MLF, 86). And also John Slater warns her: “He 
will drag you into his delusional world, and have you believe the most 
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preposterous things” (MLF, 37). Sarah is indeed caught in the narrative 
net Chubb has woven around her. “[T]here was no escaping either the 
teller or the tale” (MLF,81). 
Carey employs the phantom poet McCorkle as an allegory of 
(inter)textuality. The coming to life of a textual construct composed of 
different sources can be understood as analogous to the complexity of a 
human existence. Ironically, Carey lets the text generate a life only to 
prove that all aspects of life are textual.  
McCorkle appropriates and transforms Chubb’s initial fake into 
authentic experience. Yet his awareness that he has originated from a 
fake, a hoax, malicious mischief drives him to hate his creator. “He was 
the joke and the joke cannot love his maker” (MLF, 217). It is also the 
aspect of the joke, the lack of seriousness that prevents Chubb from 
owning up to creation. Rather than ownership it is disgust or alienation 
Chubb feels according to Freud. “An author’s creative power does not 
always obey his will: the work proceeds as it can, and often it presents 
itself to the author as something independent or even alien” (Freud, 
350). McCorkle is Chubb’s brainchild, yet, he is not accepted by him, or 
even worse, he is rejected by his maker. In a Freudian interpretation it 
could be argued that only through the destruction of his father-maker 
Chubb is McCorkle able to develop into a full and emancipated being. It 
has to be noticed that to overcome his father for McCorkle does not 
correspond to overcoming the ‘anxiety of influence’ in a Bloomian sense, 
but to define his identity in a Deleuzian sense of ‘difference’.  
The final defeat of both Chubb and McCorkle, according to a 
Deleuzian line of argumentation, resides in the failure to emancipate 
themselves from each other. Their relationship is one of dependence 
corresponding to the platonic structure of original/good copy and bad 
copy/simulacrum. “You made my life as a joke. […] But where I am, dear 
father – and he spoke this last word so hatefully that Chubb felt all the 
hairs rise on his neck – where I live I am not a joke at all, not a fake in 
any way” (MLF, 155). In order to liberate himself from the stigma of 
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being a simulacrum, McCorkle has to leave Australia, the sphere of his 
maker, and create a world of his own in Malaysia, yet their ultimate 
relationship is one of dependency. The father-son, creator-creation 
discourse is made even more relevant by McCorkle’s attributing his 
publisher David Weiss the mother role, thus having his origins distributed 
between Chubb’s malicious semen and Weiss’ motherly support. “David 
Weiss was like a mother, for he had brought me into the world, had 
given me life… When called a fake he never once doubted me” (MLF, 
81). It is a typically postmodern interest in textuality Carey here draws 
attention to. In order to assume life – in a metaphorical sense – a text 
not only depends on its author but simultaneously also and maybe even 
more importantly on the belief of the reader. 
My Life as a Fake plays with conventional perceptions of truth and 
reality as the fictional McCorkle assumes real presence and claims his 
place in the world, a place it claims from his creator Chubb. The moment 
the fake becomes autonomously real, i.e. is born at the age of 24, the 
real life of his creator Chubb is directed towards decay and desperation. 
Designed to be of the lower middle-class background Chubb so much 
detested, the bicycle mechanic Bob McCorkle is a creature “without the 
protection of the word that comes from living in it” (MLF, 274). 
Involuntarily and completely ignorant of the world McCorkle is thrown at 
the fringes of society. He has assumed real life, has become a real 
person but still feels like a hoax. With rage he addresses his creator 
Chubb to provide him with the only proof of his physical presence valid in 
the sphere of social reality, a birth certificate. It is another subtle hint of 
irony Carey inserts here by suggesting that the proof of reality, of real life 
can only be a textual one. Lines taken from Milton’s Paradise Lost 
already used by Shelley as the epigraph for Frankenstein serve as an 
illustration for McCorkle’s situation: “’Did I request thee, Maker, from my 
clay / To mould me man, Did I solicit thee / From darkness to promote 
me?’ Give me my bloody birth certificate, he said” (MLF, 97).  
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It is the birth certificate that grants McCorkle real existence in 
society. Yet, born at 24, he suffers from the lack of a childhood, a 
childhood he is to regain by means of kidnapping Chubb’s baby 
daughter, “the living principle of Chubb’s art” (Ashcroft, 38). Metaphorical 
for artistic inspiration Chubb’s offspring Tina becomes crucial in his 
ambivalent relationship with McCorkle. With Chubb’s baby, McCorkle 
feels his ability to fill the existential gap his creator has exposed him to. 
“The child, the living principle of Chubb’s art, becomes McCorkle’s child 
and with the aid of this child he proceeds to build a whole country in 
words […]” (Ashcroft, 38). With the help of Tina McCorkle exceeds 
Chubb in creativity and turns into the literary genius whose poetry so 
much fascinates the editor Sarah.  
In panic search for his creativity, Chubb follows McCorkle into the 
rainforests of Malaysia, the exotic setting which McCorkle uses to create 
and explore his own world. Supported by Tina and Mrs. Li, he sets out to 
learn all the possible words of Malaysian reality. “Bob McCorkle has his 
country stolen, she said. He came here, knew no names, nothing. Our 
job has been to gather all the names for him” (MLF, 237). He, who is 
created in language, feels a desparate desire to get in contact with 
words. “I am a poet who does not know the names of things […]” (MLF, 
154).  
Chubb’s own offspring, Tina, when confronted with her father, 
disowns him, metaphorically speaking his creativity disowns him (cf. 
MLF, 227-230). Any link to artistic productivity whatsoever has thus been 
destroyed. He had been imprisoned by hunting for his poetic inspiration 
but at the moment that he found it again, he has to realise that it will 
never be his again.  
 
3.3.1.3) Disrupted Textuality 
 
 The simulacrum McCorkle has become more real than the original 
Chubb. “What a triumph he now was. He had overcome me. I had 
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brought him forth ignorant into the world, but now he knew six 
languages, five of which I never heard of. So learned now […] He was 
the greatest writer ever born” (MLF, 255). Chubb furthermore has to 
realise that McCorkle has emancipated himself so much from his origins 
that Chubb is almost incapable of influencing him in any way. “If I could 
create you, [Chubb] said, did you never fear that I might unmake you 
too?” (MLF, 230). On his chase after McCorkle and Tina through 
Malaysia Chubb follows numerous strategies to ‘unmake’ McCorkle, all 
of which, however, seem to fail. McCorkle appears unapproachable. 
Nevertheless Chubb’s final attempt to ‘unmake’ the phantom poet by 
poisoning him is effective. However, their fate is inseparably linked as 
McCorkle’s perishing requires Chubb’s own death. “I labour all my life to 
make a work of art. And now the end is here, there is only you to give it 
to. My old enemy” (MLF, 262). Their relatioship is based on dependency. 
On his deathbed McCorkle says to Chubb: “I am easy now … We are 
one you and I” (MLF, 262). Chubb, who cynically turns out to be the 
guardian of McCorkle’s legacy, i.e. his own hostile daughter Tina, Mrs Li 
and most importantly McCorkle’s volume of poetry My Life as a Fake, 
only grasps the deeper sense of McCorkle’s last words years later: 
 
I had thought this hatred of me all gone, but recently I have come to 
wonder if, even when he seemed so gentle, he was secretly 
relishing the notion of making me a bicycle mechanic. So like him. 
To trick me into living my own lie-lah? […] Did he wish his fate to be 
mine? (MLF, 263) 
 
 Carey has Chubb live the fate he has designed for his own hoax – 
as a bicycle mechanic in a dirty Kuala Lumpur back street – when 
Sarah’s attention is drawn to him. The first thing she notices about him is 
his desolate state of health. “What struck me most particularly were the 
angry red sores on his sturdy legs” (MLF, 8). Although this first 
encounter to a certain extent already anticipates Chubb’s fate, his death, 
indicated by his poor physical condition, will come about violently. As 
John Updike observes “the ulcerations of Malaysia eat away at his legs” 
(Updike), which are his metaphorical connection to the ground, to reality. 
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Having them slowly rotting away implies Chubb’s loss of connection to 
the real world, his “attracti[ng] the mad” (MLF, 100) and thus indicates 
one of Carey’s subtle hints at the possible unreliability of Chubb’s 
narration. The metaphorical loss of Chubb’s legs as a proof of his 
connection to the real world is furthermore stressed by the Malaysian’s 
antipathy and disgust as regards the Australian poet. For them, 
McCorkle is the real person and Chubb the evil spirit.  
 
‘He come into the street in the middle of the night. Not human, 
Missus. No legs, see?’  
Was I meant to believe Christopher Chubb had somehow floated up 
Jalan Campbell like a figure of Chagall? […] All I understood was 
that Christopher Chubb had seriously alienated his neighbours. 
(MLF, 122) 
 
As opposed to Australia, in the Malaysian reality Chubb has become 
the fake and McCorkle the true poet. Carey highlights the slow 
decomposition of Chubb’s person in his Malaysian surroundings by 
employing numerous metaphors linked to decay. So does Chubb use a 
rubbish bag in order to protect himself from the tropical rain showers. 
 
[Sarah] collided with the human rubbish bag. It had almost been 
comic from the imperial detachment of my room but was not in the 
least amusing on the street. [Sarah] tried to step around that thing, 
but it would not let [her]. From deep in the folds of the plastic, a pair 
of strangely determined eyes confronted [her]. (MLF, 70) 
 
Moreover, Chubb’s old Australian suit, his only link to his home country 
and his status as a serious artist, is completely ruined after being 
cleaned.  
 
[Chubb] reached down to his suit, and I finally understood, watching 
him stroke the lapel, that the process of cleaning had so shocked 
that fabric that it was now broken on the creases, papery and 
crumbling in his hands like the wing of a dead butterfly. (MLF, 102-
103) 
 
The image of dry paper is not only applied to his suit, but also to 
Chubb’s own physical features like voice (cf. MLF, 22, 29), eyelids (cf. 
MLF, 44) and hands (cf. MLF, 101). “The tropics are not kind to paper” 
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(MLF, 27), Chubb comments, when Sarah holds the fragile journal in her 
hands for the first time. Neither are they kind to Chubb himself. It can be 
argued that Chubb represents the papery basis on which McCorkle 
inscribes his poetry. Neither of the two can exist without the other. It is 
significant that Chubb’s murder committed by Tina and Mrs. Li goes 
hand in hand with the loss of access to McCorkle’s exceptional poetry 
(MLF, 266-272). Chubb’s death is the last step in the detextualisation of 
McCorkle’s possible existence. “It would take [Sarah] an awfully long 
time to accept the full extent of the horror […] because [she] had no 
sensible explanation of McCorkle himself” (MLF, 271). Fragmented like 
the truth Sarah felt committed to find out, is finally Chubb’s body. “The 
body of truth, […] dismembered and scattered – in Greek, sparagmos” 
(MLF, 271). 
 
I reached down and felt meat, as raw as in a Chow Kit butcher’s 
shop. Then I saw the soft burr of that beautifully shaped monk’s 
head, and I knew at last what it must be. Sparagmos. This was the 
horror at the poem’s end. The man I had spent the afternoon with 
was now dismembered, his warm blood on my hands and spreading 
like honey across the floor. (MLF, 269)  
 
Chubb, who pasted together his creation McCorkle from the most 
diverse sources, regarding both his poetry and his physical features, is 
now equally disintegrated as the initial components of his fakery. It is the 
multiplicity of sources of all life and its textuality including the 
impossibility to ever gain a unified and true narrative that Carey draws 
attention to. According to Macfarlane the “epistemological blurriness […] 
is part of Carey’s point. My Life as a Fake ends in an ambiguous and 
bloody scene which deliberately unsettles even further the ideas of 
fakery, authenticity and creativity that the novel triangulates” 
(Macfarlane, 338). 
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3.3.2) THE PRECESSION OF THE SIMULACRUM 
 – MCCORKLE’S SUBVERSIVE APPROPRIATION OF REALITY 
 
3.3.2.1) The Simulacrum Writes Back 
 
If one feels inclined – and My Life as a Fake invites to do so – to 
take the novel at least to a certain extent as an allegory of Australian 
(post)colonial history, then Ashcroft’s reading of McCorkle as the 
“embodiment of post-colonial transformation” (Ahscroft, 36) becomes 
comprehensible. McCorkle becomes representative of Australia’s 
yearning for an authentic literary voice in its colonial context and its 
desire to be taken seriously in the literary world. It is the desire of a 
fringe culture to be taken for full by the literary canon of the centre. 
“Australia has an unusually rich and messy history of literary fakery” 
Macfarlane argues and explains this “susceptibility [to hoaxing and 
fakery as stemming] from Australian culture’s desperation to be 
recognized as a producer of authentic literature and not just as its 
consumer” (Macfarlane, 340). 
When Slater mentions Chubb’s literary hoax to Sarah for the first 
time, he points out the fragility of the Australian cultural self-esteem. He 
compares Chubb’s hoax with a comparable situation in Britain and 
makes his point by suggesting that hoaxes happening in Britain would 
never have the same resonance as in Australia.  
 
My point is that a prank’s a prank and [the hoaxer] wasn’t going to 
pull the whole of English culture down around our ears. Whereas if 
you take a country like Australia, you see the whole thing is much 
more fragile […] This all takes place in 1946. Imagine – twenty-four 
years after The Waste Land. You’d think the battles had been fought 
and the dead buried […]. (MLF, 19) 
 
Slater relates this cultural vulnerability to Australia’s geographical 
position. “[T]his is the country of the duck-billed platypus. When you are 
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cut off from the rest of the world, things are bound to develop in 
interesting ways” (MLF, 19). Slater characterises Chubb like most of 
Australian society of that time as “[o]f a horrible prim, self-righteous sort” 
(MLF, 19). Being at the fringe of literary activities, the Australian public is 
depicted as far more restrictive than its cultural ‘original’ Britain. The 
cultural position on the fringe is doubly fragile. On the one hand, the 
simulacrum Australia suffers from the lack of an own authentic and 
independent voice and, on the other hand, it is more conservative than 
the centre itself. It is highly cynical that Carey has an authentic 
Australian literary voice, i.e. that of McCorkle, developed out of a 
miscarried hoax by a conservative, whose intention it was to “prove the 
truth [which] was dead and rotting” (MLF, 40) due to the anti-
conservative developments involved in modernism, which had belatedly 
entered Australian avant-garde circles. Initially, McCorkle’s ‘antipodean’ 
voice is an accident, unintended and designed as a parody. Through his 
endeavour of emancipation from his creator his voice devoid of any 
parodic element becomes authentic. “It had been conceived as a parody 
[…], but this lunatic had somehow recast it without altering a word. What 
had been clever had now become true, the song of the autodidact, the 
colonial, the damaged beast of the antipodes” (MLF, 84). In this context 
Ashrcoft argues with Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of ‘minor literature’, 
which represents “a political transgression, embodied not in the content 
but in the voice” (Ashcroft, 33). McCorkle’s voice has made the 
underlying lie become true and authentic and Carey thus once more 
highlights the “narrative function of truth and the ambivalence of lies” 
(Ashcroft, 28). 
Chubb’s detestation of Australia’s provinciality is furthermore 
substantiated by his own social background, the narrow minded world of 
the petite bourgoisie which he always attempted to flee from by means 
of his great learning. 
“[Chubb] had been born into a second-rate culture, or so he thought 
[…] – a terror that he might somehow be tricked into admiring the 
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second-rate, the derivate, the shallow, the provincial” (MLF, 86-87). His 
malevolent revenge on society consists in the creation of a textual 
simulacrum whom he grants exactly the same social background he 
himself is so much disgusted by. McCorkle, on the other hand – thrown 
into this life without support –, soaks in as much as possible of this world 
Chubb so much detests and subverts it into textuality – though 
incomprehensible by the mind – of unbelievable beauty. If Australia is 
understood as a second-rate culture, it has been empowered through 
McCorkle’s voice, which has transformed the derivate, the fake into the 
authentic. 
Chubb’s own voice, which is oriented towards canonical standards, 
is defined as “[f]ormally very rigorous” (MLF, 18). According to Slater, 
representing the literary centre, Chubb is “[a] very serious provincial 
academic poet, committed to a life of envy and disappointment” (MLF, 
18). The paradoxical tragedy for Chubb is that his attempt to give truth a 
new standing results in a complete blurriness of truth, which does not 
allow the reader to believe in his words. 
Another interesting aspect Carey draws attention to is the discursive 
construction of monstrosity as an intertextual product regarding 
McCorkle and in a wider sense also Australia itself. When Slater refers 
to the platypus as an archetypical Australian animal (cf. MLF, 18), he 
thereby intends to stress its specific peculiarity of being made up of parts 
which appear as belonging to various different animals, yet it is a single 
unique living being. McCorkle is made up of different parts in a double 
sense as his poetry is composed from various different sources and his 
appearance is shaped by the physical features of three different men.  
The plurality of sources as the basis for any creation can 
furthermore be seen in relation to the novel’s most prominent fictional 
intertext Frankenstein. In her author’s introduction to Frankenstein 
Shelley notes that “[i]nvention, it must be humbly admitted, does not 
consist in creating out of void, but out of chaos” (Shelley, 8). It can be 
argued that Carey takes Frankenstein as a sort of hypotext, which 
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provides the basis for his own hypertext. There are numerous parallels 
between the two novels. And Carey even explicitly commens on 
intended analogies. 
There’s a scene very early in Frankenstein where the creature is 
glimpsed leaning from crag to crag. I thought, if this were taking 
place in Australia, it wouldn’t be icy crag to crag. It would be tropical. 
And, of course, in Frankenstein, that scene does not take place in 
Britain, the reader’s home country but in Europe. I started to think 
about a chase scene, and the geography for it. (Ackroyd qtd. in 
Murphy) 
 
It has to be noticed, however, that Carey develops his monster 
further than Shelley did with her creature. In My Life as a Fake McCorkle 
starts off as a monster, unloved and feared like Frankenstein’s creation. 
However, he is able to get back at his creator, i.e. he even supersedes 
his creator in being a more authentic human being. While Frankenstein’s 
monster is caught in its own monstrosity, McCorkle is partly able to 
emancipate himself and to start embracing life with an eagerness, which 
is expressed by his urge to learn all the words possible of his world, 
Malaysia, where he is taken as the original. 
Carey, making use of Ern Malley’s poetry, lets McCorkle appropriate 
the lines and by doing so he has, according to Ashcroft, “Bob McCorkle, 
and hence Ern Malley, [be] a surprising figure of colonial resistance” 
(Ashcroft, 36). “Now I find that once more I have shrunk / To an 
interloper, robber of dead men’s dream […] I am still / The black swan of 
trespass on alien waters” (MLF, 84). Yet this colonial resistance, which 
empowers the colonial subject McCorkle/Australia as ‘interloper’ and 
‘robber’ to take advantage of the decaying hegemony of the literary 
canon of the centre, is not a joyful one. It is a melancholic acceptance of 
the impossibility of the fringe to become part of the centre, “The Tyranny 
of Distance” (MLF, 30).  
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3.3.2.2) Making is Faking – History and Memory as Discursive Simulacra 
 
The conception of memory, and thus also history as an equally 
textual product, as fallible is placed by Carey in the novel’s framing plot, 
which leads Sarah to follow the aging poet Slater to Malaysia in the first 
place. She perceives the journey as a means to commit Slater to own up 
to the role he played in her mother’s suicide decades ago.  
 
I cannot say that I understood his role in my parent’s marriage, and 
only when my mother killed herself […] did I suspect that something 
was amiss. In the last minutes of her life I saw John Slater put his 
arms around her and finally I understood, or thought I did. From that 
moment I hated everything about him. (MLF, 3)  
 
It is Sarah’s understanding of the events going on around her that 
Carey highlights in this paragraph taken right from the novel’s beginning. 
The narrative device of uncertainty employed underlines that her 
narration will not be omniscient, but rather unreliable. The idea that she 
“finally […] understood, or thought [she] did” (MLF,3) is the first hint at 
Sarah’s being biased, i.e. her incapacity to judge events objectively, both 
as a narrator of her own life as well as the possible editor of Chubb’s or 
rather McCorkle’s extraordinary poetry. 
Sarah is thus a first person unreliable narrator on a quest for truth. 
As regards Slater she already has her prefabricated version of history 
written in her mind, i.e. that her mother committed suicide over an 
unhappy love affair with Slater. The editor departs from her own 
standards as regards truth and lie and history and imagination. Yet, 
these standards, and her apparent sovereignty in setting them up, are 
severely shaken in the course of the novel.  
“I loathe dishonesty.” This is how Chubb introduces his narration. 
“So you see how bad it is that what I am remembered for is a fake” 
(MLF, 30). And indeed, it is a daring first sentence to be articulated by a 
hoaxer. For Sarah, however, the nature of his story appears to be of no 
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importance at all until she is finally “struggling in a web of mystery” which 
results in a nervous breakdown (cf. MLF, 272). The collapse of her own 
personal history, which she has to acknowledge as faked by her own 
memory, represents the collapse of her personal access to her own 
private truth. When this access is lost, Sarah’s identity becomes fragile 
and she is more and more drawn into Chubb’s narration. “[I]n truth I had 
no interest in his story at all. All I wished was to read that fragment 
again, as he well knew, and so I must endure his tale” (MLF, 124). The 
longer the tale goes on, the more intrigued Sarah is by the ambivalences 
of Chubb’s personality. “One minute I would be filled with pity and the 
next with such intense dislike that I could only shudder” (MLF, 125).  
Carey exploits this ambivalence towards Chubb in order to create 
and hold up the enormous narrative intensity of My Life as a Fake. 
However, for Sarah it is not only Chubb’s ambivalence or her 
impossibility to judge the truth of his tale, but even more the coming to 
terms with the ambivalences in her own biography, in her personal 
history, which she so long had refused to acknowledge.  
When Slater is finally willing to talk about the past telling Sarah that 
her mother had killed herself because of her father’s homoerotic 
flirtatiousness, Sarah is devastated (cf. MLF, 124-135). “Please don’t tell 
me lies, I said. I can bear whatever it is so long as I know it is the truth” 
(MLF, 128). Sarah has to painfully realise that “everything [she] had 
assumed about [her] life was incorrect, that [she] had been baptised in 
blood and raised on secrets and misconstructions […]” (MLF, 136). 
Carey has Sarah’s life based on lies, i.e. a fake version of truth. She has 
to admit the constructed nature of her own past and thus ‘her own life as 
a fake’.  
Chubb’s possible unreliability as a narrator of his tale is thus 
equalled by Sarah’s unreliability as regards her own life. Carey’s focus 
on the constructedness of experience or more specifically on the 
textuality of experience becomes palpable in this approximation of both 
narratives. While Chubb’s tale counteracts any rational analysis, Sarah’s 
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‘true’ tale has been repressed by her rationality. The conception of the 
malleability of memory turns out to be programmatic for Carey. But he 
does not stop at this stage but rather takes the idea further by declaring 
our entire experience including the so-called ‘objective’ sphere of history 
as malleable by textuality, which Ashcroft subtly summarises: 
 
The hoax played on [Sarah] by memory is a counterpoint to the 
McCorkle hoax, and operates in a cunning way: the lie of Sarah’s 
memory is superseded by Slater’s ‘true’ story, while the ‘lie’ of 
McCorkle’s poetry, is superseded by the novelist’s ‘true’ story – the 
real McCorkle! McCorkle is given life by the test, his truth is the ‘lie’ 
of Carey’s narrative. (Ashcroft, 37). 
 
It is significant that Carey has on both structure and content level the 
two narrative strands, i.e. Sarah’s narration and Chubb’s narration, 
merge into one, as Sarah increasingly gets involved in Chubb’s fate. 
Additionally, the impression of approximation of both tales is furthermore 
intensified when looking at parallels between Sarah and McCorkle. It can 
be argued that Sarah, due to her loss of trust in her own memory, 
becomes equally shaken in her identity construction as the simulacrum 
McCorkle, who was never granted a memory in the first place. “[A] 
visible past” and “a visible myth of origin” are, according to Baudrillard, 
the prerequisites for being able to bear up to the future (Baudrillard, 
Simulacra, 6-7). It is the deconstruction of a reliable past in Sarah’s case 
and the futile attempt to construct a past on McCorkle’s part that 
summarises the ambivalent nature of memory: memory is constitutional 
for forming one’s personal identity. Paradoxically, the insight into the 
constructedness, i.e. the textuality of memory and the consequent 
disintegration of an apparently coherent narrative as regards one’s own 
personal history in turn renders indentity construction highly problematic. 
Apart from the intended maze of truth and lie, Carey’s experiment in 
provoking the creation of a life out of mere texuality is successful and so 
is his main argument, i.e. that the authentic can result out of the fake. In 
McCorkle’s case the signs for the real have substituted the real (cf. 
Baudrillard, Simulacra, 2), leaving him a simulacrum. Yet in his 
Peter Carey’s My Life as a Fake 
 118 
eagerness to approach and create his world, he has superseded 
Chubb’s disgust with reality and thus appears to be in closer contact with 
reality than his original. It can be argued that Carey’s simulacrum 
oscillates between a Baudrillardian conception of the simulacrum as 
having preceded its original and a Deleuzian construction which argues 
the simulacrum not as derivate which has become independent but as 
different in the first place. In any case, however, it has to be noticed that 
McCorkle and Chubb are inseparably interlinked, two sides of one and 
the same textual coin.  
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4 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
Postmodern metafictional texts have often been criticised for their  – 
sometimes exaggerated – focus on theoretical concerns. It has been 
argued for instance by Macfarlane that storytelling is at constant risk of 
being sacrificed in favour of highly intellectual constructions. Ergo, he 
sees both My Life as a Fake and England, England in danger of 
“paralyzing [their] own literary intelligence” (Macfarlane, 343). Other 
objections sustained as regards the metafictional genre relate to the risk 
of falling prey to oversimplifying complex contemporary theories on 
reality as emphasised by Pateman (cf. Pateman, 79). Of course, 
criticism of this kind is legitimate and comprehensible, yet 
simultaneously, the strong aspect of self-reflection including the implicit 
or explicit thematisation of theoretical preconceptions forms part of the 
aesthetic prerequesite of postmodern metafiction.  
It is the constructedness of reality, which provides the common 
grounds for the novels discussed. Their application of basic postmodern 
aesthetic principles has been analysed as stressing the fragmented, the 
plural and most dominantly the ambivalent. The enlightened myth of 
origins and originality is called into question and consequently all three 
novels are intrigued by the textuality of life. This underlying assumption 
leads Barnes, Ackroyd and Carey to investigate further into the sphere of 
all-embracing textuality.  
The three different approaches to (de)constructing authentic 
experience highlight postmodern plurality. While Barnes by means of 
satire follows his novel’s undertaking of constructing an alternative reality 
by means of selecting, inventing and rearranging history in bits and 
pieces, Ackroyd sets out from the opposite direction to investigate the 
same issue. Contrary to England, England, which aims at constructing a 
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future reality, Chatterton, by means of presenting various competing 
versions of one and the same event, focuses on the deconstruction of a 
past presented as omnipotent. Thus, both authors bring about the 
artificiality of reality, that is, the textuality of reality. Moreover, they 
therewith highlight their doubts about the strict separation between the 
spheres of art and reality as they reveal that both spheres are equally 
constructed in language.  
Peter Carey’s contribution in this deliberation on origins and 
originality is less characterised by an attempt to construct or deconstruct 
(past) realities but My Life as a Fake is rather concerned with the daring 
conception of a reality that becomes independent from its own 
constructed basis. The author thus offers an even more blurred entry to 
the debate on textuality, art and reality.  
In short, the three authors ask different questions all of which are 
circling around the ontology of reality. Barnes centres on the aspect of 
what is needed to construct reality, Ackroyd accentuates what becomes 
crucial regarding a deconstruction of reality, and Carey finally elaborates 
on the emancipatory potentional of a text: What if a textual reality frees 
itself from its own constructed basis? Is the ‘obviously constructed’ the 
most ‘authentic’ we can access? 
It is thus a highly theoretical background the novelists aim at tackling 
in their individual texts. Barnes and Ackroyd seem to balance the weight 
of theory with an enourmous extent of postmodern play, which appears 
to be almost automatically involved when it comes to postmodern self-
reflection. Carey, on the other hand, seems to discard the ludic element 
in favour of the uncanny or the irrational. His novel exhibits a high level 
of theoretical awareness, yet his mode of storytelling healthily contrasts 
Barnes’ and Ackroyd’s parodic approaches.  
It can thus be argued that the collection of novels analysed in this 
study form a net of variations of one single issue, i.e. the 
constructedness of origins and originality. Barnes has his most ironic 
construction of the theme park England, England, that is the 
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sociocultural undertaking of creating a convincing reality, framed by 
meditations on identity construction. This identity construction is based 
on memory when related to the individual, as Barnes’ highly cynical 
protagonist Martha proves, and it is based on collective memory, 
commonly called ‘history’, as regards the nation. 
Ackroyd deliberates on the constructedness of history and original 
art, but furthermore also on the hypocrisy of a literary system, which 
claims its ability to distinguish between good and bad art, meaning 
original and faked art. Yet, when Ackroyd, full of artistic self-reflection, 
has his plagiariser Harriet expose her knowledge of the fake Seymours 
to the gallerists Cumberland and Maitland, who authenticated the 
paintings fearing both public ridicule and financial loss, it becomes clear 
that the lines between true and faked art are not to be drawn in an 
aesthetic sense, only in a pseudo-moral one. Authenticity and beauty lie 
in the eye of the beholder. 
The idea of authenticity as lying in the eye of the beholder becomes 
even more relevant when related to Carey’s My Life as a Fake and his 
textual simulacrum McCorkle. McCorkle’s existence and his authenticity 
rely on readerly belief, i.e. the eye of the beholder. By basing his novel 
on the most peculiar historical circumstances, Carey’s text focuses on 
the ambivalence of experience and the contradictory nature of reality. 
His experimentation with the emancipation of a text from its author 
becomes highly provocative when paralleled to the novel’s historical 
basis, the Ern Malley Hoax, and the relative prominence Ern Malley’s 
poetry gained in Australian literary history compared to the hoaxers’ 
‘authentic’ poetry. 
Carey shows that the mimetic principle can be subverted. It is not 
only reality that engenders fiction but also vice versa, fiction generates 
reality.  
Plato, Deleuze and Baudrillard have been cited as philosophers who 
aim at providing an applicable theoretical frame for cultural analysis, and 
here specifically for analysing the simulacrum, a representation of the 
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real, which claims to be real and is indistinguishable from the real. The 
concept of the simulacrum has proven to be a useful category when 
looking at postmodern novels which negotiate the real and the fake. 
Applied to the texts discussed the simulacrum assumes presence. 
Barnes’ faked England, England becomes the simulacrum of 
contemporary England and furthermore a most self-consciously parodic 
amalgamation of postmodern theories on contemporary consumer 
culture. Especially Baudrillard’s theory of the order of the simulacra 
becomes palpable yet also endangered of being oversimplified, as 
Pateman suggested. 
Ackroyd negotiates the relationship between the real and the fake in 
the sphere of art and thus reaches the conclusion that a differentiation 
between the real and the simulacrum pretending to be the real can only 
be futile as reality itself is accessible through textuality only. Language 
itself, it can be argued, is the universal simulacrum of reality, which 
renders us to live in a state of hyperreality, as Baudrillards laments. In 
contrast to Baudrillard, Ackroyd appears to argue that the loss of access 
to reality is not engendered by our age of information culture. Rather, it 
is constitutional to textuality as such. We have never had access to 
reality except through language creating the simulacrum of reality. 
Carey’s approach to textuality and the simulacrum is charaterised by 
a desire to become authentic by means of difference. If McCorkle’s 
poetry is to be regarded as a textual simulacrum of Chubb’s, then it is 
one governed by the principle of difference, as Deleuze’s theory 
suggests. McCorkle’s poetry is the same as Chubb’s poetry and yet it is 
not. It is McCorkle’s own voice that makes it different. Similarity and 
difference are the basic conceptions Deleuze uses for his attempt to 
reverse the Platonic triadic structure of the original, the good copy and 
the bad copy, the simulacrum. McCorkle is able to emancipate himself 
from Chubb, but only to a certain extent. Finally, their relationship is one 
of deep dependence and Deleuze’s theory cannot be applied. 
 Conclusion 
 123 
It has been claimed that philosophical theory trying to account for 
contemporary reality helps to underline the postmodern concerns of the 
three novels and vice versa, yet their relationship has to be regarded as 
rather loose. It is not the novels’ purpose to emphasise contemporary 
theory, but their focus is a self-conscious reflection on contemporary 
experience.  
This contemporary experience is governed by mistrust in claims of 
objectivity and coherence. Neither is it possible by means of apparently 
objective historical research to retrieve a prime moment of origin, nor is a 
concept of originality sustainable which denies its obligation to traces of 
other cultural products. The trace becomes emblematic for contemporary 
experience and together with it also intertextuality, that is the 
interdependence of all life, which can be regarded as the living principle 
of art. 
It is a quest for authenticity which is thematised in the three novels. 
This quest is exemplified on a national and private level in England, 
England. It is stressed as a problematisation of one’s own authentic 
artistic voice as regards for instance Harriet and Philip but also 
Chatterton himself in Chatterton, and it is accentuated in My Life as a 
Fake both on an artistic level as well as on a sociocultural level, as 
McCorkle can either be read as the postmodern valorisation of the 
reader, which has the text undergo a process of emancipation from the 
author, or McCorkle can be read as allegorical for Australia in its 
postcolonial striving for its own cultural voice. 
It has been argued that the three novels and their close affinity to 
processes of (de)construction deal with the awkward quality of historical 
representation. Ackroyd and Carey already stress this interest by 
choosing historiographic metafiction as their narrative genre. Instead of 
focusing on a historical event and its consequent narrative 
destabilisation, Barnes, stressing the content level of his novel, creates 
the outrageously constructed vision of a future only to prove its 
dependency on an equally constructed past. 
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The problematisation of history goes hand in hand with the 
problematisation of personal memory on the part of the individual. 
Accordingly Barnes and Carey develop their protagonists. In England, 
England it is Martha’s consciousness of the limited objectivity her own 
memory grants that makes it impossible for her to develop an authentic 
identity, too many doubts and contradictions constrain her biography. 
Carey thematises two further approaches to one’s own memory, which, 
however, fail in a successful identity construction as well. Sarah’s trust in 
her own memory is shaken when she hears an alternative version of her 
own past. This experience extremely unsettles her and the nervous 
breakdown she suffers from at the end of Carey’s novel indicates her 
incapacity to regain control over her memory. Sarah’s failure is 
contrasted with McCorkle’s craving for experience and memory. For him, 
it is his lack of memory that makes a positive identity construction 
impossible. The problematisation of memory and thus also history as 
regards the construction of authentic experience as an individual and as 
a collective becomes metaphoric for postmodern experience in terms of 
being governed by paradox and contradiction, as Hutcheon stresses (cf. 
Hutcheon, Poetics). Concluding from the novels, it can be argued that 
the potential of postmodern authenticity does not reside in the possibility 
of a coherent narrative, but in the admission of breaks, clashes, 
ambivalences and inconsistencies and their consequent reworking. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Der kritischen Auseinandersetzung mit Epistemen der Aufklärung 
wird in der postmodernen Kultur- und Literaturtheorie ein zentraler 
Stellenwert eingeräumt. Insbesondere das sich wandelnde Verständnis von 
Konzepten wie Ursprung und Originalität lässt den erkenntnistheoretischen 
Bruch zwischen Aufklärung und Postmoderne deutlich werden.  Während 
in konventioneller humanistischer Denktradition mit dem Gedanken an 
Ursprünglichkeit Konzepte wie Beginn, Reinheit und Authentizität 
gleichgesetzt werden, verwickeln postmoderne Denkansätze diese 
Konzepte in einen Dialog mit ihren traditionellen Gegenentwürfen. So kann 
beispielsweise die Diskussion über künstlerische Originalität nur unter 
gleichzeitiger Einbeziehung von Kopie, Plagiat oder Fälschung erfolgen.  
Die Ambivalenz und Vielschichtigkeit postmoderner Erfahrung steht 
oft im Zentrum der Werke postmoderner Autoren, so auch in den 
metafiktionalen Erzählungen von Julian Barnes, Peter Ackroyd und Peter 
Carey, deren narrative Wirkungskraft sich aus der Dekonstruktion 
traditionell antagonistischer Paare wie Realität und Fiktion/Textualität, 
Original und Kopie, Wahrheit und Lüge entwickelt. Während Julian Barnes 
sich in seinem satirischen Roman England, England insbesondere der 
Konstruktion von Geschichte und der Schaffung einer artifiziellen Realität 
widmet, hebt Peter Ackroyd in Chatterton die (Un-) Möglichkeit 
künstlerischer Originalität bzw. die Bedingungen kreativen Schaffens 
hervor. Auch Peter Carey siedelt die Handlung seines Romans My Life as 
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a Fake im literarischen Bereich an. Wird Literatur generell gerne als 
möglicher Spiegel der Wirklichkeit angesehen, so wird in Carey’s 
Erzählung eine Wirklichkeit verhandelt, die erst durch Textualität enstehen 
kann.  
Der spezifisch postmoderne Zugang zu Entwürfen von Ursprung und 
Originalität, den besagte Autoren auf unterschiedliche Weise 
repräsentieren, ergibt sich aus dem Zulassen und der mitunter ironischen 
Neuverhandlung von Brüchen, Abhängigkeiten, Ambivalenzen und 
Widersprüchlichkeiten menschlicher Erfahrung. 
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